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Abstract 
 
Industrialized society is linked to the transport of hazardous materials by road and rail, 
among other. During transportation, accidents may occur and propagate among the 
tankers leading to severe fires, explosion or toxic dispersions. This may increase the 
level of individual and social risk associated to those activities, since the transport 
network often crosses densely populated area. The escalation of a primary event, in this 
case the fire, is typically denoted as domino effect, and the triggered secondary events 
typically are amplified. 
In the framework of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) transportation, severe fire and 
explosion hazards are associated to the possible catastrophic rupture of tankers, which 
may be induced by domino effect of accidental fires. Heat resistant coatings may 
protected tankers against the fire, reducing the heat load that reaches the tank shell wall 
and the lading. Indeed, the rupture is the result of the double effect of thermal weakening 
of the tank material and the increasing pressure due to LPG evaporation. However, this 
protection systems are not ideal and undergo defects due to both material degradation 
and accidental damage. Therefore, protection may be ineffective. The present work is 
aimed at characterizing the performance of defective coatings. 
The first part of the work is devoted to the characterization of past accidents occurred 
in the framework of road and rail transportation of hazardous materials. The ARIA and 
MHIDAS databases are adopted as data sources, identifying 245 road and 220 rail 
accidents involving hazardous materials. The analysis highlighted the importance of 
protecting tank from heat load to avoid the rupture and related severe scenario. For these 
reasons, in North America the installation of a heat resistant coating is used to protect 
dangerous good tankers from accidental fire exposure. In Europe, ADR and RID 
regulations govern transnational transport of hazardous materials by road and by rail, 
respectively, and still not include any section about thermal protection systems of 
tankers.  
Possible concerns related to the installation of these systems is due presence of defects 
that may be formed accidentally in the fireproofing layer. It is therefore important to 
establish what level of defect is acceptable in order to avoid the failure of tankers, in the 
prospective of a wider implementation of tankers fire protections in the European 
framework. Since large scale bonfire tests are expensive and difficult to be carried out 
in order to verify the thermal protections adopted, modelling the behaviour of 
pressurized insulated tankers when exposed to the fire is a possible solution to test the 
adequateness of defective protections. 
In order to describe the thermal behaviour of real scale LPG tanks exposed to fire, a 
lumped model (namely, ‘RADMOD’) and a Finite Elements Model (FEM) are 
developed. The models are validated against available experimental data and allow 
predicting the thermal behaviour of tankers with defective coating when exposed to fire, 
with the aim to assess the thermal protection performance. The phenomena taking place 
through the vessel in presence of defects are investigated and characterized, in order to 
reproduce the experimental data on thermal behaviour of defective thermal protection 
systems exposed to fire. 
The FEM model allows to determine the wall temperature profile and the stress 
distribution over the vessel, determining, in the end, a critical defect size that lead to the 
tank failure, with respect different fire conditions. A sensitivity analysis is performed 
on the FEM model in order to identify the parameters that mostly affect the heat 
 
 
 
exchanges of the system. This analysis highlights the main relevance of the flame 
temperature against other parameters, such as convective heat transfer coefficients and 
emissivity of flame and steel. 
The complex analysis performed by FEM model, requires high computational times, 
which may be prohibitive when a wide number of runs is required. The RADMOD code 
is a simplified lumped model, which allows to assess the behaviour, among other, of the 
pressure and the fluid temperature with lower, and thus acceptable, computational time. 
Another plus of the RADMOD model is that it can be run for a wide range of materials, 
substances, geometries and fire scenario, estimating a conservative but credible time to 
failure of the tank. The novel mathematical code for defective thermal protection system 
is added to the previous version of the RADMOD model, which was implemented for 
unprotected or completely coated tanks, thus all the phenomena related to the defect 
enclosure are characterised. In addition, other phenomena, already present in the 
RADMOD model, are revised to enhance the potentiality of the code. The comparison 
of results with available experimental data on small-scale shows that the model 
proposed in this thesis work can reasonably predict the thermal response. The 
application of the modelling tool to different geometries is performed considering real-
scale defects. Thus, several case-studies were defined in order to reproduce medium- 
and large-scale tanks varying a few parameters, such as defect size and liquid filling 
level, for testing the reproducibility of the new model. The results from the case studies 
highlight the potentiality and the flexibility of the RADMOD code in modelling the 
thermal response. 
The ultimate goal would be to apply the data collected from RADMOD code about 
temperature and pressure of lading, as boundary condition in the FEM model for an 
improved modelling of thermal behaviour of real-scale LPG tanks in fire scenarios even 
if there is a defective thermal protection system.  
 
 
 
Sommario 
 
La società industrializzata è inevitabilmente legata al trasporto di sostanze pericolose 
che, tra le altre modalità, viaggiano giornalmente su strada e su rotaia. Durante questi 
trasporti, esiste la possibilità che si verifichino incedenti con sviluppo d’incendio, in 
questi casi le fiamme possono estendersi alle cisterne e provocare altri incendi, severe 
esplosioni o dispersioni tossiche. L’esistenza di queste casualità nel trasporto di 
materiali pericolosi porta ad un aumento del livello di rischio associato a tali attività, 
sul piano del rischio individuale e sociale, visto che la rete dei trasporti attraversa spesso 
aree densamente popolate. L’escalation di un evento primario, in questo caso l’incendio, 
è generalmente indicata come effetto domino, e gli eventi secondari che vengono 
innescati sono tipicamente amplificati.  
Nell’ambito del trasporto di gas di petrolio liquefatti (GPL), gravi incendi e severe 
esplosioni possono verificarsi a seguito della rottura catastrofica della cisterna, causata, 
ad esempio, dall’effetto domino di incendi accidentali. Un modo per proteggere la 
cisterna da tali eventualità potrebbe essere installare un rivestimento termico sul 
serbatoio. Questo ridurrebbe il calore ricevuto sia dalle pareti della cisterna che dal 
fluido al suo interno, ottenendo un duplice effetto protettivo. Infatti, le cause che portano 
alla rottura della cisterna sono due: l’alta temperatura raggiunta delle pareti, che 
indebolisce termicamente i materiali di costruzione, e l’aumento della pressione interna 
dovuto all’evaporazione del GPL. Tuttavia, questi sistemi di protezione termica non 
sono ideali e sono soggetti alla formazione di difetti, che possono essere dovuti sia alla 
degradazione del materiale stesso che a danneggiamenti accidentali del coibente. 
Pertanto, l’azione di protezione può risultare inefficace. Lo scopo del presente lavoro è 
quello di caratterizzare le prestazioni dei rivestimenti termici affetti dalla presenza di 
questi difetti. 
La prima parte del lavoro è dedicata allo studio di incidenti avvenuti in passato 
nell’ambito del trasporto stradale e ferroviario di sostanze pericolose. I dati sono raccolti 
da due diversi database: ARIA e MHIDAS; identificando 245 incidenti stradali e 220 
incidenti ferroviari in cui sono stati coinvolti materiali pericolosi. L’analisi evidenzia 
l’incidentalità delle rotture dovute ad incendi esterni e la gravità degli scenari associati 
alla rottura dei serbatoi pressurizzati. Per queste ragioni, in Nord America le cisterne 
adibite al trasporto di sostanze pericolose vengono equipaggiate con rivestimenti termici 
in grado di proteggerle dall’esposizione al fuoco. Al contrario, le regolamentazioni 
europee sul trasporto stradale e ferroviario, rispettivamente gli accordi ADR e RID, non 
prevedono ancora nessuna sezione sui sistemi di protezione termica delle cisterne. 
Una problematica relativa all’installazione di tali sistemi è legata proprio alla possibile 
formazione di difetti nello strato termico protettivo. Quindi, stabilire quale livello di 
difetto può considerarsi accettabile per evitare la rottura del serbatoio, risulta importante 
sia dal punto di vista della sicurezza ed anche nella prospettiva di una più ampia 
implementazione di questi sistemi nel panorama europeo. Per testare l’adeguatezza delle 
protezioni termiche in presenza di difetti si può ricorrere ad esperimenti su grande-scala 
di serbatoi incendiati. Poiché tali esperimenti sono molto costosi e difficili da realizzare, 
una delle possibili alternative è modellarne il comportamento tramite software specifici. 
 
 
 
In questo studio sono implementati due diversi modelli, al fine di descrivere la risposta 
termica dei serbatoi GPL incendiati su grande-scala: un modello a parametri concentrati 
(chiamato ‘RADMOD’) ed un modello ad elementi finiti (FEM). Entrambi sono validati 
a fronte di dati sperimentali e consentono di predire il comportamento delle cisterne 
coibentate esposte al fuoco, con l’obbiettivo di valutare la prestazione della protezione 
termica difettata. Per permettere la modellazione di tale problema tutti i fenomeni ad 
esso legati sono prima analizzati e caratterizzati. 
Il modello FEM esegue un’analisi avanzata tramite la quale è possibile calcolare, in 
funzione di diverse condizioni di incendio, i profili termici delle pareti e la distribuzione 
delle tensioni sul serbatoio, determinando, infine, una dimensione critica del difetto 
capace di portare alla rottura della cisterna. In questo studio il modello FEM viene 
utilizzato al fine di identificare i parametri che maggiormente influiscono sugli scambi 
di calore del sistema, tramite l’esecuzione di un’analisi di sensitività. I risultati 
dell’analisi evidenziano la rilevanza della temperatura di fiamma come parametro nella 
risposta termica, a fronte di altre variabili come i coefficienti di scambio convettivo o 
l’emissività della fiamma e dell’acciaio. 
Le simulazioni eseguite con il modello FEM sono complesse e richiedono tempi di 
calcolo elevati che possono risultare proibitivi, ad esempio quando sono richieste 
simulazioni multiple. Per questo motivo viene implementato un secondo modello: il 
modello RADMOD. RADMOD, infatti, è un modello semplificato che permette di 
determinare l’andamento della temperatura del fluido e della pressione nel serbatoio, 
con tempi di calcolo minori e, quindi, accettabili. Un altro vantaggio di RADMOD è 
quello di riuscire a simulare diversi tipi di materiali, sostanze, geometrie e scenari 
d’incendio, stimando un tempo di cedimento della cisterna conservativo ma comunque 
credibile. In questo studio, il codice per la simulazione di sistemi coibenti difettati viene 
implementato ed aggiunto alla precedente versione del modello RADMOD, sviluppata 
solo per la simulazione di serbatoi non protetti o completamente coibentati. Quindi, tutti 
i fenomeni legati alla presenza del difetto vengono prima caratterizzati e poi modellati 
all’interno del codice; ed alcuni fenomeni già presenti nel modello vengono rivisitati 
per aumentarne le potenzialità. Il confronto dei risultati ottenuti dal codice con i dati 
sperimentali su piccola-scala, evidenzia la potenzialità del modello RADMOD nel 
prevedere la risposta termica di tali sistemi. Successivamente il codice è applicato a 
diversi difetti, considerando geometrie reali. Vengono, quindi, definiti diversi casi-
studio relativi a serbatoi di media e grande scala variando alcuni parametri, come la 
dimensione dei difetti ed il livello di riempimento del serbatoio, per testare la 
riproducibilità del nuovo modello. I risultati dei casi-studio evidenziano la potenzialità 
e la flessibilità del modello RADMOD. 
L’obiettivo finale dell’implementazione dei due modelli è quello di ottenere i dati su 
temperatura del fluido e pressione nel serbatoio tramite il modello RADMOD, ed usarli 
come condizioni a contorno nel modello FEM, per migliorare la modellazione della 
risposta termica di cisterne GPL coibentate in scenari d’incendio, anche in presenza di 
difetti nel sistema di protezione. 
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Table A.5 – Summary of equations set of the novel RADMOD validation sub-model for 
defective coatings, for the boiling liquid condition, 𝑃>𝑃𝑠𝑎(𝑇𝐿).  
Table A.6 – Summary of equations set of the novel RADMOD validation sub-model for 
defective coatings, for the boiling liquid condition, 𝑃≤𝑃𝑠𝑎(𝑇𝐿).  
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1 Introduction  
 
All over the world, and particularly in industrialized countries, the transport of 
hazardous materials has till years continuously increasing trend. [Paltrinieri et al. 2009] 
The transportation of chemicals is necessary for the manufacturing and distribution of 
products within and across regional and international borders. Although, transportation 
of hazardous materials is affected by severe accidents. Public concern is focused mainly 
on road and rail transport, since the road and rail networks used in transportation of 
hazardous materials necessarily come closer, and sometimes also cross, densely 
populated areas. Transport of dangerous goods need to be regulated in order to prevent, 
as far as possible, accidents to persons or property and damage to the environment, the 
means of transport employed or to other goods. [UNECE, Model Regulations Volume 
I , 2013]  
In Europe, the legislation for hazardous materials transportation is designed and 
managed by ONU through the UNECE. The legislation is divided into several 
documents tailored to the specific needs of the various means of transport, covering 
transport of dangerous goods by road, rail and inland waterways. In particular, the road 
and rail transportation are regulate, respectively, by the ADR and RID agreement. The 
ADR agreement, for instance, concerns determination and classification of dangerous 
substances, characteristics of packaging and containers, construction, equipment and 
operation of the vehicle carrying the goods in question. [ADR, 2015] 
Focusing attention on the transportation of liquefied flammable products (such as 
liquefied petroleum gas – LPG, propylene, butadiene, etc.) an accidental spill may lead 
to severe fire and explosion scenarios having the potential to cause injuries and fatalities 
also among the off-road population. Among them, one of the more severe is the BLEVE, 
which consists in the explosive release of expanding vapour and boiling liquid when a 
container holding a pressure-liquefied gas fails catastrophically. [Birk & Cunningham, 
1994] The pressurized liquefied gas vaporizes instantly and expands, originating a blast 
that is often followed by a fireball due to the ignition of the flammable substance. [Reid, 
1979] 
The BLEVE may be caused by an external fire that impinges the tank. The fire exposure 
causes a temperature increase of the tank wall and, thus, of the fluid inside the tank. The 
mechanical resistance of the shell material is compromised by high wall temperature 
and by pressure-induce stress, due to the evaporation of the liquid. Even with a properly 
working and sized pressure relieving device, able to keep the internal pressure within 
the vessel design limits,  the tank can rupture due to wall material degradation at high 
temperature. Thus, the combination of both these factors may lead to the catastrophic 
rupture of the tank, and consequent BLEVE and fireball. Hence, the chance of BLEVE 
can be reduced by the installation of systems able to prevent or, at least, to delay for a 
time lapse sufficient for emergency response, the thermal collapse of the tank. 
In North America, specific transport regulations have been adopted, requiring road and 
rail tankers carrying flammable liquefied gases to be equipped with pressure relief 
valves and, mainly, rail tank-cars have to be thermally insulated. For instance in Canada 
the thermal protection system is designed so that the tank-car will not rupture for 100 
minutes in an engulfing pool fire or 30 minutes in a torching fire [CFR Code of Federal 
Regulation, 2015; CGSB, 2002] However, such protective measures are not compulsory 
in Europe. In fact ADR and RID regulations do not require any passive fire protection 
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on LPG tankers. Possible concerns related to the implementation of protections on 
tankers is related to the possible formation of defects, that may deplete the thermal 
protection performance. 
There are intrinsic defects related to the installation of a coating, i.e. in correspondence 
of joints or external hooks the coating can not cover the entire surface of the tank. 
Moreover, as thermal protection system on tank undergoes wear or insufficient 
maintenance, it is possible that the insulation degrades. Vibrations and shocks may 
cause the slippage or the crushing of insulation blanket, reducing the thermal protection 
to the tank.  
It is therefore crucial to assess whether or not a given degree of defect is acceptable. 
Addressing this issue requires a deep understanding of the phenomena which take place 
when a tank-car covered by defective thermal protection is exposed to fire. For instance, 
the slippage of the blanket results in the formation of an air gap between the external 
steel jacket, that covers the coating, and the tank-car shell. In case of exposure to fire, 
complex mechanisms occur for heat transfer from the flame through the several layer 
of the tank, i.e. steel jacket, undamaged coating or air gap, shell wall and, finally, to the 
lading which is in vapour or liquid phase. [Scarponi et al. 2016] 
The thermal response of such system needs to be investigated deeper. The best way to 
achieve this aim would be reproducing real-scale bonfire tests concerning pressurized 
insulated tankers and testing the behaviour of several insulation deficiencies. Trials of 
this kind are not nimbly feasible, since they are almost prohibitive under the economical 
point of view and also for safety and environmental concerns. The implementation of 
simulation tools overcomes the impossibility of testing the effect of defects on real-
tanks, the closer the model reproduces the reality, the lower the need to perform bonfire 
tests. Modelling the thermal behaviour through a computer model also allows the 
simulation of a wide range of geometries, materials, fire conditions and other 
parameters. 
In the present work, two different models are presented in order to determine the thermal 
behaviour of real-scale LPG tanks with defective insulation system, involved in 
accidental fire impingement: a FEM model and a lumped parameters model.  
The FEM method divides the vessel in elements and nodes and allows to obtain the 
approximated value of exact solution of temperature and equivalent stress, in each 
nodes. The model is based on two distinct simulations, thermal and mechanical, which 
are concatenate in order to obtain accurate modelling of pressurized vessels exposed to 
fire. In detail, the model determines the wall temperature profile by a thermal analysis, 
the results of which are extracted and used in a mechanical analysis, determining the 
stress distribution over the vessels. The results obtained in each nodes allows the use of 
correct failure criteria to evaluate the time to failure of the tank. The computational time 
of this analysis is very high and being not acceptable in case multiple runs are required. 
A sensitivity analysis is performed on a thermal FEM model reproducing the 
experiments carried out by Birk and VanderSteen [VanderSteen & Birk, 2003] on a 
portion of tanker shell, with several insulation deficiencies. The sensitivity analysis aims 
to identify the most critical parameters affecting the heat exchange in tankers exposed 
to fires, therefore varying a few of several parameters, as the flame temperature and the 
steel emissivity, the temperature behaviour of the defect is analysed. 
In order to reducing the computational time of the FEM model, a lumped parameters 
model (namely ‘RADMOD’) is developed. The lumped parameters analysis 
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substantially reduces computational costs dividing the system in different zones (macro-
nodes), depending on the fire conditions, in which are defined and obtained by the 
model, averaged value of parameters. 
 The RADMOD model is developed, based on a previous model developed by 
[Landucci et al. 2013]. With respect to the previous version of the model, the novel 
developed tool defective insulation systems. The model was further enhanced for 
different types of heat exposure conditions, the heat and material balances were revised 
for fully engulfing fire and for half engulfing fire. Complex phenomena are also 
enhanced, as the liquid thermal stratification. The novel sub-model is developed for 
small-scale tanks, in order to validate it against experimental test data on a 1.9 m3 tanks 
conducted by Birk et al. in 2006.  [Birk et al. 2006]  
The model was then extended to medium- and large-scale vessels in order to run 
different real-scale geometries of defects. The latter were identified by Birk and 
Cunningham through a thermographic method for the inspection of tank-car thermal 
insulation in 1994. [Birk & Cunningham, 1994] Several case studies were defined and 
analysed varying some parameters, as the liquid filling level and the vessel geometry, 
in order to test the potentialities of the present approach.  
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2 Safety issues in the transportation of hazardous materials 
 
2.1 Transportation of hazardous materials in European framework 
In everyday language the term hazardous materials also referred to as 
dangerous/hazardous substances or goods solids, liquids, or gases that can harm people, 
other living organisms, property, or the environment. They not only include materials 
that are toxic, radioactive, flammable, explosive, corrosive, oxidizers, asphyxiates, 
biohazards, pathogen or allergen substances and organisms, but also materials with 
physical conditions or other characteristics that render them hazardous in specific 
circumstances, such as compressed gases and liquids, or hot/cold materials. [TSO, 2012] 
2.1.1 Transport volume of hazardous materials 
All over the world, and particularly in industrialized countries, the transport of 
hazardous materials (hazmat) rise continuously in years. [Directive 94/55/CE]  Every 
day large amounts of these materials are involved in road, rail and inland waterway 
transport. It was estimated that more than 4 billion of hazmat tons were transported 
annually at worldwide level in the first half of the past decade [Zografos & 
Androutsopoulos, 2004]: in USA, there are at least 300 million hazmat shipments each 
year, and totally approximately 3.2 billion tons. In Germany, each year around 300 
million tons of dangerous goods are conveyed, around 140 million tons of which by 
road. In Italy, 74 millions of hazmat tons were transported on trucks in 2001, [BAM, 
2012] while table 2.1 contains data on the rail transport of dangerous goods on national 
territory in 2011-2012, [MIT, 2012/2013] according to the RID classification, which is 
discussed in the following paragraph.  
Table 2.1 – Rail transport of dangerous goods in Italy during 2011-2012 [MIT, 2012/2013] 
 
RID 
class 
Dangerous Good 2011 2012 
Tonn-km  
x 1000 
Averaged 
travel (km) 
Tonn-km  
x 1000 
Averaged 
travel (km) 
1.1 Explosive 1.407 286 661 237 
2.1 Gases (compressed, 
liquefied or dissolved 
under pressure) 
385.978 399 350.359 384 
3 Flammable liquid 388.331 269 384.845 268 
4.1 Flammable solid 6.850 163 3.122 155 
4.2 Spontaneously 
combustible substance 
1.229 190 1.990 530 
4.3 Substance which in 
contact with water emits 
flammable gas 
7.419 255 2.904 291 
5.1 Oxidising substance 10.291 302 7.886 204 
5.2 Organic peroxide 1.849 601 2.385 590 
6.1 Toxic substance 84.110 284 73.746 259 
6.2 Infectious substance - - - - 
7 Radioactive material 72 166 41 167 
8 Corrosive substance 144.567 304 125.224 329 
9 Miscellaneous dangerous 
goods 
169.862 283 198.584 250 
Total  1.201.965 308 1.151.745 296 
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2.1.2 The ADR / RID agreements 
Since hazmat daily cross international borders an harmonized regulation system was 
needed. The different regulations from country to country make international trade in 
chemicals and dangerous products seriously impeded, if not impossible and unsafe. 
[UNECE, 2016] In the European Community, the hazmat transportation is regulated by 
ONU through the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). The 
agreement is divided into several documents tailored to the specific needs of the various 
means of transport, starting from a common basis:  
 RID (Règlement concernant le trasport International ferroviaire des 
merchandises Dangereuses), for the railway sector 
 ADR (Accord Européen Relatif au Transport International des Marchandises 
Dangereuses par Route), for the road sector 
 IMDG (International Maritime Dangerous Goods), for shipbuilding, maritime 
sector 
 ADN (Accord Européen Relatif au Transport International des Marchandises 
Dangereuses par Voies de Navigation Intérieures), for inland waterways 
The ADR agreement was signed in Geneva on September 1957 and entered into force 
in January 1968. [ADR, 2015] In 1962 Italy adhered to the ADR agreement [L. 
1839/1962] and it was originally applied to international transport only. Than the ADR, 
RID and ADN agreements were extended to internal transport under the intention of 
European Union to harmonize across the Community the conditions under which 
dangerous goods are transported [Directive 94/55/CE] and Italy transposes that directive 
in January 1996 [D.M. 4 settembre 1996] The agreement itself is brief and simple, most 
of the provisions are indicated in the annexes: A - General provisions and provisions 
concerning dangerous articles and substances, and annexes B - Provisions concerning 
transport equipment and transport operations.  [ADR, 2015] 
The ADR agreement regulates: 
 the classification of dangerous substances in regard to the road sector 
 standards and tests that determine the classification of individual substances as 
dangerous 
 the conditions of packaging of goods, characteristics of packaging and 
containers 
 construction methods for vehicles and tanks 
 the requirements for the means of transport, including travel documents 
Moreover, the agreement refers to employees who are involved in hazmat transport at 
various levels: from the drivers of vehicles to people loading and unloading to 
operations managers. Persons of those categories must have been trained and often have 
achieved patent permits. [ADR, 2015] The prevision laid down the ADR do not apply 
to the transport of dangerous goods by private vehicles or under the responsibility of the 
armed force. [D.M. 4 settembre 1996] 
2.1.3 Classification of dangerous goods 
The ADR agreement classifies the substances in nine hazard classes that define the type 
of risk that hazardous material may pose. Some substances have main risks and 
secondary risks, and thus meet the definition of more than one hazard class. To further 
group substances with similar risks, some hazard classes contain divisions. [ADR, 2015] 
The ADR classification is reported in table 2.2.  
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Table 2.2 – ADR classification of dangerous good [ADR, 2015] 
 
Class Dangerous Goods 
1 Explosive substances and articles 
2 Gases 
2 Flammable liquids 
4.1 Flammable solids, self-reactive substances and solid desensitized explosives 
4.2 Substances liable to spontaneous combustion 
4.3 Substances which, in contact with water, emit flammable gases 
5.1 Oxidising substances 
5.2 Organic peroxides 
6.1 Toxic substance 
6.2 Infectious substances 
7 Radioactive material 
8 Corrosive substances 
9 Miscellaneous dangerous substances and articles 
 
ADR also defines three packing groups, which indicate the degree of risk a hazardous 
material may pose in transport in relation to other materials. Packing group is not 
applicable to all hazard classes divisions, it refers to classes 1, 2, 5.2, 6.2, 7 and to self-
reactive substances of class 4.1. This classes are assigned to packing groups in 
accordance with the degree of danger they present [ADR, 2015] as follow:  
 Packing group I – Substances presenting high danger 
 Packing group II – Substances presenting medium danger 
 Packing group III – Substances presenting low danger 
Then, once the dangerous goods class has been defined, the European legislation give 
some provisions of how to avoid or reduce the accident of the tanks subjected to an 
external heat load, such as an accidental fire. For flammable substances the most 
hazardous condition of transportation is the state of pressurized liquefied gas, in case of 
sub cooled liquids or high pressure gases the consequences are not as much severe 
[Landucci et al. 2013]. Therefore in the former scenario (and also for toxic gases) the 
European Agreements RID and ADR, commit all filling and discharge openings of tanks 
be equipped with an internal instant closing stop-valve which closes automatically in 
the event of unintended movement of the vessel or in the event of fire (for tank-
containers, this requirements only applies if they have a capacity of more than 1 m3) for 
risk reduction. In addition it also contains requirements for pressure relief devices to 
ensure the integrity of the tank even if the tank is fully engulfed in fire. For example, 
for tanks of non-refrigerated liquefied gases, the internal pressure does not exceed 20% 
of the working pressure. [ADR, 2015] 
The present work focuses on liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) which transportation is 
extremely frequent in Europe. LPG is a mixture of saturated hydrocarbons, primarily 
propane and butane, in their liquid state, that is, under pressure at ambient temperature. 
It is a useful fuel for mobile and remote applications, because it requires only moderate 
pressure (< 2 MPa) to remain liquid form at ambient temperature and it readily 
vaporized when the pressure is released. This is the main advantage of LPG as fuel, 
because it is liquid for transportation and storage, but gaseous for use. The composition 
of LPG consequently depends on the season and the location where it is marketed. In 
fact, propane evaporates at -42 °C, at atmospheric pressure, instead at 0.6 °C, which is 
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the boiling point of butane at the same pressure condition. Thus, different grades of LPG 
can be produced. In regions where the winter temperatures drop below 0°C, the main 
constituent of LPG is propane, because butanes are liquids at such conditions. In hot 
climates, LPG can be a butane-propane mixture. [Maitlis & De Klerk, 2013] 
In the ADR classification LPG belongs to class 2, division 2.1. As mentioned before, 
the hazard related to LPG is also due to its liquefied gas condition. A flammable gas 
liquefied through pressurization is a gas that has internal energy sufficient to suddenly 
evaporates and turns out in a flammable mixture with air. 
 
2.2 Past accidents data analysis 
In order to identify the major safety issues associated to the transportation of hazardous 
materials, past accidents data analysis was carried out. In fact, this type of analysis 
grants valuable information on causes, dynamics and consequences, which can provide 
the necessary experience to be used for safety improvement and to the characterization 
of accidental scenarios. 
2.2.1 Past accident report – Viareggio 2009 
One of the most severe accident connected with the rail transportation of hazmat 
occurred in Viareggio (Italy) in 2009. On Monday June 29th 2009, a freight train was 
composed of 14 tank wagons, each having a nominal capacity of about 46.7 t (100,000 
L) was passing through Viareggio. At 23:45 the first tank wagon derailed and 
overturned after passing through Viareggio railway station at a speed of 90 km/h, below 
the imposed limit of 100km/h. The following 4 tank cars also derailed and overturned. 
The train engine did not derail and stopped few meters ahead of the first car. After 
derailment, an intense loss of containment took place from the first tank wagon. The 
entire inventory of a commercial LPG mixture was released from the breach. No loss of 
containment occurred from the other 13 tank vessels. Firemen emptied all the derailed 
cars on July 2nd. According to the report of the engine drivers, no immediate ignition 
followed the release. Before the ignition of the gas cloud, the drivers had time to shut-
down the engine, to remove the documents from the engine and to run about 200m away 
from the railway. Several witnesses remember a cloud of cold and white mist 
propagating around the area where the derailment took place. The cloud ignited few 
minutes after the start of the release. It is still uncertain which was the ignition point. A 
flash fire resulting in severe damage took place. Several houses were involved in the 
fire and 31 fatalities were caused by intense heat radiation exposure or collapse of 
building. [Landucci et al. 2011] 
2.2.2 Methodology and selection criteria 
The data were collected from two different databases, the ARIA (Analysis, Research 
and Information on Accidents) database and the MHIDAS (Major Hazard Incident Data 
Service) database; the first one was used  as primary source while the second one was 
used as supplement since it is no longer updated. The MHIDAS database was hosted by 
United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive. The ARIA database operated by the 
French Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy lists the accidental 
events, which have, or could have damaged health or public safety, agriculture, nature 
or the environment. [ARIA, 2016] It collects events that are mainly caused by hazardous 
industrial or agricultural facilities and also by transportation of hazardous materials.  
The research was carried out  on all countries but France, this is due to the 40000 
accidents collected in France against the 6000 collected in other countries, but France. 
The French data also concern small accidents which are not important for this research 
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that aiming at the classification of substances and primary causes involved in hazmat 
transportation. The selection of contextual accidents would be laborious and it would 
not have lead to significant changes in the final results, assuming that there is no reason 
why France should be out of European average accidents in hazmat transportation. For 
this reason it was assessed the exclusion of the France from the location of accidents.  
The following scenarios were considered during the research: 
 Accidents occurred during transport of dangerous goods by road, inside a 
company or on the road 
 Accidents occurred during transport of dangerous goods by rail, in or outside 
of an classified installation 
This analysis has taken into account all accidents of this type occurred from 1980 to 
September 2015. 
Three categories of substances were individuated and classified by the physical state in 
which they were transported, through the following methodology: 
 Liquid 
 Liquefied gas 
 Other 
The flammable and toxic substances transported in liquid phase, at ambient temperature, 
are classified as liquid if their boiling point is under 30°C, otherwise they are classified 
as liquefied gas, if their boiling point is over 30°C. Solid, gaseous and cryogenic 
substances, both flammable and toxic, are classified as other. In addition to the above 
classification, substances were divided by hazardous properties (flammable or toxic) 
specifying what type of substance were involved in the accident (ammonia, LPG, etc.). 
Primary causes are the events that turn out in the involvement of hazmat transportation 
tank in the road or rail accident, which is followed by the failure of the tanker an 
subsequent leakage of substance. The analysis of primary cause was conducted by 
classifying them in the following categories: 
 Human error 
 Failure of truck/locomotive 
 Failure of tanker 
 Failure of rail/rail control system, for rail transportation 
 External event 
Human error includes all the events which were not intended by the actor, which are a 
deviation from intention, expectation or desirability. Collision, truck overturns, lost of 
control of the vehicle, derailment, failure to close the valves, unsafe welding, failure of 
operating hook, etc. are some example of what the human error category contains.  
The failure of truck or locomotive includes the failure of every elements belonging to 
the truck or convoy except the tankers; such as the breakdown of a wheel, lost of the 
tanker, fire on truck not related to an external event, failure of the axle, etc. 
The failure of the tanker could occur in several modes including the failure of a valve 
or pressure relief valve, the premature opening of rupture disk, the crash of a part of the 
tanker which was deformed. The leakage from the tank was also included in this 
category, as well as the fire on the tanker, which was considered as the consequence of 
a leakage.  
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In the rail transportation it was necessary to add another category: the failure of the rail 
or of the rail control system, which includes the causes related to the rail damage, such 
as fracture, corrosion, defective rail, misalignment; and to the failure of “rail” control 
system, such as the failure of automatic stop device, of a switch and, more generally, of 
traffic control system.  
The external event is the last category, it includes: external impact, sabotage, 
earthquakes, hurricane and external fire. The latter is the cause on which this work will 
focus. The external fire could occur, amongst other events, from another tank or from 
another unit, by the ignition of a flammable substance leakage during the tank 
loading/unloading operations or from a short circuit of electrical cable. All the unknown 
causes were included in the external event category. 
Focusing on the LPG transportation, the primary causes were investigated as the causes 
that led to the tank failure; if a human error caused the accident it may lead to a cold 
BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion), with the instantaneous loss of 
containment, or it may generate a fire which engulfs the tank and may turns out in the 
failure of the tank. In the first scenario the primary cause was considered as the human 
error, while the external fire was considered as the cause of the second scenario. The 
same classification of primary causes of accidents reported above were used for LPG 
tanks causes of failure. 
Also the consequences were collected for the LPG accidents and they were classified as 
follows: 
 Release  only leakage without ignition 
 Instantaneous release  cold BLEVE  
 Release, ignition and fire  no BLEVE occurred 
 Release, ignition and fire  with consequent fired BLEVE 
2.2.3 Results of the historical analysis 
As mentioned before, the data were collected principally from ARIA database, which 
lists 339 occurrences referred to road transportation and 320 occurrences referred to rail 
transportation, in relation to the selection criteria aforesaid between 1980 and 2015. 
After selection of contextual accidents and implementation with MHIDAS database, 
245 occurrences referred to road transportation and 220 occurrences referred to rail 
transportation have been examined. The results of the analysis is reported and than 
discussed in this section. 
Road transportation results 
Figure 2.1 reports the category of substances involved in severe accidents in road 
transportation while Figure 2.2 shows the primary causes of accidents occurred in 
hazmat road transportation. Figure 2.3 and 2.4 respectively reports the primary causes 
of accidents in road transportation which involve LPG and the consequences of these 
category of accidents. 
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Figure 2.1: Classes of substances involved in hazmat road transportation accidents 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Primary causes of accidents occurred in hazmat road transportation 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Primary causes of accidents occurred in LPG road transportation 
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Figure 2.4: Consequences of accidents occurred in LPG road transportation 
 
Rail transportation results 
Figure 2.5 reports the category of substances involved in severe accidents in rail 
transportation, while Figure 2.6 shows the primary causes of accidents occurred in 
hazmat rail transportation. Figure 2.7 and 2.8 respectively reports the primary causes of 
accidents in rail transportation which involve the LPG and the consequences of these 
category of accidents. 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Classes of substances involved in hazmat rail transportation accidents 
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Figure 2.6: Primary causes of accidents occurred in hazmat rail transportation 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Primary causes of accidents occurred in LPG rail transportation 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Consequences of accidents occurred in LPG rail transportation 
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2.3 Safety issues related to the transportation of pressurized flammable 
gases 
Past accidents data analysis identified the relevant accidents occurred in years during 
the road and rail transportation of dangerous goods, around the world. The classes of 
substances involved and the main causes of accidents are classified, with particular 
focus on accidents occurred during LPG transportation, the consequences of which are 
also identified and classified. It is timely, therefore, to detailed analyse the safety issues 
related to LPG transport. They are discussed in this section to complete the picture and 
come to some conclusions. 
Dangerous goods are carried through a transportation network, which civilians daily use 
and which crosses vulnerable and densely populated areas. During the transportation of 
LPG or, generally, pressurized flammable gas, if an accidental leak occurs it may lead 
to catastrophic event which can harm people and neighbouring buildings, as occurred 
in the Viareggio accidents. (see paragraph 2.2.1) 
2.3.1 BLEVE definition  
As evidenced by past accident data analysis, one of the most critical scenarios that may 
follow an accidental leakage of LPG is the boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion 
(BLEVE). This event typically follows the catastrophic rupture of a tank containing the 
pressurized liquefied gas, which instantly vaporizes and expands. The liberated energy 
in such cases is very high, causing high blast pressures and generation of fragments with 
high initial velocities, and resulting in propulsion of fragments over long distances. 
[TNO Yellow Book, 2005] The blast is often followed by a fireball due to LPG ignition. 
[Reid, 1979] In the end of the 1970s, the BLEVE was a mysterious phenomenon, several 
theories have been put forward to explain this very energetic event but none have been 
proved. [Birk & Cunningham, 1994] Among the large number of definitions that can be 
found in literature, [Hemmatian et al. 2015] Walls defined BLEVEs for first time in 
1957 [Walls, 1979] as a failure of a major container into two or more pieces occurring 
at a moment when the container liquid is at a temperature above its boiling point at 
normal atmospheric pressure. Then Reid in 1976 [Reid, 1979], defined BLEVEs as the 
sudden loss of containment of a liquid that is at a superheated temperature for 
atmospheric conditions. More recently, on the basis of some observations which 
highlight that there is no practical reason why fragments or superheat limits need to be 
mentioned in the definition, some authors proposed less restrictive definitions. In 
particular, Birk and Cunningham in 1994 have defined BLEVEs as the explosive release 
of expanding vapour and boiling liquid when a container, holding a pressure-liquefied 
gas, fails catastrophically. Catastrophic failure was defined as the sudden opening of a 
tank/container to release its contents nearly instantaneously. [Birk & Cunningham, 
1994; Eckhoff, 2014] 
In the present work the latter definition of BLEVEs will be used. The TNO definition is 
also reported: BLEVE is an explosion resulting from the sudden failure of a vessel 
containing a liquid at a temperature significantly above its boiling point at normal 
atmospheric pressure, e.g. pressure liquefied gases. The fluid in the vessel is usually a 
combination of liquid and vapour. Before rupture, the liquid contained is more or less 
in equilibrium with the saturated vapour. If the vessel ruptures, vapour is vented and the 
pressure in the liquid drops sharply. Upon loss of equilibrium, liquid flashes at the 
liquid-vapour interface, the liquid-container-wall interface, and, depending on 
temperature, throughout the liquid. [TNO Yellow Book, 2010]  
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Usually two types of BLEVE are defined: “fired” BLEVE and “unfired” or “cold” 
BLEVE. [Paltrinieri et al. 2009] The first one is thermally induced by an external fire, 
thus it usually follows the tank collapse due to fire engulfment. If the ignition of the 
vapour is immediate, and very often it is because the external fire, a fireball occurs. The 
“cold” BLEVE is not thermally induced, it may be caused by a violent impact on the 
tank during a traffic accident or by the tank sudden failure due to material defect or to 
overfilling. [Prugh, 1991] In a cold BLEVE there is no certain ignition so the fireball 
may not be present, surely it is easy that in a road/rail environment there is enough 
energy and sources to ignite the flammable cloud. If the ignition is delayed the cloud 
will cause a flash fire rather than a fireball. [TNO Yellow Book, 2005] 
The primary causes of a “cold” BLEVE are wholly incidental, as this type of BLEVE, 
of course happens only if the severity of the accident is enough for the tank strength, 
but it cannot be delayed or avoided at the time of accident. The focus in this work is on 
“fired” BLEVE, which can be avoided, or at least delayed, through the installation of 
an adequate fireproofing system in combination with appropriate designed pressure 
relief valves (see the detailed analysis in Section 2.3). Moreover in a statistic on several 
transport accidents reported by Paltrinieri et al. more than 85% of BLEVEs recorded 
are thermally induced. [Paltrinieri et al. 2009] 
 
2.3.2 Fireball definitions 
As seen above, when a BLEVE occurs a given amount of flammable vapour is suddenly 
released into the atmosphere. A fraction of liquid droplets can deposit on the ground 
(rain-out fraction) and form a flammable pool, while another part is entrained by the 
vapour causing an aerosol cloud. If the cloud is immediately ignited it turns out in a 
phenomenon called fireball. A fireball is defined as a fire, burning sufficiently rapidly 
for the burning mass to rise into the air as a cloud or ball. [TNO Yellow Book, 2005] 
The ignition must be immediate for the fireball to occur, if the mass of flammable 
vapour mixes sufficiently with air, the delayed ignition will give rise to a flash fire rather 
than a fireball. Since the mixing with air is limited, the flame is only on the external 
surface of the volume of the released gas, thus it can be considered a diffusion flame.  
While the external surface burns, the internal fuel droplets act as fuel reservoir. In fact 
they progressively vaporize, mix with air and burn. The resulting fireball is a transient 
phenomenon the duration of which lasts up to a minute. The fireball passes through 
three phases [Lees, 1996] : 
 growth  growth to half diameter upon final diameter 
 steady burning  roughly spherical 
 burnout  size held steady 
The growth phase may be divide into two intervals, each lasting about 1 second. In the 
first interval the flame is bright and the flame temperature is about 1300°C, the smaller 
droplets of fuel vaporize and the fireball grows to about half its final diameter. In the 
second interval of the growth phase, the fireball grows to its final volume, the surface 
starts to be dark and sooty and the flame temperature decreases by approximately 
200°C. In the second phase, which lasts some 10 seconds, the fireball, which is now 
roughly spherical, is no longer growing. At the start of this phase, it begins to lift off. It 
rises and changes to the familiar mushroom shape. The estimated effective flame 
temperature is 1100-1200°C as in the second interval of the growth phase. In the third 
phase, which lasts some 5 seconds, the fireball remains of the same size, but the flame 
becomes less sooty and more translucent. [TNO Yellow Book, 2005] Once there is no 
more fuel the fire extinguish itself. The radius of the fireball can be calculated from the 
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quantity of combusting material. It was found that peak emissions came from areas at 
the top of the expanding fireball whereas the emission was lower from lower portions 
of the fireball because of increased soot shielding and poorer mixing with ambient air. 
[TNO Yellow Book, 2005] 
 
2.3.3 Analysis of cascading scenarios in the transportation of LPG  
As mentioned before, the most dangerous scenario that may follows an accidental 
leakage of LPG is the BLEVE with consequent fireball.  
The typical mechanism which leads to the fired BLEVE can be considered as a domino 
effect or “cascading event” [TNO Yellow Book, 2005], consisting in the following 
steps: 
 occurrence of primary event  a road or rail accident occurs with development 
of fire 
 propagation of the event  the fire extends to LPG tankers  
 starting of BLEVE mechanism  temperature of the tank walls increases, thus 
pressure increases by LPG evaporation 
 tank catastrophic rupture due to increased pressure and thermal weakening of 
materials  BLEVE with blast wave and possible debris thrown away 
 rapid ignition of flammable aerosol  fireball with high radiation heat flux 
When a road or rail accident happens, it is likely that a fire develops from the ignition 
of the fuel that leaks from the vehicle. The ignition sources in these situations can be 
many, e.g. the metal sheets of the vehicle involved in the crush easily generate sparks. 
Moreover there are several flammable materials in vehicles that may go to feed the 
flames. If one or more, as is easily in rail transportation, LPG tanks are involved in the 
accident, directly or indirectly, the flames may extend up to them.  
From this moment on, the situation becomes much more critical. The heat is transferred 
from the fire to the tank outer surface by convection and thermal radiation. If the fire is 
large or if the tank is sufficiently distant from the flame radiation will dominate, 
otherwise also convection must be taken into account. [Landucci et al. 2013] The heat 
is transferred by conduction through all layers of tank: through external jacket and 
insulation blanket (if present) and through the tank shell.  
The heat is now received by the internal load by convection and radiation. The liquid-
side tank wall usually has high heat transfer coefficients, particularly if the liquid is 
boiling, resulting in a cooling effect. On the contrary, the vapour-side tank wall has a 
less efficient heat exchange due to low heat transfer coefficients, with consequent wall 
temperature increase. The latter weakens the tank materials which are, moreover, 
subjected to the differential dilation in correspondence of liquid-vapour interface. At 
this stage, LPG starts boiling and inner pressure of tank increases; one must recall that 
the LPG is a liquefied pressure gas, thus in saturated condition in vapour-liquid 
equilibrium. Although the tank is constructed to withstand the internal pressure that is 
generated, the combination with the weakening of materials can lead to the catastrophic 
failure with instantaneous release of the contents. The time between the start of the fire 
and the tank rupture is defined as time to failure (ttf). [Landucci, 2008] The energy 
released in the physical explosion following the rupture of the vessel, is the work of 
expansion of the LPG from the burst pressure to atmospheric. The burst pressure depend 
from the situation in which the tank fails, in case of external fire the pressure at failure 
is estimated as the 21% more of the opening pressure of safety valves. [TNO Yellow 
Book, 2005] Part of the released energy is spent for the projection of fragments and the 
rest for the formation of pressure wave. Primary fragments have high kinetic energy and 
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are projected at distance, they impact what is surrounding causing damages and 
secondary fragment. The explosion overpressure affects buildings, vehicles and humans 
nearby. The damage to humans are due to the action of shock wave on the sensitive 
organs, i.e. lungs and tympanic membrane, and to the impact of debris fragments and 
collapsed buildings. The ignition of the cloud generates a heat flux, which affects a large 
area around the accident. For instance, an LPG fireball generated from 10 tonn of 
substance, after 5 second from the ignition has a radiative heat flux with a lethality zone 
of about 80 meters diameter and it causes irreversible injuries up to 100 meters, at 
ground level. [TNO Yellow Book, 2005]  
It is clear that if a road or rail accident may be confined in its close proximity, an 
accident that involves one or more LPG tanks may afflict people and buildings relatively 
distant. Taking into account the mechanism described above, it is evident that the 
catastrophic rupture of the tank can be avoided by controlling the load temperature, thus 
the wall temperature. When it is possible and only after the safety enhancement for 
workers, the temperature increase is controlled by fire fighters spaying water on the wall 
of the tank until the external fire is extinguished. 
 
2.4 Safety devices adopted for the protection of the tank 
BLEVEs caused by fire can be avoided or at least delayed providing tank with adequate 
thermal protections. [Paltrinieri et al., 2009] Thermal protections consist of an insulating 
coating layer and a pressure relief valve (PRV). The insulating coating is aimed at 
reduce the heat flux reaches by tank shell walls, so as avoid the thermal weakening of 
material. PRVs are aimed at preventing the pressure build up during fire exposure by 
venting the overpressure. The benefits of safety device coupled with thermal insulation 
on LPG tank will be developed in this section.  
2.4.1 Passive fire protection systems 
A generic passive protection is defined by CCPS as a barrier which does not require any 
external activation to perform the safety function. [CCPS, 2010] 
Passive fire protection (PFP) systems consist in coating, cladding or free-standing 
system which, in the event of fire, will provide thermal protection to restrict the rate at 
which heat is transmitted to the object or area being protected. [EN ISO 13702, 1999] 
Firewall are thermal shields placed between the targets and the potential fire sources, 
which are able to absorb the thermal radiation ensuring the survivability of the target. 
Clearly enough they are only applied in fixed installations. [Landucci, 2008] 
PFP through PFP coatings can be suitable for transport vessels, since they are directly 
applied on the tank shell.  
The PFP systems are differentiated according to the materials they are made of, whether 
organic or inorganic. Inorganic-based materials are typically vermiculite sprays or 
cement boards that are inert to flame impingement and keep the initial structure with 
good thermal resistance. They are not able to adapt their configuration to the fire 
aggression so they may become brittle after fire exposure. Due to high thickness applied 
and consequent weight, they are mostly only suitable for fixed installations. [Landucci 
et al. 2009] The cementitious products protect the tank by evaporation of the moisture 
trapped within the material, keeping the underlying steel temperature around 100°C. 
[Zuccaro, 2012] The heat input is also reduce by the concrete high mass and low thermal 
conductivity. The weight of concrete can be lightened by aggregation with lightweight 
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products, as vermiculite. In this case due to the lower mass and in order to obtain the 
appropriate water content, structural steel shell are typically covered with a very thick 
coating layer.  [Landucci et al. 2009] Another type of inorganic materials used as 
fireproofing are the thermal insulation systems, such as mineral wool and cellular glass. 
Both are lightweight, dimensionally stable, essentially impermeable to moisture, and 
they are non-combustible. [Zuccaro, 2012] The density of these materials is one order 
of magnitude lower than other products and these property makes it a convenient 
solution even if it needs higher thickness to perform adequate protection. Thus, different 
layers of material are applied on equipment to protect and than stainless steel jacketing 
is employed to obtain fire resistance. [Landucci et al. 2009] The latter type of 
fireproofing materials are particularly suitable for the application on tanks for the 
transport of hazardous goods. 
Organic-based materials present better mechanical properties and they may be more 
adequate to obtain light structures, like portable tanks of dangerous goods. [Landucci et 
al. 2009] Intumescent coatings are the organic-based material normally used in 
hydrocarbon-processing complexes, generally they are epoxy based, spray or hand 
applied. When exposed to sufficient heat, intumescent coating expands to form a thick, 
insulating carbonaceous char. The reduction of the heat load to the steel substrate relies 
on the thermal insulating capability of the char and the ability of the char to remain 
adherent and physically intact. [Zuccaro, 2012] The application of several layers of 
material is necessary to assure a sufficient duration of the fire protection, since the 
material tends to be slowly burned by the flames. [Landucci et al. 2009] One main 
problem with intumescent coatings is related to corrosion of steel substrate that has been 
sometimes reported beneath apparently intact coating. Moreover, intumescent products 
and in general organic-based materials may degrade with prolonged outdoor weathering 
and exposure to slightly elevated temperatures. [Zuccaro, 2012] This does not render 
organic-based materials optimal for protection of tanks for the transport of goods. 
 
2.4.2 Pressure relief valves 
As mentioned before, pressure relief valves are also common tool in the passive fire 
protection, they don’t reduce the heat flux entering the system, but reduce the pressure 
ejecting mass from the process. [Crowl & Tipler, 2013] The pressure relieving devices 
are designed to open during emergency or abnormal conditions to prevent rise of 
internal fluid pressure in excess of a specified design value. [CCPS, 1998]  
A pressure relief valve has the task to vent off excess pressure enough quickly and re-
close for preventing the further flow of fluid after normal conditions have been restored. 
The required relieving area of the safety valve depends on scenario and this aspect is 
the basis for the selection of the type and size of device. The standard regulations API 
520 [API 520, 2014] is a design manual widely used for sizing of relief valves on both 
liquid and gas filled vessels and the standard API 527 [API 527, 2014] gives permissible 
leakage rate of valves and testing procedure. 
During the relief the fluid may be in liquid, liquid-vapour mixture, gas or supercritical 
phase. Thus, the safety system must be able to handle various process condition.  
Pressure relief valves have spring-loaded disks that close a main orifice against a 
pressure source. As pressure rises, the disk begins to rise off the orifice and a small 
amount of fluid passes through the valve. Continued rise in pressure above the opening 
pressure causes the disk to open the orifice in a proportional fashion. The safety valve 
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is similar to the relief valve except it is designed to open fully, or pop, with only a small 
amount of pressure over the rated limit. Conventional safety valves are sensitive to 
downstream pressure and may have unsatisfactory operating characteristics in variable 
back pressure applications. The balanced safety relief valve is available and minimizes 
the effect of downstream pressure on performance. [ASM, 2015]  
2.4.3 Safety requirements for the effective fire protection of LPG tankers 
Focusing on LPG transportation, if a severe accident occurs the emergency teams should 
have the time for the intervention, since, in the fired-domino described in previously 
section, the tank failure due to the propagation of fire is delayed respect to primary 
event, i.e. the external fire. The problem is the tank resistance, which in the case of 
absent protection may withstand fire conditions for a limited period (5-30 minutes). This 
lapse of time is usually not sufficient to avoid the safe suppression of the fire due to fire 
brigade intervention. A realistic evaluation of the time required for effective mitigation 
by the fire brigades, based on actual data available from past accidents in the 
Netherlands, evidenced that a time lapse of 75 minutes is required to allow an effective 
protection or prevention of BLEVE by active measures upon the arrival of the fire 
brigades. [Molag & Kruithof, 2005] Therefore the comparison between the ttf of tank 
and the time for arrival of rescuers shows that the intervention time is not sufficient for 
avoid the rupture unless the tank resistance has been enhanced. Thermal insulation 
around the tank can reduce the excessive heating of the steel wall and PRV can reduce 
the internal pressure. These coupled actions extend the time to BLEVE and can avoid 
the failure of the tank. [Landucci et al, 2009] 
In North America specific transport regulation [CFR, 2015;  CGSB, 1997] have been 
adopted, requiring road and rail tankers carrying flammable liquefied gases to be 
equipped with pressure relief valves. In addition, rail tankers have to be also thermally 
insulated. The Canadian General Standards Board requires that the thermal insulation 
system must be able to avoid the rupture of the tank for 100 minutes in an engulfing 
pool fire, or 30 minutes in an engulfing torching fire. One common system includes a 
13 mm blanket of high-temperature ceramic fibre thermal insulation covered with 3 
mm steel jacket. [Birk & Cunningham, 1994] This insulation system is the one used in 
the model development later in this work. 
Even if the double action of thermal insulation and PRV seems to be the answer of 
safety issues related to transportation of LPG, it may be insufficient to avoid the vessel 
catastrophic rupture. Indeed, the fireproofing system is not ideal and it may degrade 
during its lifetime. The PFP effectiveness can be influenced by damages or defects 
which lead to a double negative effects: the thermal weakening of the constriction 
material, due to the temperature increase, and strong local thermal dilatation. In fact, the 
shell wall in contact with the liquid undergoes a cooler effect while the shell wall in 
contact with vapour does not. If a defect in the thermal insulation system is present, the 
difference of the vapour and liquid temperatures is very strong, the vapour-side wall 
thermal dilation will be much higher than the liquid-side wall one, these phenomenon 
at the interface leads to the increase of the mechanical stress distribution in the defective 
part.  
Characterization of thermal insulation defects is the central purpose of this work and it 
will be deeply analysed in Section 3. 
 
 
27 
 
2.5 Discussion and conclusions 
In the present Chapter Past accident data analysis, which results are reported in Section 
2.2.3, showed that the percentage of classes of substances involved in severe accidents 
are in line with the percentage of hazardous materials transported by road and rail. It 
was estimated that over 50% of hazardous materials transported (both by rail and road) 
are liquids, while gases (compressed, liquefied) occupy around 10%. [Paltrinieri et al., 
2009] In fact, flammable and toxic liquid is the class of substances more involved in 
severe accidents both in road and rail transportation. This is due to the global quantities 
of hazardous materials transported, as said, but also due to the lower thickness of the 
shell of the tank used for transportation at ambient pressure, as in the case of liquids, 
than the tanks used for liquefied gases, which have to resist a higher pressure. If an 
accident occurs, the tank with the thicker shell is more likely to resists.  
The results of accidents involving LPG highlight that the problem related to the 
transportation of such hazardous substance is relevant to public safety. The external fire 
is the cause of the 40% for road and 26% for rail transportation accidents, approximately 
half party of which led to fired BLEVE in the road transportation, while in the rail 
transportation BLEVE occurs in 22% of accidents. The percentage of accidents in which 
LPG does not ignite after leakage is 18% in road transportation and 13% in rail 
transportation, this means that in the remaining 82% and 87%, respectively road and 
rail, of accidents there is development of a fire.  These results highlight that the safety 
issues related to the hazmat transportation is relevant for public safety in order to avoid 
severe consequences from transportation accidents and prevent Viareggio-like 
accidents. In the Viareggio accident only a series of random events avoid the BLEVE 
occurrence and the propagation of fire to other LPG tankers. The LPG leak found many 
obstacles through the expansion area, such as wall of the station, car and tree. This type 
of confinement could have caused an overpressure in case of ignition. When such 
overpressure occurs, the event is a vapour cloud explosion (VCE) rather than a flash 
fire. [TNO Yellow Book, 2005]  
Finally, even if other worst-case scenarios have been avoided, the flash fire resulted in 
31 fatalities and in extended damages to residential buildings around the railway line. 
The need of specific regulations which concern the possible implementation of safety 
devices is now evident. As mentioned before, the European framework, the installation 
of thermal insulation system on transportation tankers is still not approved because of 
defects and degradation in which these systems undergo. Since the coating systems are 
not ideal, they have to be well characterised in terms of protection performance, in 
particular if defects are present. Assessing the acceptability levels for the coating 
defects, in order to avoid vessels failure when exposed to fire, is of utmost importance 
for the wider implementation of coatings as relevant safety measure. 
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3 Characterisation of defective coatings for fire protection 
 
As mentioned in the previously section,  a coating defect is not always able to cause the 
fired tank failure. Both size and features of the defect can influence the heat conduction 
into the steel-wall and limit the temperature growth. [Landucci et al. 2011b] Therefore, 
it is crucial to understand what kind of defect can be considered dangerous and 
determine a critical defect size that leads to the tank failure. The characterization of 
defects is of underlying importance to achieve this aim and to assess the thermal 
response of defective coatings.  
The first step for characterisation is to analyse the nature of this defects. It was assess 
that defects in coating system can be accidental or intrinsic. [Birk & A.M. Birk 
Engineering, 1999] The accidental defects may be caused by material matters, such as 
erosion and degradation, or by external event such as human damages, creeping on the 
terrain, the incidental crash with other tank-car or hurdles. [Landucci et al. 2011b] On 
the other hand, intrinsic defects are related to the discontinuities that exist in a normal 
tank-car, such as the manway nozzle, jacket spacers and body boisters. [Birk & A.M. 
Birk Engineering, 1999] 
 
3.1 Insulation discontinuities 
Discontinuities are direct metal conduction paths that are present due to tank design 
features. The effect of heat flow through discontinuities might lead to local "hot spots" 
at these locations particularly if the discontinuity were in the vapour space region of the 
tank, and could be of concern with commodities where a chemical reaction may be 
initiated if they are raised to a certain temperature. [Birk & A.M. Birk Engineering, 
1999] Discontinuities and associated heat transfer coefficient (U coefficient) values 
were suggested by Johnson. [Johnson, 1998] Those data are shown in table 3.1. Birk 
suggested to consider these U values based only on thermal conductivities of the tank 
wall materials. [Birk & A.M. Birk Engineering, 1999] 
Table 3.1 - Summary of Insulation Discontinuity U values, from [Johnson, 1995] 
Location U (W/k) 
manway nozzle and cover 2.4 
siphon and air vent nozzle 1.0 
safety relief valve nozzle 0.52 
jacket spacers 2.5 
bottom outlet saddle 2.1 
draft sills 11.9 
body bolsters 10.6 
brake cylinder support 0.75 
brake lever support 0.52 
Total U for discontinuities 
(sum of individual U’s) 
32.3 
Total U for thermally insulated tank  
(assuming conductance of 0.426 W/m2 K) 
74.3 
Total U for thermally protected tank  
(assuming conductance of 22.7 W/m2 K) 
3960 
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The table shows that the discontinuities are not very significant for a thermally protected 
tank with a 13 mm insulation. Indeed, the insulation discontinuities increase overall U 
by 1%. [Birk & A.M. Birk Engineering, 1999] For these reason, the discontinuities of 
insulation system will be ignored during this thesis work. 
However discontinuities are significant for thermally protected tank, i.e. a tank car with 
just the steel jacket and no thermal insulation in the gap. The tank may be protected by 
the steel jacket which behaves like thermal radiation shield and this reduce the heat flow 
by about half. [Birk, 1983] The overall U coefficient, in this case, is increased by 43% 
by the insulation discontinuities. This result is somewhat misleading because the 43% 
increase represents a small overall increase in heat transfer when compared to what a 
large insulation defect would produce. For instance 1 m2 of defect can be more 
important than all the discontinuities. [Birk & A.M. Birk Engineering, 1999]  
 
3.2 Insulation defects 
As mentioned before, the defects in thermal insulation system are due material 
degradation or due accidental damages. In case of silica blankets, the insulating layers 
can also slip out by the position resulting in a long flatted defect. [VanderSteen & Birk, 
2003] This insulation defects usually leave a large percentage of the tank surface 
uncovered [Birk & Cunningham, 2000] and thus, in case of exposure to fire, a large 
percentage of heat can reach the internal shell wall and the lading, may leading to the 
tank failure. The available data on the characterization of defective coatings are reported 
in this section. 
As argued in the previously sections, the implementation of computer models is of 
underlying importance to test the thermal response of a wide range of conditions, such 
as testing different vessel materials, fire exposures, geometries of defect and so on. To 
show the reliability of this models, comparison with experimental data is required. 
Nevertheless, real-scale experiments on filled tank-car expose to fire are lacking for 
coated (undamaged or defective) tanks, as well as for unprotected tanks. The only 
available trial of this kind dates back to 1974, it was carried out on two rail-tanks, each 
with a total capacity of 128000 litres and filled with 96% of propane. One of the rail-
tanks was coated. [Anderson & Townsend, 1974] From there onwards only smaller 
scale experiments were carried out on filled tanks. On the other hand, it is worth to 
mention that reproducing a real-scale experiment, is almost prohibitive under the 
economical point of view as well as for safety and environmental concerns. 
For what concerns experiments on tanks with defective insulation system, only two 
bonfire trials were performed. One of which was carried out on a filled tank [Birk et al. 
2006], while the other tested the defects on a portion of tank shell [VanderSteen & Birk, 
2003]. The tests carried out in this trials are reported in this section, as the only available 
experimental data for the validation of models presented in this thesis work. More 
experiments would be needed in this experimentation area, in order to better understand 
the thermal response of different defect geometries and thus, for the development of 
enhanced computer models. 
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3.2.1 Real-scale defects geometries identified by thermographic inspection of 
tank-car  
An inspection technique was developed by Birk and Cunningham in 1999 [Birk & 
Cunningham, 2000] to find thermal insulation deficiencies on rail tank-cars. This 
method uses a thermal imager to find insulation gaps under the tank steel jacket. The 
method relies on a small temperature difference existing between the tank lading and 
the surroundings. Solar heating can also assist in generating thermal gradients that the 
thermal imager can identify. The effectiveness of using a thermal imager for detecting 
insulation deficiencies was validated against simulated tank-car tests carried out in the 
laboratory. After validation, field tests were conducted on real rail tanks with the aims 
to identify which have insulation deficiencies. The field study consisted of several field 
trips to industries and railway yards to image uninsulated and insulated tank-car and 
stationary tank. [Birk & Cunningham, 2000] The results of the field test shown that the 
thermography is an effective technique for inspecting insulated tank cars and that 
several tank-cars have deficiencies on their thermal insulation system, as shows in figure 
3.1.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 – Two different tank-cars, each with underlined insulation deficiencies [Birk & 
Cunningham, 2000] 
The parts of the tank that the thermographic images identified as lighter are those in 
which the insulating material is intact, while in the darker parts the insulation is 
defective. This shows that the coating defects on rail-tank currently in use are not rare 
and are not negligible.  
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Three different geometries can be identified on the two different rail-tanks. Defect 1 and 
2 have a rectangular geometry with a different value of aspect ratio. This is defined as 
the ratio between the longest edge and the shortest one and represents how much the 
defect geometry is close to a square, whose aspect ratio is 1. Defect 3 is L-shaped due 
to the formation of two rectangular defects, which are adjacent forming a single defect. 
[Scarponi et al. 2016] Aspect ratio and areas of the defects are reported in table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2 - Geometries of real-defects individuated by Birk and Cunningham in 1999  
[Scarponi et al. 2016] 
 Aspect ratio Area (m2) 
Defect 1 0.45 1.68 
Defect 2 0.93 2.51 
Defect 3 - 3.86 
 
The geometries of defect 1 and 2 are investigated in the case studies implemented with 
the RADMOD code. They are analysed and their influence on the thermal response is 
discussed in Section 7. 
 
3.3 Thermal protection deficiency fire tests on a quarter section tank-car  
– FEM validation data 
Fire test data is provided that will be useful in developing a guideline to assess different 
thermal protection deficiencies. Thus, a total of 12 thermal protection deficiency fire 
tests were conducted in 2003 by Department of Mechanical Engineering of Queen’s 
University, Canada. [VanderSteen & Birk, 2003] Identical fire conditions were used and 
only the thermal protection defect was changed.  
Five different-sized square thermal protection defects were studied. These data are used 
in the present work for the finite volume model validation.  
3.3.1 Tests conditions 
Apparatus 
The apparatus consisted of a 2.1 m long quarter section of a tank-car. The primary wall 
is tank-car steel and has a thickness of 16 mm and a radius of curvature of approximately 
1.5 m. The outer steel jacket is plain carbon steel and has a thickness of 3 mm. Both the 
shell and the jacket were painted flat black in order to ensure high emissivity. This was 
measured to be around 0.9 - 0.95. Therefore, this value was also considered in the FEM 
model validation in this thesis work. Holes were drilled through the tank wall to allow 
either the addition of 13 mm spaces or for clamping the steel jacket against the tank 
wall. Most tests required the 13 mm spaces to keep the jacket from crushing the 13 mm 
thick insulation. If the test required crusher insulation, however, the spaces were 
removed and the jacket was bolted to the tank wall.  
According to the standard, the pool-fire environment must have a fire temperature of 
871 +
−
 56 °C [CGSB, 2002]. To achieve this aim, and other conditions to represent a 
credible pool fire, an array of nine propane utility burners was used to uniformly heat 
the tank wall. These burners are nominally rated at 586 kW when the propane is supplied 
at 240 kPa, but the propane pressure was regulated down to approximately 10 kPa, for 
the reasons above.  
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An imagine of the apparatus can be seen in figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2 – Front view of test apparatus, showing the outer steel jacket (no insulation) 
[VanderSteen & Birk, 2003] 
Insulation system 
The type and thickness of the thermal insulation used in this testing was the same as that 
found on actual tank-car. The thermally protected configuration consisted of 13 mm of 
ceramic insulation placed on top of the tank wall and covered with a 3 mm out steel 
shell. As mentioned before, the spacing was maintained using spacers bolted to the tank 
wall. Specifications of the insulation are given in the table 3.3.  
Table 3.3 – Properties of insulation used in the trial [VanderSteen & Birk, 2003] 
Specification Property 
Material Ceramic fibre blanket 
Vendors Fiberfrax - Unifrax 
Thickness (mm) 13  
Density at new condition (kg/m3) 72 
Thermal conductivity, k  
at new condition  
 
Temperature (°C) k (W/m K) 
200 0.06 
400 0.11 
600 0.18 
800 0.28 
 
Instrumentation 
The test instrumentation consisted of a a wall thermocouple, an infrared (IR) thermal 
imager, an infrared thermometer gun and two fire thermocouples. Still photography 
were also used to collect data from the testing. A digital camera was used in each fire 
test to record the shape of the flame from several different locations.  
The wall thermocouple and the IR thermal imager were used for the measurement of 
the inner wall temperature. Whereas the flame temperature and the black body 
temperature of the fire were measured through the IR thermometer gun and the fire 
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thermocouples. The black body temperature determines the thermal radiation emitted 
by the fire. The wall thermocouple was mounted on the black unheated surface of the 
tank wall in the centre of the region where the defects were positioned.  
3.3.2 Tests results 
In tests with square defects cut out of the insulation, the thermal image data was very 
useful in study the temperature rise with time, and also the temperature gradients across 
the defect. [VanderSteen & Birk, 2003] 
The imagines of the fire engulfment can be seen in figure 3.3.  
 
Figure 3.3 – Front (sx) and side (dx) views of fire engulfment [VanderSteen & Birk, 2003] 
Table 3.4 summarizes the validation data used for the validation of the FEM model, the 
cells marked represent an available data set. Further details on the experimental results 
obtained are reported elsewhere. [VanderSteen & Birk, 2003] The FEM validation will 
be discussed in the Section 8.1. 
Table 3.4 - Summary of the validation data adopted for the FEM validation presented in this 
thesis work. The cell marked with an “X” represent an available data set [Scarponi et al. 2016]  
Type of 
configuration 
Defect 
size 
(cm) 
Ambient 
temperature 
(°C) as initial 
condition 
Transient 
temperature 
in the defect 
Temperature profile in 
the defect at different 
time 
5 
min 
10 
min 
15 
min 
20 
min 
Fully protected 0 a -9 X     
Steel jacket only - b -13 X     
Squared defect 15.2 -10 X X X X X 
Squared defect 24.4 0 X X X X X 
Squared defect 40.6 0 X X X X X 
Squared defect 61.0 0 X X X X X 
a The insulation is undamaged  
b The insulation was removed from the space between vessel wall and steel jacket 
An example of the thermal imager data obtained in the fire tests are reported in figure 
3.4. The figure shows the temperature distribution on the inner wall of the tank. In 
particular, the temperature profile along a horizontal line passing through the center of 
the defect are show for different defect sizes. The distance from the center of the defect 
is normalized on the semi-length of the defect edge (d/2). These data were measured 
after 20 minutes from the beginning of the test. It is important to note that for the larger 
defects, the temperatures at the center of the defect are almost the same, regardless the 
defect size. 
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Figure 3.4 – Temperature profile across defect at various times during one of the tests (test 4) 
[VanderSteen & Birk, 2003] 
 
 
3.4 Fired tests on propane pressure vessels with defective coating – 
RADMOD validation data 
In order to generate fire test data on a propane-filled pressure vessel with defect in its 
thermal protection system, six instrumented small-scale tanks (1.9 m3) were exposed to 
controlled fire in 2004. [Birk et al. 2006]  
Two of the tanks were unprotected and they were used for comparison with the full-
scale unprotected test of the propane-filled rail tank-car, named RAX 201, conducted in  
1974 by Townsend et al. [Anderson & Towsennsend, 1974] The remaining four tests 
considered defects covering 8% and 15% of the tank surface area. One of those were 
aborted due to burner system problem, the other three are used for the validation of 
lumped sub-model for defective thermal protection system presented in this work. 
3.4.1 Tests conditions  
Apparatus 
In the tests series, the tanks were ASME code 1890 litres, which were used as 
approximate 1/3rd scale models, based on diameter, for 125 m3 112J type rail-tank-cars, 
RAX 201. The tanks were horizontal steel cylinders, their design gauge pressure at 46°C 
was 1.72 MPa. The white tanks were painted black in the region of the defect to ensure 
a high emissivity.  
The tanks specifications are given in the table 3.5. 
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Table 3.5 – Tank properties and geometry used in the trial [Birk et al. 2006] 
Specification Property 
Capacity (l) 1890 
Length (m) 3.07 end to end 
Diameter (m) 0.953 
Minimum wall thickness – shell (mm) 7.4 
Minimum wall thickness – head (mm) 5.3 
Material – shell SA-455 ASME Steel 
Material – head SA-414 gr.C ASME Steel 
Design pressure at 46°C (MPa) 1.72 
Calculated burst pressure at 46°C (MPa)  7.1 
 
To ensure proper scaling against RAX 201, and controllable test condition the 
mechanical PRV was replaced with computer controlled valve and its set pressure was 
increased, moreover the engulfing fire was replaced with 25% partially engulfing 
generated through an array of liquid propane burners. The 25% fire engulfment gives 
vapour space peak wall temperatures similar to 100% engulfment. However the tank 
will pressurized and empty through PRV about four times slower. It has been estimated 
that the 25% engulfed tanks should fail a little later, order of 1 minute later, than if were 
100%. [Birk et al. 2006] 
The fire was designed to represent a full-scale pool fire with an effective blackbody 
temperature in the range of 815-927°C. This temperature is specified for fire testing of 
tank-car protection systems in North America. [CGSB, 2002] To respect this and other 
conditions, in order to represent a credible pool fire, a 5 x 5 array of liquid propane 
torches and a liquid propane evaporator, were designed and used in the trial. The 
propane was supplied to the evaporator at approximately 205 kPa.  
A sketch of the burners position with respect to the tank is shows in figure 3.5. 
 
Figure 3.5 – Burner array configuration over the tank [Birk et al. 2006] 
 
Insulation system 
In the insulated tests, the tanks were covered with ceramic blanket insulation. This 
insulation was covered with 3 mm carbon-steel jacket in the flame impingement zone. 
Specifications of the insulation are given in the table 3.6. 
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Table 3.6 – Properties of insulation used in the trial [Birk et al. 2006] 
Specification Property 
Material Ceramic fibre blanket 
Vendors Unifrax 
Width (m) 1.2 
Thickness (mm) 13  
Density at new condition (kg/m3) 72 
Thermal conductivity, k  
at new condition  
 
Temperature (°C) k (W/m K) 
-20 0.03 
100 0.05 
300 0.09 
500 0.15 
650 0.20 
800 0.30 
 
The thermal conductivity is a function of temperature and the different values of the 
conductivity will be use in the RADMOD code depending on the temperature of the 
wall which is in contact with the insulation. More specifically the liquid wetted wall 
temperature is expected to be within the first couple range, the protected vapour space 
wall temperature in the second range (300-500°C) and the jacket temperature in 
engulfing fire is expected to be in the last couple of values (650-800°C). 
Figure 3.6 shows the location and size of of both large and small insulation defects, 15% 
and 8% respectively, and the protective steel jacket used. 
 
Figure 3.6 – Standard ASME 18901 test tank and nominal flame width and location relative to 
tank insulation defects and steel jacket [Birk et al. 2006] 
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Instrumentation 
Each test tank was instrumented with 48 sheathed lading thermocouples, one static 
pressure transducer, and from 11 to 17 wall thermocouples. The lading thermocouples 
were contained in five vertical bundles with each bundle containing a full range of 
thermocouple lengths, each of which represents a specific fill level, figure 3.7 shows 
the lading thermocouples location. The wall thermocouples were welded directly to the 
wall and they were typically located as show in figure 3.8. 
 
Figure 3.7 – Lading thermocouple location [Birk et al. 2006] 
 
 
Figure 3.8 – Wall thermocouple layout for one of the tests (test 04-03) [Birk et al. 2006] 
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3.4.2 Tests results 
An imagine of the fire engulfment can be seen in figure 3.9.  
 
Figure 3.9 – Burner array and evaporator set-up [Birk et al. 2006] 
Large thermal defect, test 04-03 
The tank for 04-03 had 15% insulation area defect, it was filled and purged with 1300 l 
of propane, about 71% fill by volume. The PRV was set to pop at 2.63 MPa and close 
at 2.39 MPa. The simulated PRV had a 15 mm orifice. The fire exposure generally was 
good. The fire had an effective black body temperature in the range 860-940°C. The 
tank failed at 1420 seconds (24 minutes). The tank pressure was about 2.55 MPa and 
the PRV never opened. It was expected that the PRV would have happened at about 25 
minutes. Just before failure, the peak wall temperature increased rapidly to about 780°C; 
it is likely that the tank had bulged to make direct contact with the hotter jacket.  
 
Figure 3.10 – Test 04-03 tank after rupture. The steel jacket split open at the top tack weld. 
[Birk et al. 2006] 
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Figure  3.11– Tank failure, test 04-03 [Birk et al. 2006] 
 
Large thermal defect, low hoop stress, test 04-04 
The tank for 04-04 was a repeat of test 04-03 with two modification: the PRV was set 
to pop at 2.12 MPa and close at 1.93 MPa, in order to give about a 20% reduction of 
hoop stress, and the fill was increased to 78%. The wind caused fluctuations in the fire. 
The tank failed at 54 minutes, if the time span when the fire was poor were removed, 
the adjusted failure time would be about 35 minutes. 
  
 
  
Figure 3.12 – Tank rupture test 04-04 [Birk et al. 2006] 
 
Small thermal defect, test 04-04 
This test involved a tank with 8% insulation defect area. The defect spanning almost the 
entire tank circumference except for the bottom 20-30°. As in the test 04-03 the tank 
was filled and purged with 1300 l of propane, about 71% fill by volume. The PRV was 
set to pop at 2.63 MPa and close at 2.39 MPa. The simulated PRV had a 15 mm orifice. 
The test started off well so it has been up to 2000 seconds (33 minutes) when the wind 
increased for about 1200 seconds dropping the wall and jacket temperatures 
substantially. The wind speed then dropped and the test continued with rising wall 
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temperature. The PRV initially opened at 2130 seconds (35.5 minutes) and cycled 16 
times before the tank failed at about 3550 seconds (59 minutes). The adjusted failure 
time would be 2400 seconds (40 minutes). 
Summary 
The summary of the tests used in this work for the validation is reported in table 3.7, 
further details on the experimental results obtained in tests are reported elsewhere. [Birk 
et al. 2006] Whereas, RADMOD validation will be discussed in the Section 8.3. 
Table 3.7 – Summary of data adopted for the RADMOD validation presented in this thesis work. 
 Test 04-03 
15% area defect 
Test 04-04 
15% area defect 
Test 04-05 
8% area defect 
PRV settings (MPa) 2.63 2.12 2.63 
9% blowdown 9% blowdown 9% blowdown 
Nozzle (mm) 15 15 15 
Initial fill  71 78 71 
Approximate volume (l) 1300 1430 1300 
Initial lading temperature (°C) 11 21 13 
Time to failure (s) 1425 3360 3545 
Adjusted time to failure (min) 20 24-36 29-46 
PRV pops (# time) 0 79 16 
Time to first PRV pop (s) NA 1063 2133 
Fill at failure  71% 64% 65% 
Liquid temp at failure (°C) 37 60 50 
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4 Methodological approach 
 
In this chapter the aims of the work are briefly described and the core methodological 
steps are reported in flow chart form, in Figure 4.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 – Flow chart describing the methodology used in the present work 
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The analysis of past accidents data allowed for the characterisation of the main causes 
and main consequences related to the transportation of hazardous materials, focusing on 
the scenarios involving LPG. This analysis aimed to assess the need of a passive fire 
protection system for LPG tanks, in order to avoid their catastrophic failure due to 
external heat load. The presence of deficiencies in such insulation system was 
characterised first through the analysis of bonfire experiments [VanderSteen & Birk, 
2003; Birk et al. 2006] and then, through the analysis of literature studies [Scarponi et 
al. 2016], both, experiments and literature, focused on coated tanks exposed to fire with 
defective insulation systems.  
This basis permits to characterise the problem and achieve the two aims of this thesis 
work: 
1. The development of an advanced finete elementes method (FEM) model able 
to predict the thermal response of insulated tanks exposed to fire in presence of 
defects in their insulation systems. The FEM model is validated [Scarponi et al. 
2016] against available experimental data [VanderSteen & Birk, 2003] and then 
a sensitivity analysis is performed. This part of the work is aimed at evaluating 
the dependence of the temperature reached by the wall of the tank in 
correspondence of defect on main parameters, such as temperature and 
emissivity of the flame, steel emissivity and convective heat coefficients.  
 
2. The more innovative progress of this thesis work is the development of a 
lumped parameters model for evaluation of thermal behaviour of tanks exposed 
to fire with defective coating system. The goal is to implement a simplified 
model with low time of simulation and adaptable to different materials, tank 
and defect geometries, and configurations, which allows to obtain informations 
on the fluid lading behaviour, among other parameters, during the fire exposure. 
The model is validated against available experimental data [Birk et al., 2006] 
showing also a conservative but credible prediction of the time to failure of the 
tank. The model is then applied to different reale-scale tanks and reale-scale 
defect geoetries, varying some of the several parameters, such as the initial 
filling, in order to assess the thermal response of the system. This model 
requires less dettailed informations to run and obtains less dettailed results 
giving in any case a credible response of the performance of defective insulation 
systems installed on tanks in case of flame impingement. 
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5 Analysis of the behaviour of pressurized vessels exposed to 
fire: theoretical considerations 
 
In case fire scenario affects one or more transport tankers, thermal radiation and 
convection associated to the flame may trigger a domino-effect chain with associated 
escalation of events, as it was shown in paragraph 2.3.3. In the framework of the LPG 
transport, accidental fire may develop and affects the pressurized vessel, the heat from 
the flame is transferred to the tank by radiation and convection. This causes the tank 
shell to heat up, conduction takes place through the tank walls up to the lading which 
reaches the heat by means of convection mainly, and radiation. [Moodie, 1988] Where 
the tank inner surface is in contact with the lading in vapour phase, the heat exchange 
coefficients are relatively low and the wall temperature in these regions increases 
rapidly. [Birk, 1988] The increase of the wall temperature causes a degradation of the 
shell material properties and thus a decrease in the material strength. Otherwise, the heat 
transfer coefficients in the regions where the wall is wetted by the liquid are relatively 
high and the wall is cooled by the liquid as a result. The liquid phase is not usually 
homogeneous and while heated, the near-wall liquid becomes hotter and less dense so 
it rises reaching the interface with the vapour. This leads to a stratification phenomenon 
[Aydemir et al. 1988] which determines the increasing liquid temperature and thus the 
internal pressure to rise until it reaches a level where the pressure relief valve will open 
venting mass and resulting in the mixing of lading.  The thermal rupture of the tank 
depends on the tank internal pressure, the tank wall temperature distribution, and the 
tank material strength at the elevated temperature which exist during the fire. [Birk, 
1988] In this chapter all the phenomena and the related issues tanking place in such 
scenario are discussed. 
 
5.1 Material balances 
The material balances are strictly dependent by the presence of the PRV. The flux 
through the valve depend on the discharge pressure for which two fluxes can be 
registered: 
 Sonic flux  
 Supersonic flux 
The discharge pressure determines the critical conditions for which the supersonic flux 
occurs. This critical conditions are due to the compressibility of the vapour, in fact the 
flow through the PRV nozzle will increase to a maximum value as the downstream 
pressure is reduced, and any further decrease in the downstream pressure will not affect 
the flow. [Perry & Green, 2007] The determination of the appropriate methodology for 
the evaluation of mass flow through the PRV depends on the approximation considered 
for the situation: 
 Ideal gas  [API 520, 2014] 
 Non-ideal gas  [Leung & Epstein, 1988] or [CCPS, 1998] 
 Two-phase relief  [Leung & Nazario, 1992] or [Leung & Epstein, 1990] 
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The methods reported above are some of the guidelines available for determine the mass 
vented by the PRV (Φ̇). From this evaluation is possible to define the mass balances 
that relates the mass liquid variation to the vapour mass variation (eq. 5.1): 
𝑑𝑚𝑣
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑑𝑚𝑙
𝑑𝑡
− Φ̇        (5.1) 
Where 𝑚𝑣 and 𝑚𝑙 are respectively the vapour and the liquid mass. The rate of liquid 
evaporated is related to the liquid conditions (𝑇𝑙 and P), if the temperature of the liquid 
is lower that the boiling temperature of the liquid at the pressure inside the vessel then 
the heat absorbed by the liquid causes an increase in the liquid temperate (eq. 5.2), on 
the contrary the heat absorbed by the liquid causes an evaporation of the liquid itself, if 
the temperature of the liquid is higher than the boiling temperature (eq. 5.3). 
Not boiling liquid: 
𝑑𝑚𝑙
𝑑𝑡
= 0     (5.2) 
Boiling liquid:  −∆𝐻𝑣𝑎𝑝
𝑑𝑚𝑙
𝑑𝑡
= ?̇?𝑙
𝑖𝑛    (5.3) 
Where ∆𝐻𝑣𝑎𝑝 is the latent heat of vaporisation of the liquid and ?̇?𝑙
𝑖𝑛 is the heat load to 
the liquid and it will be discussed in the Paragraph 5.2.3. 
 
5.2 Heat transfer mechanisms and balances 
5.2.1 Fire  
Fire heat transfer to a tank is very case-specific. The fire heat input will depend on many 
variables, such as the fuel type, the wind conditions, the size of the fire, etc. It is only 
possible to discuss trends and likely case situations. [Birk, 1995] The fire that a general 
equipment can be subjected to is generally categorized as either a pool fire or a jet fire. 
A jet fire is a pressurized release of flammable gas and/or liquid with a high momentum, 
forming a cone shaped flame envelope in the direction of the release. Jet fires radiate 
high heat fluxes of about 230 kW/m2 when JP-type fuels are involved, and the 
momentum can push firewall protection away and burn through steel like a blow torch. 
Heat fluxes of hydrocarbon pool fires are significantly lower than for jet fire, due to the 
limited convective term associated to the flame velocity. May be expected to reach 
effective flame temperature of between 700-800 °C [Keltner et al. 1990] which gives a 
heat fluxes in the range of 70-100 kW/m2. [Birk, 1995] In this thesis work the focus is 
on LPG transportation issues, thus the fire impingement considered here is the pool fire. 
The flammable pool may develop from leakage of the fuel of vehicles involved in an 
accident or from the leakage of flammable liquid content, if hazmat tankers are involved 
in the accident.  
The thermal load from the flame to the tank is a combination of convection from the hot 
combustion products passing over the tank surface and radiation emitted by the flame 
to the tank surface. This event is complex and depends on several issues. [Landucci et 
al. 2009] In fact, the relative proportions of radiative and convective load from a flame 
varies depending on the fuel type and location of the tank within the flame, while the 
total heat loads depends on the fuel type, the size and shape and the location of the tank 
within the fire. Moreover the heat loads are not constant over the surface of the tank 
surface. [Roberts et al., 2004] In most cases, it can be assumed that the flame and the 
tank wall are diffuse grey bodies and that the ambient temperature of the surroundings 
 
45 
 
is low compared to the flame temperature. With this assumptions the heat flux absorbed 
by the tank wall can be expressed as:  
?̇?𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑒→𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙 = ?̇?𝑟𝑎𝑑 (𝜎𝜀𝑠(𝜀𝑓𝑇𝑓
4 − 𝑇𝑤
4)) + ?̇?𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 (ℎ(𝑇𝑓 − 𝑇𝑤))   (5.4) 
Where 𝜀𝑠 and 𝜀𝑓 are the flame and the steel surface emissivity, respectively, σ is the 
Stefan-Boltzmann constant, Tf and Tw are the flame and the wall temperature 
respectively, and h is the convective heat transfer coefficient of the flame. The worse 
case if the fire is sooty, in this case the vessel will become a black body (𝜀𝑠 = 1) 
receiving all the heat radiation. [Birk, 1995] 
5.2.2 Tank insulation and shell  
The heat transfers through the tank wall and associated coverings is determined by the 
temperature gradient in the radial direction. [Aydemir et al. 1988] The heat load is 
transported by mean conduction through the tank layers. In case of protected tank, the 
wall have an outer passive fire protection coating and the surrounding steel jacket.  The 
conduction through a solid material, written in cartesian coordinate system, is: 
?̇?𝑖𝑛 − ?̇?𝑜𝑢𝑡 =
𝛿
𝛿𝑥
(𝑘𝑥
𝛿𝑇
𝛿𝑥
) +
𝛿
𝛿𝑦
(𝑘𝑦
𝛿𝑇
𝛿𝑦
) +
𝛿
𝛿𝑧
(𝑘𝑧
𝛿𝑇
𝛿𝑧
)   (5.5) 
Where T is the temperature, t the time, c the heat capacity, ρ the density and k the thermal 
conductivity. 
The terms of heat entering and leaving the wall depend on the layer considered. The 
insulating material reaches the heat from the fire and transfer through conduction to the 
vessel inner walls. The latter then exchanges with the lading through both convection 
and radiation. The wall in contact with the vapour phase has low convective heat 
exchange coefficient  and thus the heat is not easily dispersed to the vapour and the 
temperature increases. As the wall reaches higher temperature, thermal radiation from 
the tank to the lading becomes increasingly important. A small part of radiation is 
absorbed by the vapour, because of the transparent nature of vapour, and the major 
proportion of radiative heat transfer is to the liquid surface facing to vapour-space wall. 
[Moodie, 1988] 
5.2.3 Liquid phase 
In the liquid zone the temperature is lower one, since the heat transfer coefficients are 
higher and the heat is dispersed from the wall to the liquid. The heat transfer mechanism 
at the initial phase is pure natural convection. In fact the liquid is heated from the bottom 
and by side, temperature difference between the liquid in contact with the walls and the 
liquid bulk, generate density gradients that drive the natural flow and it can give 
stratification, leaving a cold bulk in the middle and a hot layer around and at the top. 
[Birk, 1995] The effects of this phenomenon are discussed in section 5.3. If the heat flux 
is high enough the wall temperatures rises up and saturated or sub cooled nucleate 
boiling will start. Bubbles of gas start to form in contact with the wall and grow up, until 
they become big enough to go up to the liquid surface. If the heat flux is even bigger, 
there is a point where a film of gas is created by the wall and the heat transfer coefficient 
drops down intensely, and that is the critical flux. The qualitative behaviour of the liquid 
heat transfer coefficient, as called h, is illustrated in figure 5.1. The last transition 
indicates in the graph is from nucleate boiling and film boiling, this occurs when the 
temperature gradient increases and radiation takes place in the gaseous film on the wall. 
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As shown in section 5.2.1, a jet fire and a pool fire, are not credible that can provide a 
heat flux higher than critical heat flux: consequently, the transition from nucleate boiling 
and film boiling does not occur in the scenario considered here. 
 
Figure 5.1 - Behaviour of the liquid heat transfer coefficient with the driving force, the 
difference of temperature between the wall and the saturation temperature of the liquid at a 
given pressure [Kern, 1965] 
When the PRV opens up there is a quick drop in pressure, all the mass of liquid becomes 
superheated and it begins to boil. So, when the PRV opens, there is a good mixing effect 
in the liquid and the stratification disappear. Two different situations must be considered 
to write appropriate heat balance in the liquid phase: 
 Not boiling  temperature of liquid lower than boiling temperature of liquid at 
the internal pressure of vessel (eq. 5.6) 
 Boiling  Temperature of liquid higher than boiling temperature of liquid at the 
internal pressure of vessel (eq. 5.7) 
In the not boiling case the heat absorbed by the liquid causes an increase in the liquid 
temperature (eq. 5.6) while in the boiling case the heat absorbed by the liquid causes an 
evaporation of the liquid itself and thus the temperature of the liquid remain 
approximately constant (eq. 5.7) assuming that all the heat received is used for the 
evaporation, the balances follow: 
𝑚𝑙𝑐𝑣,𝑙
𝑑𝑇𝑙
𝑑𝑡
= ?̇?𝑙 + ?̇?𝑙𝑣       (5.6) 
𝑚𝑙𝑐𝑣,𝑙
𝑑𝑇𝑙
𝑑𝑡
≅ 0        (5.7) 
Where ml and cv,l are respectively the mass and the specific heat of the liquid, and Tl is 
the liquid temperature. The terms ?̇?𝑙 and ?̇?𝑙𝑣 are the heat loads to the liquid, ?̇?𝑙 is the 
heat received from convection with the liquid-space tank wall and the radiation from 
the vapour-space tank wall, ?̇?𝑙𝑣 is the heat exchange between the liquid and the vapour. 
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The latter is due the temperature difference between the two phases which determines a 
heat transfer process in the phase interface. The two equations are approximate, in fact 
another transfer mechanism is present in the liquid phase when stratification occurs, that 
is the transferring of heat to the sub-cooled bulk fluid (see section 5.3). [Aydemir et al. 
1988] 
5.2.4 Vapour phase 
The convective heat transfer coefficient for the vapour space is low and the wall 
temperature increases as the vapour temperature. The gas in the vapour space is 
superheated and severely stratified. [Aydemir et al. 1988] The entering heat load is by 
convection from the vapour-space tank wall and a small account of radiation, 
considering the vapour not transparent, in addition there is the heat provided from the 
liquid mass evaporated. The situations in which the heat balances change are in function 
of: 
 PRV opening (eq. 5.8) 
 PRV stay closed (eq. 5.9) 
if the PRV is open, a term is added to the stay closed balance (eq. 5.8) this term is related 
to the PRV which vents out mass dissipating heat from the vapour, as shown in eq. 5.9. 
𝑚𝑣𝑐𝑣,𝑣
𝑑𝑇𝑣
𝑑𝑡
= ?̇?𝑣 + ?̇?𝑙𝑣 +
𝑑𝑚𝑙
𝑑𝑡
𝐻𝑙      (5.8)  
𝑚𝑣𝑐𝑣,𝑣
𝑑𝑇𝑣
𝑑𝑡
= ?̇?𝑣 + ?̇?𝑙𝑣 +
𝑑𝑚𝑙
𝑑𝑡
𝐻𝑙 − Φ̇𝐻Φ     (5.9) 
Where mv and cv,v are respectively the mass and the specific heat of the vapour and Tv 
is the vapour temperature. ?̇?𝑣 is the heat received by convection and radiation from the 
tank wall and ?̇?𝑙𝑣 represent sthe heat exchange with the liquid phase. 𝐻𝑙 and 𝐻Φ are the 
entalpies associated respectively to the mass of liquid evaporated (
𝑑𝑚𝑙
𝑑𝑡
) and to the mass 
vented by the PRV (Φ̇) (see Section 5.1).  
 
5.3 Stratification phenomenon 
When a tank is heated from a fire the liquid is not usually heated uniformly, from 
experimental evidence the liquid at the bottom of the tank is cooler than the liquid on 
the top. [Birk, Cunningham, 1996] Thermal stratification occurs frequently in vessels 
of liquefied gases, such as LPG, due to external heating. This stratification effect has a 
relevant effect on safety aspect like BLEVE prediction and energy. [Birk & 
Cunningham, 1996] 
As said in paragraph 5.2.3, due to the heating of inner tank walls in the liquid-space, the 
fluid particles near the wall are heat and thus became less dense. They begin rising along 
the walls of the vessel. Upon reaching the liquid surface, these particles spread towards 
the centre and fall back into the cooler regions of the fluid, they then re-enter the 
boundary layer to repeat the above process. This recirculating natural convective flow 
establishes a vertical temperature gradient inside the tank, and thus the liquid became 
thermally stratified. [Aydemir et al., 1988] Due to this phenomenon, the liquid on the 
free surface has a higher temperature than the bulk liquid: the pressure in the vessel is 
controlled by this warmest liquid layer. It is possible to divide the lading liquid domain 
in three different zones [Aydemir et al. 1988] :  
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 a bulk liquid  in which the subcooled liquid is present;  
 a stratified liquid layer  zone from bulk to liquid–vapour interface 
 a boundary liquid layer  zone near to the hot walls, in which the liquid rises 
up to reach the interface due to the natural convection  
Figure 5.2 shows a schematisation of the several formed in the liquid-phase containing 
in the vessel exposed to fire. [D'Aluisa et al. 2014] 
 
Figure 5.2 – Schematisation of the thermohydraulic behaviour of liquid-phase lading in the 
vessel exposed to fire [D'Aluisa et al. 2014] 
The magnitude of the temperature gradient is a function of several parameters but for a 
given fluid and heat flux, experience indicates that the depth of lading is of primary 
importance; the lower the filling level, the less severe the stratification. Another 
observation from the laboratory vessel is the existence of vertically-upwards fluid 
motion near the bottom of the cylinder. In this region, fluid particles rise directly 
upwards and mix with the bulk of the fluid instead of attaching to the wall to form a 
boundary layer. This mechanism is important since it provides direct heating to the 
central core regions and also retards the initiation of boundary layer. [Aydemir et al. 
1988] 
The stratified temperature distribution is present until other processes dissipate the 
temperature gradient. The liquid stratification is affected by thermal and transport 
properties of the fluid, by the liquid vertical dimension and geometry, by distribution 
and rate of the heat source, by the PRV operation. Immediately after the start of fire 
exposure, stratification phenomena begin till the eventual opening of PRV. Then, the 
resulting boiling causes mixing effects reducing massively the stratification. If the PRV 
closes it is then observed that the stratification starts again. [Birk & Cunningham, 1996] 
So the de-stratification phenomena mainly depends on the behaviour and sizing of the 
PRV and on the heat power heating the tank. [Birk & Cunningham, 1996]  
The temperature-stratification effect is seen at all scales and it plays an important role 
in the outcome of an accident situation. Temperature stratification  determines the time 
to first opening of the PRV and it also affects the severity of the outcome since it affects 
the liquid energy at the time of failure. [Birk, 1995] The role of thermal stratification on 
BLEVE is important; for a given tank pressure, the average temperature of the liquid 
decreases as the liquid become more stratified. That is because the tank pressure is given 
by the top warm layer. So for a given release valve opening pressure there is less energy 
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in the liquid the more it is stratified. The response upon sudden depressurization does 
not only depend on the average liquid temperature. If the liquid is stratified, then the hot 
layers will be more super-heated than the cool layers, so the pressure recovery given by 
the boiling of the liquid will start earlier from the warm layer. Eventually, this can 
suppress the boiling from the cold layers, since also the hydrostatic pressure is 
contributing to this. If the temperature of the liquid is uniform the pressure recovery 
after the opening of the PRV is going to be stronger and therefore more likely to fail the 
tank. [Birk & Cunningham, 1996] 
On the other hand, the more the liquid is stratified the faster the pressure rises, so the 
time to PRV opening will be shorter if the liquid is stratified respect to a situation in 
which the liquid is homogenous. [Birk & Cunningham, 1996] The effect of the PRV 
opening are discussed in the following section 5.5.  
 
5.5 PRV opening effects  
When the PRV opens and vents vapour, the depressurization leads a boiling process, 
that consumes energy in the warmest liquid layers and the resulting bubble rise causes 
mixing in the warmest layer, so the combination of these effect reduces the stratification. 
So, as time progresses, continuous mixing of the fluid results in more uniform 
temperatures throughout the liquid. [Aydemir et al. 1988]  
The time to destratify depends on the tank scale and the PRV action which itself is 
controlled by the degree of fire exposure. If a tank is engulfed in fire the resulting large 
PRV flow will tend to destratify the liquid quickly, whereas if the tank is exposed to a 
small fire the liquid may not destratify at all. [Birk & Cunningham, 1996] While 
destratification takes place, little mass is being lost from the tank through the PRV, since 
most of the heat input is going into the bulk of the liquid (sub-cooled boiling where 
vapour-bubbles collapse into cooler core liquid) and not into vapour generation for 
venting. when the liquid temperature becomes uniform, the mass flow through the PRV 
increases because all of the fire heat is now going into vapour production at the PRV 
set pressure. This is when the liquid level starts to drop more rapidly. [Birk, 1995] While 
the liquid level decreases the tank surface area in contact with the vapour phase 
increases, and thus reducing the area with the liquid cooler effect. 
 
5.4 Vessel failure mechanisms 
A tank may suffer a failure during a fire for a number of reasons, for the horizontal 
cylindrical vessel these include: 
 uncontrolled pressure built-up due to heating or reaction 
 wall-thinning due to hoop stress and high-temperature material degradation 
 severe bending stressess due to thermal stresses induced by differential 
temperature on tank top and bottom 
 mechanical damage due to impacts, corrosion or poor manufacture 
Of the above types of failure, mechanical damage is difficult if not impossible to identify 
in an accident situation, as the severe bending stresses. The latter may not alone be 
capable of causing a failure but may cause premature failure when coupled to 
mechanical damage of some kind. Uncontrolled pressure build-up is strictly related to 
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the design and sizing of pressure relief system. While, wall thinning due to hoop stress 
and high-temperature material degradation is a likely scenario in the event that a tank 
in good condition is exposed to severe fire impingement. [Birk, 1995] In this scenario, 
with continuing fire attack the vapour metal walls weaken and commence plastic 
deformation at the hottest locations eventually leading to the formation of a creep. If the 
PRV opens the liquid level decreases and the tank surface in which the creep may form 
increases. Over some period of time, the creep results in the formation of a fissure or 
hole in the tank wall. This fissure may grow leading to the catastrophic failure or it may 
stop leading to a depressurisation due to the content discharge. This two scenarios 
depend on the condition of the wall and the thermodynamic condition of the tank 
contents. [Venart, 2000]  
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6 Modelling the thermal response of insulated vessels exposed to 
fire in presence of defective coatings: FEM simulations  
 
6.1 Theoretical background on defective coating  assessment 
Scant data are available for the characterisation and the modelling of defective coating 
used for the thermal insulation of vessels. The possible presence of defects in the 
thermal coating and the critical size of a defect in compromising the performance of the 
thermal protection system were never systematically explored before the past decade. 
[Scarponi et al. 2016] In fact, as discussed in paragraph 3.2.1, the first step through the 
characterisation of defective coatings has been through the thermographic inspection 
method proposed by Birk and Cunningham in 2000. [Birk & Cunningham, 2000] 
Subsequently, two bonfire trials were performed aimed at the definition of criteria to 
tests the performance of defective insulation system, one of which aimed to test the 
effect on a portion of tank shell of different coating deficiencies [VanderSteen & Birk, 
2003] and the other one tests the effect of small and large insulation defects on LPG 
filled tanks. [Birk et al. 2006] 
Nevertheless, there weren’t any studies on insulated tank exposed to fire with defective 
coating, the thermal behaviour of such system was investigated only in the past year by  
G. Emrys Scarponi et al. [Scarponi et al. 2016] which developed a thermal model 
supported by finite elements analysis and perform a study on the heat transfer 
mechanism inside the enclosure, which is discussed below. The finite elements method, 
discussed in this section, is aimed to reproduce the thermal response of defective 
coatings in order to define a specific set of key performance indicators (KPIs) aimed at 
provide a tool to facilitate the task of assessing the acceptability of a given degree of 
defectiveness.  
6.1.1 Heat transfer mechanism inside the defect enclosure 
Coating defect forms an enclosure between steel jacket and tank shell-wall, within there 
is a layer of air which can transfer the heat through convection, conduction and 
radiation. The hypothesis is that radiation is the dominant heat transfer mechanism. In 
fact, the radiative heat flux is proportional to the temperature raised to the fourth power 
and in the enclosure there is a high temperature gradient between the steel jacket 
temperature, which rises quickly up near to flame temperature, and the shell-wall 
temperature, which remains much lower especially if in contact with liquid-phase. 
[Landucci et al. 2011] On the other hand, the conductive and convective transports are 
expected to be low.  
The three mechanisms were modelled and tested in order to assess which of those is 
dominant and which is negligible. The tests were conducted through a mono-
dimensional finite volume model developed by Scarponi et al. [Scarponi et al. 2016] 
Therefore, three models were applied: the first model considers only the radiation 
mechanism, in the second also convection was considered and the third model considers 
a static layer of air in which the heat is transferred by conduction, in addition to the 
radiation between the two walls. In the computation of the radiation flux, it is assumed 
that each point forming the enclosure radiates and receives radiation towards and from 
all other points according to a view factor, which depends on the reciprocal position of 
the points. In the case of convection model, a convective heat transfer coefficient in the 
enclosure and the heat flows entering and leaving the latter, all solved in function of a 
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bulk temperature of the air in the gap. The heat transferred by conduction is written as 
the transient heat conduction equation for the air in the enclosure as a static layer, 
considering an air thermal conductivity. The three models were tested both for the case 
in which the inner wall is wetted by the liquid and for that in which the vessel content 
is in the vapour phase.  
The results confirm the hypothesis that the radiation is the dominant heat transfer 
mechanism and that the contribution of conduction and convection can be neglected, 
since the temperature profile in the air gap obtained from the second and third models 
have not appreciable deviation from the profile obtained with the first model. [Scarponi 
et al. 2016] 
 
6.2 Modelling approach and energy balace 
As mentioned before, the model supported by finite element analysis was developed by 
G. Emrys Scarponi et al. [Scarponi et al. 2016] and it is reported in this section.  
The Finite Element Method (FEM) is a numerical analysis technique with which is 
possible to obtain approximated solutions of exact solutions of interest. [Gubinelli, 
2003] The mathematical approach consist in the definition of a domain and the 
identification of a model describing the relations between the variables, coupled with 
proper boundary conditions. The FEM analysis discretizes the domain through a “mesh” 
of finite elements and calculates the solution of the problem in particular points, called 
“nodes”. 
In the model presented in this work, the domain of interest is an insulated vessels with 
deficiencies in its coatings. The model describing the problem consists in a transient 
heat balance and it is coupled with differential equations, as boundary conditions, which 
depend on the different zones identified in the domain. In an insulated vessels exposed 
to fire in presence of defective coatings, four different zones can be identified and thus 
four different boundary conditions are defined. Figure 6.1 shows the geometry of the 
problem with the different zones. 
 
Figure 6.1 – Sketch of the zones identified for the domain in the FEM model and assignment of 
boundary condition [Scarponi et al. 2016] 
Zone 1 and 2 are the external surfaces of the steel jacket. The first zone is impinged by 
the flames, while zone 2 considers the case of partially engulfing fire and represents the 
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not impinged area. In zone 1 the flame exchanges with the steel jacket through both 
radiative and convective mechanism, expressed respectively by eq. 6.2 and 6.3. The sum 
of these boundary conditions represents the total heat power entering the system. The 
mechanisms governing the first region are the same for zone 2 but the heat leaves the 
system. So, for zone 2 the radiative and convective flows are from the steel jacket to the 
ambient air, with the corresponding temperatures and properties, as shown in eq. 6.4.  
Zone 3 is the defect enclosure, the insulation is missing forming an air gap. The heat 
transport mechanisms in this region is discussed in paragraph 3.2.2, where is stated that 
radiation is the main heat transport mechanism inside this enclosure. Therefore, the 
boundary condition zone 3 is a radiative flux in which each point radiates and receives 
radiations towards and from all the other points forming the enclosure according to a 
view factor, which depends on the reciprocal position of the points. A deeper discussion 
of radiative heat exchange in enclosures can be find elsewhere [Modest, 2003].  
The last zone, zone 4, is the internal surface of the tank shell, where heat reaches the 
lading, both in vapour or in liquid phase, depending on the liquid level. In this thesis 
work, the model is used in its validation form. Thus, the entire internal surface was 
supposed to be in contact with air according to the experimental setup [VanderSteen & 
Birk, 2003] reported in section 3.3. So, the convective flux leaving the system written 
for zone 2 is used also here, as eq. 6.5 shows, but changing the correlation for the 
convective heat exchange coefficient. 
The governing equation, i.e. the transient heat balance, for a solid material can be written 
as: 
𝜌𝑐
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)    (6.1) 
Where T is the temperature, t the time, c the heat capacity, ρ the density and k the thermal 
conductivity. 
While the boundary conditions coupled with eq. 6.1 are: 
Zone 1 – radiative and convective flows entering the system: 
?̇?𝑟,𝑓 = 𝜎𝜀𝑠(𝑇𝐵𝐵
4 − 𝑇𝑤
4)       (6.2) 
?̇?𝑐,𝑓 = ℎ𝑓(𝑇𝑓 − 𝑇𝑤)       (6.3) 
Zone 2 – radiative and convective flows leaving the system: 
?̇?𝑟+𝑐,𝑜𝑢𝑡 = 𝜎𝜀𝑠(𝑇𝑤
4 − 𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑟
4 ) + ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟(𝑇𝑤 − 𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑟)    (6.4) 
Zone 4 – validation model, convective heat flux leaving the internal wall: 
?̇?𝑟+𝑐,𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑_𝑎𝑖𝑟 = 𝜎𝜀𝑠(𝑇𝑤
4 − 𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑟
4 ) + ℎ𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑_𝑎𝑖𝑟(𝑇𝑤 − 𝑇𝐿)   (6.5) 
Where σ is the Stefan-Boltzmann constant, Tw and εs are the temperature and the 
emissivity of the steel wall respectively, TBB is the black body temperature of the fire, 
Tf is the flame temperature, Tair is the ambient temperature. The black body temperature 
depends on the flame temperature and the emissivity assigned to the flame.  
εs is the emissivity of the steel wall, it depends from the temperature reached by the 
wall. Both the steel jacket and the tank wall are made of carbon steel, thus the average 
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value of the emissivity is set to 0.7 according with the temperature range of interest (0 
– 700 °C) [Eurocode 1, 2005]. 
The convective heat exchange coefficients hf and hair are, respectively, between the 
flame and the tank wall (zone 1) and between the tank wall and the ambient air (zone 
3). While hvalid_air is between the internal tank wall and the air (zone 4). For each 
convective coefficient is needed a correlation for evaluate its value. 
The convective coefficient hf is a function of the fluid dynamic regime of the flame 
impinging the tank wall, which depends in turn on the burning rate of the fire. For low 
momentum flames, as in the case of the simulated pool fire in the experiments, the 
coefficient can be estimated as follows [Knudsen et al. 1999]: 
𝑁𝑢 =
ℎ𝑓𝐿
𝑘𝑓
= 0.26 𝑅𝑒0.6 𝑃𝑟0.3      (6.6) 
Where Nu, Re and Pr are the Nusselt, Reynolds and Prandtl numbers respectively, L is 
the characteristic dimension of the system and kf is the thermal conductivity of the 
flame. Reynolds number introduces the regimes of flow, laminar or turbulent, with 
respect flame velocity, while Prandtl merges the fluid properties, function of 
temperature. [Mauri, 2012]  
For the determination of the natural convective heat transfer coefficient hair for 
cylindrical geometry, several correlation can be found in literature [Boetcher, 2014]. 
Most of them require the preliminary calculation of the Nusselt number (Nu) by 
empirical correlations: 
𝑁𝑢 =
ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝐿
𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑟
= 𝛼 𝑅𝑎𝛽       (6.7) 
Where kair is the thermal conductivity of the air, L is the characteristic dimension of the 
system and Ra is the Rayleigh number. Ra number is associated to the natural 
convection and, in the conditions considered here, its expected value varies between 
1010 and 1011 . [ Scarponi et al. 2016] According to King [King, 1932] for the expected 
Ra value range, the coefficients α and β are assumed equal to 0.13 and 0.33 respectively. 
The convective heat exchange coefficient hvalid_air was calculated using eq. 6.8, valid in 
case of natural convection under an inclined plate [Churchill & Chu, 1975].  
𝑁𝑢 = (0.825 +
0.387 𝑅𝑎1 6⁄
(1+(
0.492
𝑃𝑟
)
9 16⁄
)
8 27⁄ )
2
     (6.8) 
 
In addition to the assignment of the boundary conditions, material properties have to be 
defined for the steel and the insulation. Both the tank shell and the jacket are made of 
carbon steel, for which detailed thermal properties can be easily find in literature 
[Eurocode 1, 2005]. The thermal protection used in the test and its properties are 
reported in paragraph 3.3.1. 
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6.3 Numerical implementation on a distribuited parameters code 
The model was implemented on the ANSYS® software, using the ANSYS® 
Mechanical APDL Release 14.5 module [ANSYS inc, 2013], based on finite elements 
approach. The problem geometry was defined in order to reproduce the experimental 
apparatus describes in paragraph 3.3.1. The time step adopted in each implementation 
is set to 5 seconds. 
6.3.1 Types of models 
Three different models are implemented through a distributed parameters code: 
 Fully protected 
 Sealed 
 Defect 15.2 
A schematisation of the models is shown in figure 6.2, while table 6.1 reports a summary 
of the geometries and their properties. 
(a)         (b)    (c) 
Figure 6.2 – sketch of geometries (a) fully protected (b) sealed (c) defect 15.2 
The fully protected model has an insulation layer between the steel jacket and the tank 
wall. In the sealed geometry the coating is removed and air fills the empty space. The 
last model is a defective coating with a square air gap of 15.2 x 15.2 cm, which 
correspond to one of the defect geometries tested by Birk and VanderSteen. 
[VanderSteen & Birk, 2003] 
Table 6.1 – Summary of the models implemented with the FEM model 
  Fully protected Sealed Defect 15.2 
Steel jacket yes yes yes 
thickness 3 mm 3 mm 3 mm 
material carbon steel carbon steel carbon steel 
Tank shell    
thickness 16 mm 16 mm 16 mm 
material carbon steel carbon steel carbon steel 
Insulation yes no yes 
thickness 13 mm - 13 mm 
material ceramic - ceramic 
Defect no - yes 
area - - 231 cm2 
 
6.3.2 Mesh 
The volumes are meshed with the element SOLID90, indicated in the ANSYS [ANSYS 
inc, 2013] as suitable for transient thermal analysis. SOLID90 has 20 nodes and 6 faces.  
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Considering the cylindrical geometry, the axial and annular length of the elements are 
set at 50 mm whereas the radial dimension is 3 mm for the steel jacket, 3.25 mm for the 
insulation blanket and 3.2 mm for the tank shell.  
The mesh obtained using such geometric parameters is shown in figure 6.3. 
 
Figure 6.3 – Mesh implemented in the FEM model [Scarponi et al. 2016] 
 
6.3.3 Mesh independence 
Four simulations are set in order to run an independence analysis, the aim is to prove 
that the solution obtained with the previous setting is independent both from mesh and 
time step. Thus, a finer mesh is also implemented and the time step is reduced by half, 
the setting of the independence analysis is shown in table 5.1. The analysis is conducted 
on the geometry with square defect 15.2. 
In the fine mesh the axial and annular lengths of the elements are reduced from 50 mm 
to 30 mm, the radial dimensions of the insulation blanket and of the tank shell are 
reduced by half, 1.63 mm and 1.6 mm respectively, while the steel jacket radial 
dimension is kept unaltered (3 mm). Not all lengths are reduced by 50% because halving 
the dimensions generates an aspect ratio forbidden by the SOLID90 element. 
Nevertheless, the number of element created in the fine mesh is more that seventeen 
times the number of element of the coarse mesh, as shown in table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2 – Summary of independence tests conducted on the FEM model mesh 
Test ID Mesh Number of elements Time step (s) 
Baseline Coarse 1440 5 
01 Coarse 1440 2.5 
02 Fine 24624 5 
03 Fine 24624 2.5 
 
The results of the analysis are shown in figure 6.4, where the percentage difference of 
temperatures (see eq. 6.9)  is reported in function of time. The temperatures refer to the 
centre of the defect and their are obtained with the baseline (coarse mesh, wider time 
step) and with the finer mesh. 
∆𝑇% =
𝑇𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡−𝑇𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒
𝑇𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒
∗ 100        (6.9) 
 
 
Figure 6.4 – Mesh independence results 
 
In the first minute the results of tests with halving time step (01 and 03) diverge from 
the baseline of about 12% and thus, for graphic reasons, the first minutes is not reported 
in figure. Up to minute 2 the differences from the baseline is about 1% , from this point 
onward the percentage is less than unit. The results show that the solution of the coarse 
mesh is invariant with both the finer mesh and the shorter time step. This allow to use 
the coarse mesh and the wider time step for the simulations, saving computational time 
without compromising the results. 
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7 Evaluation of pressure build-up in tankers exposed to fire 
through lumped codes 
 
7.1 Overview of the lumped modelling approaches 
The modelling of the the pressure build-up of an equipment exposed to fire is a very 
complex problem. Different and particular problems must be solved, more specifically, 
the radiant flux over the target and the wall temperature behaviour must be modelled, 
then the possible failure conditions have to be analysed in order to assess the proper 
failure criteria to be adopted in the evaluation of the time to failure. The use of a 
distributed parameter approach (see chapter 6) would require many hours for 
preparation and for run time, which may be unacceptable even in the case of the analysis 
of a single scenario, limiting the analysis to a reduce number of accidents. Moreover, 
the uncertainty that affects the definition of the primary accidental scenarios will in any 
case affect the precision of the modelling results. [Landucci et al. 2009] Thus a lumped 
model approach was developed to evaluate the performance of tankers exposed to fire. 
This method requires less detailed information and it also obtains less accurate results 
which provides anyway a conservative but credible behaviour of the system. [Landucci 
et al. 2009] The easiness of use and the time-saving, few minutes for running, are key 
advantages of the lumped approach.  
The lumped model is based on the division of the domain in  different zone, called 
“nodes”. In each node conditions and properties of the material can be considered 
uniform, averaged over the node, and the variable of interest (pressure, temperature, ..) 
are function of time alone. Then is set the heat balance in each node, with attention at 
the boundary conditions between different region, and the global conservation laws, 
concerning both mass and heat, obtaining a set of equations time-dependent able to 
assess the thermal behaviour of the different nodes as the pressure behaviour of the 
system. [Landucci et al. 2009; Landucci et al. 2013] 
Several lumped models were developed from 1970 to nowadays for assessment of the 
thermal response of the vessels and its contents in case of fire exposure. These models 
generally concern horizontal cylindrical LPG vessels to engulfing fire and they allow 
the analysis of phenomena as the fire protection system influence or the PRV. [Landucci 
et al. 2009] The models and their developed setting are shown in tables 7.1. 
Table 7.1 – Available lumped parameter models, for the predicting the consequences of fire 
attack [Landucci et al. 2016]  
(FE = fully engulfed; PE = partially engulfed; JF = jet fire engulfment) 
Reference date Model Name Fire 
exposure 
Thermal 
insulation 
[Graves, 28] 1973  FE Yes 
[Johnson, 25 26] 1980-1998  FE Yes 
[Aydemir et al. 1988] 1987 PLGS-I FE No 
[Beynon et al. 1988] 1987 HEAT-UP FE Yes 
[Ramskill, 1988] 1984-1987 ENGULF I & II FE, PE No 
[Forrest, 1985] 1986 SAFIRE FE No 
[Birk, 1988]33 1988-2006 TANKCAR FE, PE No 
[Shebeko et al. 2000] 2000  FE Yes 
[Salzano et al. 2003] 2003  FE, JF No 
[Gong et al. 2004] 2004  FE No 
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[Lautkaski, 40] 2009 ENGULF II FE, PE No 
[Landucci et al. 2009] 23 2009 RADMOD FE, PE, JF Yes 
[Heymes et al., 42] 2013  DS No 
[Birk et al. 24] 2013  FE, PE No 
 
Between the models reported above, before 2006 only few models manage different 
vessel geometries and different vessel categories (e.g. ENGULF and SAFIRE) and only 
few models are able to predict correctly the influence of the PRV action (e.g. HEAT-
UP and Salzano et al. codes). Hence the need to develop a lumped model able to predict 
the time to failure of insulated and unprotected vessels of any type, atmospheric and 
pressurized, undergoing different modes of fire exposure, taking into account the 
influence of the PRV action. [Landucci et al. 2009] This model, namely RADMOD, and 
its enhancement for defective coatings, are the main items of this work. In the next 
section the novel RADMOD model implementations are described, section 7.2 focusing 
on the enhancements of the previously code and the novel implementation for defective 
coating is discussed in section 7.3. 
 
7.2 RADMOD code 
The RADMOD code was developed first by the PhD project of Gubinelli and then by 
[Landucci et al. 2013]. The novel versions of the RADMOD model for horizontal 
cylinders was developed by Bazzocchi [Bazzocchi, 2014] and subsequently enhanced 
by Nigro [Nigro, 2015] who also extended the model for vertical configurations.  
The last version of RADMOD model [Nigro, 2015] for horizontal cylinders is the basis 
of the code novel implementation for defective coatings presented in this thesis work. 
The updating are discussed in this section (7.2.2) and the fundamental equations 
implemented in the model are reported in appendix A. For what concerns the failure 
criteria adopted in the code, they are reported in Section 7.2.4. 
Moreover, three sub-models are available for the evaluation of thermal stratification 
phenomena, two of which are implemented in the novel RADMOD model and discussed 
in paragraph 7.2.5. Whereas, the more improvement of the RADMOD code for 
defective coatings is discussed in section 7.3.  
For further details on the RADMOD model and sub-models implementation refer to 
[Nigro, 2015] and previously works [Bazzocchi, 2014; Landucci et al. 2013]. 
7.2.1 Model set-up 
The thermal model was setup in MatLab, with a link to the Excel to allow the insertion 
of initial condition and have a simplified view of the results of the simulation which are 
collected in another Excel spreadsheet. In order to solve a system of First-Order 
differential equations an explicit solution procedure was chosen, i.e. Matlab ODE45 
solver. Explicit procedure in time is more simple to program, but requires small enough 
time steps to prevent numerical instability. So its simplicity and a medium order of 
accuracy has led us to choose this calculation procedure. [Nigro, 2015] 
Another assumption made is that the fluid inside the tank is a pure substance (propane). 
If a mixture (propane-butane for LPG case) is considered the simulation will be more 
complex because the different concentrations in vapour and liquid have be calculated. 
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[Landucci et al. 2009] So the mixing rules should be used to obtain an accurate thermal 
analysis. 
7.2.2 RADMOD nodes 
The first version of the code was developed for coated or unprotected equipment, 
vertical and horizontal pressurized vessels and for vertical or spherical atmospheric 
vessels. All mathematical equations consider a simplified framework of the equipment, 
without further details about nozzles, instrumentation or piping system. Moreover for 
both horizontal and vertical cylinders also the two semi-elliptical heads are neglected. 
The focus in this thesis is on the pressurized vessels, the nodes individuated for such 
problem by the fist version of RADMOD are schematic described in Figure 7.1. 
 
Figure 7.1 – Sketch of horizontal cylindrical tank of the RADMOD code [Landucci et al. 2013] 
The nodes are numbered from 1 to 8 and each of them indicates a specific zone of the 
tank wall or the thermal coating: 
 Node 1  Inner shell wall in contact with the liquid (not with the flame) 
 Node 2  Inner shell wall in contact with the vapour (not with the flame) 
 Node 3  Coating of the liquid side (not in contact with the flame) 
 Node 4  Coating of the vapour side (not in contact with the flame) 
 Node 5  Shell wall in contact with the liquid and not with the flame 
 Node 6  Shell wall in contact with the vapour and not with the flame 
 Node 7  Coating of the liquid side in contact with the flame 
 Node 8  Coating of the vapour side in contact with the flame 
This plan of the nodes is valid for the partial fire engulfment. In the novel version of the 
RADMOD code, the nodes not directly in contact with the flame (nodes 1,2,3,4) are not 
contemplated in the novel version. It is assessed to denominate the nodes keeping the 
pair of numbers and add two extra nodes in order to perform a better study of the 
behaviour of the protection layer and shell , as suggest by [Butler et al. 2001]. So six 
nodes for shell and coating are available: 
 Node 1-5  Inner shell wall in contact with the liquid 
 Node 2-6  Inner shell wall in contact with vapour 
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 Node 3-7  Coating of the liquid side 
 Node 4-8  Coating of the vapour side 
 Node iV  intermediate node between shell and coating of the vapour side 
 Node iL  intermediate node between shell and coating of the liquid side 
After these modification the final sketch for the RADMOD model for horizontal 
vessels is shown in Figure 7.2. 
 
Figure 7.2 Nodes illustration of horizontal cylindrical tank of the RADMOD code  
The mathematical formulation of the model is different in the cases with or without 
coating, depending on the shape. When an unprotected vessel is analysed, nodes 3-7 and 
4-8 are not present, so the two associated equations are not solved. However, in both 
cases the equations describing the behaviour of the liquid and vapour are the same. 
7.2.3 RADMOD variables and equations 
In the complete version of RADMOD Baseline applied to a coated horizontal tank there 
are 12 unknown variables so 12 equations are needed. The unknown variables are: 
 Liquid temperature 𝑇𝐿 
 Vapour temperature 𝑇𝑉 
 Internal pressure P 
 Level inside the tank L 
 Liquid mass 𝑚𝐿 
 Vapour mass 𝑚𝑉 
 Temperature of shell in contact with the liquid 𝑇15  
 Temperature of shell in contact with the vapour 𝑇26 
 Temperature of shell in contact with the flame on liquid side 𝑇𝑖𝐿 
 Temperature of shell in contact with the flame on vapour side 𝑇𝑖𝑉 
 Temperature of coating in contact with the flame on liquid side 𝑇37 
 Temperature of coating in contact with the flame on vapour side 𝑇48 
The thermodynamic implies to split the problem in two parts depending on the liquid 
saturation (see chapter 5), the system of equations is different if the liquid is sub-cooled 
or super-heated. So at every iteration through the check of pressure against the saturation 
pressure (Psat ) at the liquid temperature (TL ) is needed in order to have the right system 
of equations. If the pressure of the system is higher than saturation pressure the liquid 
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is sub-cooled otherwise it is superheated. The saturation pressure is evaluated through 
Antoine equation. The only energy balances to split in this two cases are the ones written 
for the lading (liquid and vapour phase) since the heat transfers through the tank layer 
(shell, coating and jacket) are not related to the liquid saturation.  
The improvements of the heat balances are reported below, whereas the failure criteria 
adopted in the code are reported in paragraph 7.2.4.  
Vapour transparency 
The first improvement of the RADMOD code regards the radiation received by the 
vapour phase. The vapour is not considered transparent to the radiation from the vapour-
space wall, thus the radiation received by the liquid is reduced by a quantity which is 
added to heat loads to the vapour, with respect to heat transfer coefficients between the 
vapour and the wall. Thus, the liquid and the vapour temperature balances are modified 
as shown in equation (7.1) and (7.2) for the liquid node and (7.6) and (7.7) for the vapour 
node. 
Liquid temperature (𝑇L)  Not boiling liquid:  
𝑚𝐿𝑐𝑣𝐿
𝑑𝑇𝐿
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑞𝐿,𝑏𝑜𝑖𝑙 + 𝑞𝐿,𝑟𝑎𝑑 + 𝑞𝐿𝑉     (7.1) 
Liquid temperature (𝑇𝐿)  Boiling liquid:    
𝑑𝑇𝐿
𝑑𝑡
= 0         (7.2) 
Where 𝑚𝐿is the liquid mass, 𝑐𝑣𝐿 is the heat capacity of liquid at constant volume. Since 
the liquid can be assumed uncompressible, the specific heat at constant volume is 
considered equal to the specific heat at constant pressure (𝑐𝑝𝐿). 𝑞𝐿𝑉 is the convective 
and radiative heat power between the vapour-phase and the liquid-phase. The terms 
𝑞𝐿,𝑏𝑜𝑖𝑙 and 𝑞𝐿,𝑟𝑎𝑑  are the convective and radiative heat powers received by the liquid 
from the walls, the convection is from the liquid-space walls and the radiation from the 
vapour-space ones. The radiative contribution is define as: 
𝑞𝐿,𝑟𝑎𝑑 = 𝐴26𝑖𝑛𝑡𝜎𝜀𝐹𝑣,𝐿(𝑇26
4 − 𝑇𝐿
4) − 𝑞𝑉,𝑟𝑎𝑑    (7.3) 
Where 𝜀 is the steel emissivity, σ is the Stefan-Boltzmann constant (5.6703x10-8) , 𝐹𝑣,𝐿is 
the view factor between the tank wall and the liquid surface, 𝐴26𝑖𝑛𝑡 and 𝑇26  are the 
internal surface of node26, facing on the lading and its temperature. 𝑞𝑉,𝑟𝑎𝑑 is the 
radiation received by the vapour, thus, the novel term, defined as: 
𝑞𝑉,𝑟𝑎𝑑 = 𝐴26𝑖𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑉,𝑟(𝑇26 − 𝑇𝑉)      (7.4) 
Where the radiative heat-transfer coefficient from the wall to the vapour-phase (ℎ𝑉,𝑟) is 
calculate by the empirical correlation [Perry & Green, 1997]: 
ℎ𝑉,𝑟 = 5.6783
[(
𝑇26
100
)
4
−(
𝑇𝑉
100
)
4
]0.173
(𝑇26−𝑇𝑉)
     (7.5) 
The term of absorbed radiation by the vapour-phase in then added to the vapour node 
energy balance, as follows: 
Vapour temperature (𝑇𝑉)  Not boiling liquid:   
𝑚𝑉𝑐𝑣𝑉
𝑑𝑇𝑉
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑞𝑉 + 𝑞𝑉,𝑟𝑎𝑑 − 𝑞𝐿𝑉 − 𝑧𝑧𝜙
𝑅𝑇𝑉
𝑀𝑊
    (7.6) 
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Vapour temperature (𝑇𝑉)  Boiling liquid: 
𝑚𝑉𝑐𝑣𝑉
𝑑𝑇𝑉
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑞𝑉 + 𝑞𝑉,𝑟𝑎𝑑 − 𝑞𝐿𝑉 − 𝑧𝑧𝜙
𝑅𝑇𝑉
𝑀𝑊
+
𝑑𝑚𝐿
𝑑𝑡
(𝑐𝑣𝑉(𝑇𝑉 − 𝑇𝐿) − 𝑧𝑧
𝑅𝑇𝐿
𝑀𝑊
) (7.7) 
Where 𝑚𝑉 is the vapour mass, 𝑐𝑣𝑉 is the heat capacity of vapour at constant volume, zz 
is the compressibility factor, Ф is the mass flux discharged from PRV, R is the ideal gas 
constant and MW is the molecular weight. If the pressure relief valve is not installed or 
it is closed Ф is equal to zero simplifying the equation. The heat power 𝑞𝑉 is the 
convective contribution pf the vapour-space walls. 
Heat load from the flame 
The heat flux from the flame to the shell was set as a constant input data in the previously 
version of the RADMOD code, in the novel implementation the input data are different 
and require to set the flame temperature and the flame emissivity, allowing the 
evaluation of a dynamic heat flux with respect to the wall effective temperature. The 
total flux from the flame to the external nodes can be expressed as the sum of a 
convective and a radiative contribution (𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡 = 𝐼𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 + 𝐼𝑟𝑎𝑑). The radiative term is 
written in function of the generic temperature of the wall, in order to adapt the equation 
by replacing the generic wall temperature with the specific temperature, as shown 
below: 
𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡 = (𝜎𝜀𝑠(𝜀𝑓𝑇𝑓
4 + (1 − 𝜀𝑓)𝑇𝑎𝑚𝑏
4 )  − (𝜎𝜀𝑠𝑇𝑤
4)) 𝐹𝑣,𝑎 + (1 − 𝐹𝑣,𝑎)𝜎𝜀𝑠𝑇𝑎𝑚𝑏
4  (7.8) 
Where 𝑇𝑤 is the generic wall temperature, 𝑇𝑓 is the flame temperature, 𝜀𝑓 and 𝜀𝑠 are the 
emissivity of the flame and of the steel wall, respectively, σ is the Stefan-Boltzmann 
constant (5.6703x10-8). 𝐹𝑣,𝑎 is a shape factor, it takes into account the case of distant 
source, in which the near-flame shell exchanges both with the ambient air and with the 
distant flame. Equation (7.8) is suggested by Heymes et al. through the study of an LPG 
tank exposed to fire. [Heymes et al. 2013] In the novel version of RADMOD 𝐹𝑣,𝑎 is 
implemented to allow further development, thus its value is currently set equal to the 
unit. 
Partial engulfment 
In case the flame impingement affects only a portion of tank, the equations set remains 
unchanged as well as the nodes division, the only difference concerns the exchange 
areas between the flame and the external nodes. Thus, the temperatures obtained by the 
code are average over the nodes. The idea comes from the first RADMOD version 
[Landucci et al. 2013] where, in case of distant source, the nodes kept their configuration 
and only the external areas of exchange were modified. This improvement affects the 
balances of external nodes, node37 and node48 in case of coated tank or nodeiL and nodeiV 
if the vessel is unprotected, since the other two external nodes are not present, see Figure 
7.2.  
Unprotected tank   external nodeiL and nodeiV (𝑇𝑖𝑉 and  𝑇𝑖𝐿)   
𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠𝐿
𝑠𝑠
2
𝐴𝑖𝐿̅̅ ̅̅
𝑑𝑇𝑖𝐿
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝑖𝐿,𝐹𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡,𝐿 − 𝐴𝑖𝐿,𝐴𝐼𝑎𝑚𝑏,𝐿−𝐴𝑖𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑘𝑠𝐿
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝐿 − 𝑇15)   (7.9) 
𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠𝑉
𝑠𝑠
2
𝐴𝑖𝑉̅̅ ̅̅
𝑑𝑇𝑖𝑉
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝑖𝑉,𝐹𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡,𝑉−𝐴𝑖𝑉,𝐴𝐼𝑎𝑚𝑏,𝑉 − 𝐴𝑖𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑘𝑠𝑉
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝑉 − 𝑇26)  (7.10) 
Coated tank   external node37 and node48 (𝑇37 and  𝑇48)  
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𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑝𝑖
𝑠𝑖
2
𝐴37̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑𝑇37
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴37,𝐹𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡,𝐿−𝐴37,𝐴𝐼𝑎𝑚𝑏,𝐿 − 𝐴37𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑘𝑖𝐿
𝑠𝑖
(𝑇37 − 𝑇𝑖𝐿)     (7.11) 
𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑝𝑖
𝑠𝑖
2
𝐴48̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑𝑇48
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴48,𝐹𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡,𝑉 − 𝐴48,𝐴𝐼𝑎𝑚𝑏,𝑉 − 𝐴48𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑘𝑖𝑉
𝑠𝑖
(𝑇48 − 𝑇𝑖𝑉)  (7.12) 
Where d, cp, k and s are respectively the density, the heat capacity, the thermal 
conductivity and the thickness of the steel, with subscript, or relative to the insulation, 
depending by the subscript s or i.  
The areas ( 𝐴𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ) represent the average nodal areas, the heat leaving the systems to the 
inner nodes is expressed in each equation as:  𝐴𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒,𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑘
𝑠
(𝑇𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 − 𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒), and 
represents the power heat transferred by conduction from the node of interest to the 
internal layer of the tank with which the node is in contact.   
In case of partial engulfment 𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐿/𝑉 and 𝐼𝑎𝑚𝑏𝐿/𝑉 are respectively, the heat flux that the 
shell receives from the flames and the heat flux transferred by the shell wall to the 
ambient air, on the liquid or vapour shell space depending by the subscript L or V. 
The areas with the subscript F or A represent the surfaces engulfed by the flame (F) and 
the not engulfed surfaces in contact with ambient air (A). They are defined in equations 
set (7.13) and (7.14) respectively.  
Fully engulfed tank 
𝐴𝑒𝑥𝑡_𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒,𝐹 = 𝐴𝑒𝑥𝑡_𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒       (7.13a) 
𝐴𝑒𝑥𝑡_𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒,𝐴 = 0        (7.13b) 
Half engulfed tank 
𝐴𝑒𝑥𝑡_𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒,𝐹 =
𝐴𝑒𝑥𝑡_𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒
2
       (7.14a) 
𝐴𝑒𝑥𝑡_𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒,𝐴 =
𝐴𝑒𝑥𝑡_𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒
2
       (7.14b) 
The total external area of the node is 𝐴𝑒𝑥𝑡_𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒, and it is calculated only on geometrical 
considerations on the tank geometry and on the liquid level. Whereas, the other terms 
depend on the engulfment degree, when the tank is partially engulfed the external 
surface of the nodes are halved and each half is redefined as the subscripted areas (F) 
and (A), respectively (eq. set 7.14). If the tank is fully engulfed in the flame, the areas 
which exchange with ambient (A) are set to zero, whereas the areas which exchange 
with the flame (F) are set equal to the totality of the external nodal surface (eq. set 7.13). 
So, in this case, the outgoing terms from the walls to the air being zero.  
Thermal conductivity of insulation  
The last novel implementation regards the input data required for the coating layer. This 
include the setting of the thermal conductivity, which could be insert as a constant or, if 
more information are available, as temperature dependent values. The second case is 
the new implementation, there are three values to insert depending on the temperature 
range and defining three thermal conductivities: kiL, kiV and kiJ. The subscripts refer to 
different zone with which the insulation is in contact: the liquid wetted wall (L), the 
vapour space wall covered by the coating (V) and the external steel jacket (J). Each 
thermal conductivity differs from the others by the temperature range which is expected 
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to be reached in the zone in contact with the insulation. Thus, for coated tank, kiJ is 
associated to the external nodes (node37 and node48), kiL and kiV are indeed associated to 
the intermediate nodes (nodeiL and nodeiV) respectively. 
7.2.4 Failure criteria 
Two different failure criteria are used in the RADMOD code for the evaluation of the 
time to failure (ttf) of the tank. Both predict a conservative ttf, the first is the more 
simplified and conservative using the Von Mises criterion for the evaluation of ttf, 
whereas the second criterion is based on the standard BS7910:2013 “Guide to methods 
for assessing the acceptability of flaws in metallic structures”. [BS7910, 2013] 
Von Mises criterion 
The axial (𝜎𝑎𝑥), the circumferential (𝜎𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐) and the equivalent (𝜎𝑒𝑞) stresses, according 
to Von Mises, are calculated as follows: 
𝜎𝑎𝑥 =
𝑃𝑅𝑒
2𝑠𝑠
        (7.15a) 
𝜎𝑎𝑥 =
𝑃𝑅𝑒
𝑠𝑠
        (7.15b) 
𝜎𝑒𝑞 = √𝜎𝑎𝑥
2 + 𝜎𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐
2 − 𝜎𝑎𝑥𝜎𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐      (7.16) 
The equivalent stress is compared with the admissible stress of the material (𝜎𝑎𝑑𝑚) that 
is a function of temperature. For the evaluation of the admissible stress, the yield 
strength of the material (𝜎𝑌) is divided for a safety factor (S.F.), considered equal to 1.1 
in this work, which considers all the welds and the other unknown details that makes 
the vessel weaker: 
 𝜎𝑎𝑑𝑚 =
𝜎𝑌(𝑇𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑙)
𝑆.𝐹.
       (7.17) 
The temperature at which is evaluated the yield strength is the maximum temperature 
among those of the shell nodes. This approach is the most easy and conservative for the 
evaluation of the ttf because the yield strength is calculated at the 0.2% of deformation, 
so it considers only the elastic field. The time to failure of the vessel is predicted through 
equation (7.18) as the first time when the following inequality is no more verified: 
𝜎𝑒𝑞 > 𝜎𝑎𝑑𝑚        (7.18) 
As already said, the results obtained from this criterion are very conservative, anyway 
in an actual accident there can be unpredictable severe damage on the shell itself and 
this results gives an idea of the worst real-case. 
Standard BS7910:2013 
The criterion used in the code is the basic application, low level called option 1, of the 
standard “Guide to methods for assessing the acceptability of flaws in metallic 
structures”. [BS7910, 2013] It evaluates the ductile rupture considers the flaws in the 
material, in particular the weld as the critical zones. The crack propagation mode 
considered in this work is Mode I where the crack is opened by a tensile stress normal 
to the plane of the crack. Knowing detailed information on metallic surface much more 
detailed results could be obtained compared with the simplified approach explained 
above.  
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This criterion can be seen graphically in Figure 7.3, the assessment line is obtained by 
two dimensionless parameters: the load ratio (𝐿𝑟) and the fracture ratio (𝐾𝑟), defined in 
eqations (7.80 and 7.82) respectively. Inside the curves the stress is acceptable and the 
crack won’t propagate, outside the curve the stress is too high so the tank is expected to 
fail: 
 
Figure 7.3 – Failure criteria according to BS7910:2013 [BS7910, 2013] 
The load ratio is defined as: 
𝐿𝑟 =
𝜎𝑒𝑞
𝜎𝑌(𝑇𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑙)
        (7.19) 
Where the equivalent stress can be evaluated with the Von Mises criteria and it is 
divided by the yield strength at the temperature of the material. The maximum value of 
the loading rate: 
𝐿𝑟,𝑚𝑎𝑥 =
𝜎𝑢+𝜎𝑌
2𝜎𝑌
        (7.20) 
Where 𝜎𝑢 is the ultimate tensile strength of the material. If no material data is available 
it can be conservatively considered 1.  
The fracture ratio is calculated as:   
𝐾𝑟 =
𝐾1
𝐾𝑚𝑎𝑡
        (7.21) 
 
Where 𝐾1 is the stress intensity factor for the crack and 𝐾𝑚𝑎𝑡 is the material toughness. 
For the penny shaped crack, considered in RADMOD model: 
𝐾1 = 2σmax,Mohr√
𝑎
𝜋
       (7.22) 
𝑎 is the radius of the crack with a set value of 2.5 mm, σmax,Mohr is the maximum stress 
obtained by the Mohr circle which corresponds to the circumferential stress 𝜎𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐 in this 
case. 𝐾𝑚𝑎𝑡  derives from material information and for the analysis of steel structures 
can be settled to 50 Mpa m0.5. 
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Knowing 𝐾r and 𝐿𝑟 at every iteration it is possible to enter the graph and check if the 
shell can hold the pressure or it is expected to fail. For level 1 assessment the curve can 
be numerically evaluated as follows: 
 𝐿𝑟 ≤ 1    →   𝑓(𝐿𝑟) = (1 + 0.5𝐿𝑟
2)−
1
2[0.3 + 0.7𝑒−𝜇𝐿𝑟
6
]  (7.23a) 
 1 < 𝐿𝑟 < 𝐿𝑟,𝑚𝑎𝑥   →   𝑓(𝐿𝑟) = 𝑓(1)𝐿𝑟
𝑁−1
2𝑁    (7.23b) 
 𝐿𝑟 ≥ 𝐿𝑟,𝑚𝑎𝑥            →   𝑓(𝐿𝑟) = 0    (7.23c) 
Where 𝜇 = min (0.001
𝐸
𝜎𝑌
 ; 0.6)  and 𝑁 = 0.3 (1 −
𝜎𝑈
𝜎𝑌
) with E the Young module of 
material and for steel ASTM-A36 it is around 200Gpa [Engineering ToolBox, 2016]. 
7.2.5 Simplified stratification sub-models   
Three simplified stratification sub-models are available in the RADMOD code, two of 
which are from literature and the third one is developed and tuned also on 
Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) calculations. Basically, the stratification sub-
models split the liquid into two or three nodes individuating a liquid bulk at constant 
temperature and one or two nodes which are responsible for all the heat exchange and 
thus their temperature results altered. For all the theoretical consideration on the 
stratification and, in particular, on the effect on it of the PRV opening, see section 5.3. 
The latter effects are implemented in the model stopping the stratification sub-model at 
the first PRV opening, switching to the Baseline RADMOD model. 
Generally, all the stratification sub-models are not good for coated tank as the time scale 
is longer and it is not reasonable that the bulk keeps the initial temperature with no heat 
exchange for the whole process. [Bazzocchi, 2014] For this reason, in this work only 
the third stratification sub-model (called Strat 3) is implemented in order to upgrade it 
with the novel parameters tuned by A. Rum [Rum, 2015] so for details and equations 
on the other two models (called Strat 1 and Strat 2) refer to [Bazzocchi, 2014]. 
Strat 3 
This approach is proposed by Bazzocchi [Bazzocchi, 2014] and further tuned in CFD 
simulations by Rum [Rum, 2015]. The version proposed in this work implements the 
upgrade obtained by Rum’s CFD simulations, in the lumped RADMOD model. 
The approach is similar to the Strat 1 proposed by Birk [Birk, 2013], it is based on 
simplifying assumptions that do not involve the resolution of equations of motion. The 
liquid is split into two nodes considering that all the input heat is received by an upper 
stratified layer, laying above the bulk phase at constant temperature (see Figure 7.4). 
 
Figure 7.4 – Lading nodes according to the Strat 3 model [Bazzocchi, 2014] 
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The equations system is the same as in the Baseline RADMOD, the only difference is 
in the liquid mass, where instead of the whole liquid mass there is just the stratified 
layer part. Since all the heat received by the liquid goes to the stratified layer, to solve 
the system of equation a novel fitting parameter has to be entered: the height of the 
stratified layer h1. Strat 1 model just assumed a constant thickness for the boundary 
layer used as fitting parameter that is difficult to tune and adapt to different geometries 
and was derived only for large scale configurations. Instead, as discussed on the 
following, the parameter was subjected to extended validation based first on 
experimental results [Bazzocchi, 2014] and then results of detailed CFD modelling. 
[Rum, 2015] 
The previously prediction of the value of ℎ1  is found by comparison of several 
RADMOD simulations against experimental data, changing the value to perfectly match 
the the time to open of the PRV, it results in the following correlation: 
ℎ1
𝐷𝑖
= 0.0861√
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛,𝑃𝑅𝑉−𝑃𝑖𝑛
𝐷𝑖𝐹𝐷
      (7.24) 
Where 𝐷𝑖 is the inner diameter of the tank (in m), the pressure difference (in bar) is 
given by the opening pressure of the PRV and the initial pressure of the tank and 𝐹𝐷 is 
the initial volumetric filling level as a fraction, empty is 0 and full is 1. 
The novel correlation for the evaluation of the height of the stratified layer is reported 
below in equation (7.25) and the relative coefficient values are reported in Table 7.3: 
ℎ1
𝐷𝑖
= 𝑎1 + 𝑎2 ∙ 𝐹𝐷 + 𝑎3 ∙ 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝐹𝑙𝑢𝑥 + 𝑎4 ∙ (𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛,𝑃𝑅𝑉 − 𝑃𝑖𝑛)  (7.25) 
Where the not-already defined variable is the  𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝐹𝑙𝑢𝑥 expressed in 𝑊/𝑚2, this 
parameter is calcuted through equation (7.8) setting the value of 𝑇𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙 equal to the initial 
temperature 𝑇𝑖𝑛, int his way the maximum heat flux over the external wall is evaluated 
and thus a maximum value of ℎ1 is obtained. 
 
Table 7.3 – Coefficient values for the evaluation of ℎ1 in the novel implementation of Strat 3 
model [Rum, 2015] 
coefficient value 
a1 −0.1042 
a2 0.3027 
a3 1.2 ∙ 10−6 
a4 −8 ∙ 10−9 
 
Quite clearly, the value of ℎ1 cannot exceed the level in the tank. In case the correlation 
results in values of ℎ1 higher than the actual height occupied by the liquid, it means the 
stratification phenomenon is not relevant. This usually occurs for low values of 
volumetric filling level, as documented by experimental observations [Heymes et al. 
2013]. The MatLab code checks this and in the case of no stratification it just runs the 
Baseline RADMOD. 
Once it is known the value of ℎ1, the mass of the liquid going into the equations system 
is simply derived; it is possible to evaluate the ‘level’ of the bulk (𝐿𝑏𝑢𝑙𝑘) as: 
𝐿𝑏𝑢𝑙𝑘 = 𝐿 − ℎ1        (7.26) 
So the mass of the bulk and of the stratified layer are: 
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𝑚𝑏𝑢𝑙𝑘 = 𝜌𝐿𝑅𝑖
2𝑊 (cos−1 (
𝑅𝑖−𝐿𝑏𝑢𝑙𝑘
𝑅𝑖
) − sin (
𝑅𝑖−𝐿𝑏𝑢𝑙𝑘
𝑅𝑖
) (
𝑅𝑖−𝐿𝑏𝑢𝑙𝑘
𝑅𝑖
))  (7.27) 
𝑚𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡.𝐿. = 𝑚𝑡𝑜𝑡,𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 − 𝑚𝑏𝑢𝑙𝑘      (7.28) 
This model is active only before the opening of the PRV and the evaporated part is 
small, the bulk layer is considered at constant mass and temperature so all the heat and 
mass exchange is happening with the stratified liquid layer. At the opening of the PRV 
an instant mixing occurs, so to evaluate the average liquid temperature it is possible to 
do an energy balance to a perfect mixer: 
𝑚𝐿𝑐𝑝𝐿(𝑇𝐿 − 𝑇𝑏𝑢𝑙𝑘) = 𝑚𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑝𝐿(𝑇𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 − 𝑇𝑏𝑢𝑙𝑘) (7.29) 
Where 𝑚𝐿 is the total liquid mass and 𝑐𝑝𝐿 is the specific heat of the liquid evaluated at 
an average temperature of the temperature difference multiplying it. 
Since all the heat received by the liquid goes to the stratified layer, the equations system 
is the same as in the Baseline RADMOD, the only difference is in the liquid mass, where 
instead of the whole liquid mass there is just the stratified layer part. 
 
7.3 Upgrade of the lumped model: simulation of defective coatings 
The RADMOD model described in the previously section allows the prediction of the 
behaviour of unprotected and coated tanks, in this thesis work it is implemented a 
thermal sub-model able to predict the response of the coating in presence of defects in 
itself. Chapter 3 is aimed to characterize this thermal insulation defects, there can be 
seen that the defects in insulation systems considered in this work are air gaps formed 
between the external steel jacket and the shell of the vessel. The phenomena taking place 
in this enclosure are described in paragraph 6.1.1. 
For the implementation of the sub-model, first the nodes division is revised through a 
geometrical analysis of the problem, then the heat exchanges between the nodes are 
modified to add the terms related to the novel nodes. The model is validated against 
experimental data explained in section 3.4, and the validation results are discussed in 
section 9.3. Due to the particular conditions used in the experimental tests used for the 
model validation another sub-model is needed, this is reported in paragraph 7.3.2. Both 
the Baseline and the Strat 3 RADMOD models are enhanced for the simulation of 
defective coatings and are implemented in the RADMOD sub-model. 
7.3.1 Thermal sub-model for defects on thermal insulation system 
RADMOD nodes 
The nodes division of the Baseline code is modified and four new nodes are individuated 
for the defective zone, a sketch of the section of the tank and the related division in 
nodes are shown in Figure 7.5 and 7.8.   
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Figure 7.5 – Sketch of the vessel and the related node division in the novel RADMOD model 
for defective coatings 
 
Figure 7.6 – Node division in the novel RADMOD model for defective coatings 
The nodes considered in Section 7.2.2 are the same in this novel sub-model, with the 
addition of four new nodes: 
 Node d1  Shell wall in contact with the liquid and with the air gap  
 Node d2  Shell wall in contact with the vapour and with the air gap 
 Node d3  Coating defect of liquid side (air gap) 
 Node d4  Coating defect of vapour side (air gap) 
 
The input data required in this thermal sub-model are reported below and can be seen 
in Figure 7.7:  
 Defect top height ( 𝐻𝑡𝑜𝑝) 
 Defect bottom height ( 𝐻𝑏𝑡𝑚) 
 Defect length ( 𝐿𝑑𝑒𝑓)  
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Figure 7.7 – Required input defect data in the novel RADMOD model for defective coatings 
Knowing the liquid level in every iteration the code estimates the defect area in the 
vapour or in the liquid space. The greatest difficulty was to define the novel exchange 
areas and upgrade the existing ones, as mentioned in the previously section, the 
definition of three areas for each nodes could be reviewed to make the model easier to 
handle.  
Defective areas definition 
First the angles formed by the top and bottom heights of the defect are calculated 
through the equations set (7.30) and the angles sketch is shown in Figure 7.8. 
 
 
Figure 7.8 – Definition of defect angles in the novel RADMOD model 
𝛼𝑡𝑜𝑝 = acos (
(𝑅𝑒+𝑠𝑖)−𝐻𝑡𝑜𝑝
𝑅𝑒+𝑠𝑖
)      (7.30a) 
𝛼𝑡𝑜𝑝 = acos (
(𝑅𝑒+𝑠𝑖) −𝐻𝑏𝑡𝑚
𝑅𝑒+𝑠𝑖
)      (7.30b) 
Where 𝑅𝑒 is the external radius of the vessel and 𝑠𝑖 is the thermal insulation thickness. 
Now, three cases are possible: the defect is both in liquid and vapour space or the defect 
is only in one phase space, liquid or vapour. The model checks this condition comparing 
the height of defect with the liquid level, in every iteration. Thus the areas can be defines 
as shown in equations (7.31a-7.38a). Whereas the averaged value of the nodal defect 
areas is expressed in general form in equation (7.39): 
Defect in both liquid and vapour space 
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𝐴𝑑1,𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝐿𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑅𝑖  (acos (
𝑅𝑖−𝐿
𝑅𝑖
) − 𝛼𝑏𝑡𝑚)     (7.31a) 
𝐴𝑑1,𝑒𝑥𝑡 = 𝐿𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑅𝑒  (acos (
𝑅𝑒−𝐿
𝑅𝑒
) − 𝛼𝑏𝑡𝑚)    (7.32a) 
𝐴𝑑2,𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝐿𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑅𝑖  (𝛼𝑡𝑜𝑝 − acos (
𝑅𝑖−𝐿
𝑅𝑖
))     (7.33a) 
𝐴𝑑2,𝑒𝑥𝑡 = 𝐿𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑅𝑒  (𝛼𝑡𝑜𝑝 − acos (
𝑅𝑒−𝐿
𝑅𝑒
))    (7.34a) 
𝐴𝑑3,𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝐴𝑑1,𝑒𝑥𝑡       (7.35a) 
𝐴𝑑3,𝑒𝑥𝑡 = 𝐿𝑑𝑒𝑓(𝑅𝑒 + 𝑠𝑖) (acos (
(𝑅𝑒+𝑠𝑖)−𝐿
𝑅𝑒+𝑠𝑖
) − 𝛼𝑏𝑡𝑚)   (7.36a) 
𝐴𝑑4,𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝐴𝑑2,𝑒𝑥𝑡       (7.37a) 
𝐴𝑑4,𝑒𝑥𝑡 = 𝐿𝑑𝑒𝑓(𝑅𝑒 + 𝑠𝑖) (𝛼𝑡𝑜𝑝 − acos (
(𝑅𝑒+𝑠𝑖)−𝐿
𝑅𝑒+𝑠𝑖
))   (7.38a) 
𝐴𝑑̅̅̅̅ =
𝐴𝑑,𝑖𝑛𝑡+𝐴𝑑,𝑒𝑥𝑡
2
       (7.39) 
Where 𝑅𝑖 is the internal radius of the vessel and 𝐿 is the liquid level, thus acos (
𝑅−𝐿
𝑅
) 
represents the angle formed by the liquid level defined in the same way as 𝛼𝑡𝑜𝑝 and 
𝛼𝑏𝑡𝑚 are defined in equations set (7.30). 
The case in which the defect is only on the liquid side can happen only if the initial 
value of 𝐻𝑡𝑜𝑝 results lower that the liquid level. Whereas the other case, defect in vapour 
side only, corresponds to 𝐻𝑏𝑡𝑚 greater than 𝐿 and it can also take place during the 
simulation due to level falls below the defect lower height 𝐻𝑏𝑡𝑚. In these cases one side 
(liquid or vapour) has no “defective” nodes, so, to keep the model simple, rather than 
define another set of equations for each case, the areas corresponding to the nodes no 
more present are set to zero. Thus the areas definitions reported in sets (7.31a – 7.38a) 
are modified in the equations (7-31b – 7.38b) and (7-37c – 7.38c)  for defect only in 
liquid and vapour side, respectively, as follows:  
Defect in liquid side only 
𝐴𝑑1,𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝐿𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑅𝑖 (𝛼𝑡𝑜𝑝 − 𝛼𝑏𝑡𝑚)     (7.31b) 
𝐴𝑑1,𝑒𝑥𝑡 = 𝐿𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑅𝑒 (𝛼𝑡𝑜𝑝 − 𝛼𝑏𝑡𝑚)     (7.32b) 
𝐴𝑑2,𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 0        (7.33b) 
𝐴𝑑2,𝑒𝑥𝑡 = 0        (7.34b) 
𝐴𝑑3,𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝐴𝑑1,𝑒𝑥𝑡       (7.35b) 
𝐴𝑑3,𝑒𝑥𝑡 = 𝐿𝑑𝑒𝑓(𝑅𝑒 + 𝑠𝑖)(𝛼𝑡𝑜𝑝 − 𝛼𝑏𝑡𝑚)     (7.36b) 
𝐴𝑑4,𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 0        (7.37b) 
𝐴𝑑4,𝑒𝑥𝑡 = 0        (7.38b) 
Defect in vapour side only 
𝐴𝑑1,𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 0        (7.31c) 
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𝐴𝑑1,𝑒𝑥𝑡 = 0        (7.32c) 
𝐴𝑑2,𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝐿𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑅𝑖 (𝛼𝑡𝑜𝑝 − 𝛼𝑏𝑡𝑚)     (7.33c) 
𝐴𝑑2,𝑒𝑥𝑡 = 𝐿𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑅𝑒 (𝛼𝑡𝑜𝑝 − 𝛼𝑏𝑡𝑚)     (7.34c) 
𝐴𝑑3,𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 0        (7.35c) 
𝐴𝑑3,𝑒𝑥𝑡 = 0        (7.36b) 
𝐴𝑑4,𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝐴𝑑2,𝑒𝑥𝑡       (7.37c) 
𝐴𝑑4,𝑒𝑥𝑡 = 𝐿𝑑𝑒𝑓(𝑅𝑒 + 𝑠𝑖)(𝛼𝑡𝑜𝑝 − 𝛼𝑏𝑡𝑚)     (7.38c) 
In both cases the average area of the not-present nodes cannot be calculated as the mean 
of internal and external areas, because the heat exchange equations between the nodes 
are not changed and thus an averaged value of the nodal area equal to zero generates an 
indeterminate form in the resolution of the equation. For these reason, in case of defect 
only in one of the fluid-phase side, the averaged defect nodal areas are set to unit for the 
not-present nodes, the equations results do not change because all the other related areas 
are set to zero but it avoids the inseminate form. Thus, equation (7.39a) is valid for the 
existing nodes, while for the other nodes it is defined as in equation (7.39b): 
If  𝐴𝑑,𝑖𝑛𝑡/𝑒𝑥𝑡 ≠ 0 
𝐴𝑑̅̅̅̅ =
𝐴𝑑,𝑖𝑛𝑡+𝐴𝑑,𝑒𝑥𝑡
2
       (7.39a) 
If  𝐴𝑑,𝑖𝑛𝑡/𝑒𝑥𝑡 = 0 
𝐴𝑑̅̅̅̅ = 1         (7.39b) 
Now that the defect nodal areas are defined they are subtracted from the surfaces defined 
in the Baseline RADMOD model, following the schematization reported in Figure 7.6.  
With the configuration reported above, the defect can cover a maximum of half total 
insulation surface and in case of half engulfed tank the defect is assumed to be on the 
engulfed side. The validation model (see paragraph 7.3.2) has a different configuration 
that may be used for implementation of a defect on both tank sides. 
RADMOD equations in presence of defective coatings 
Since all the nodal are are modified with respect the defect position, which changes in 
function of the liquid level during the simulation, and since no conduction through the 
shell is considered in the RADMOD model, the heat exchange equations defined for the 
Baseline RADMOD are valid and untouched with the exception of the liquid and vapour 
ones. This equations are the same as in the Baseline but with the addition of the 
exchanging terms with the defective nodes. At the variables defined for the Baseline 
RADMOD model are added four new variables and related equations for the defective 
nodes: 
 Temperature of shell in contact with the liquid and defect 𝑇𝑑1  
 Temperature of shell in contact with the vapour and defect 𝑇𝑑2 
 Temperature of defect in contact with the flame on liquid side 𝑇𝑑3 
 Temperature of defect in contact with the flame on vapour side 𝑇𝑑4 
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For the heat exchange phenomena taking place inside the defect enclosure, refer to 
paragraph 6.1.1. For what concerns the fundamental equations implemented in the 
RADMOD Baseline and in the novel sub-models for defective coating, the summaries  
are reported in appendix A.  
A schematisation of all the exchanges tanking pace in this problem is reported in Figure 
7.9 where the nodes shown in Figure 7.5 are exploded in single blocks. The radiative 
fluxes are indicated with the red arrows, the convective heat transport with the green 
ones and the conductive exchanges are the blue arrows. The flame, and the ambient air 
exchanges in case of partially engulfed tank, are graphically on the left side. 
 
Figure 7.9 – Schematization of the nodes and the exchanges between them of the novel 
RADMOD sub-model for defective coatings 
 
Temperature of shell under defect in contact with liquid phase (𝑇𝑑1) 
𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠𝐿𝑠𝑠𝐴𝑑1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑𝑇𝑑1
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝑑1𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑞𝑑3,𝑟𝑎𝑑 − 𝑞𝑑1,𝐿    (7.40) 
Where 𝑑𝑠, 𝑐𝑝𝑠𝐿  and 𝑠𝑠 are the density, heat capacity and thickness of the carbon steel 
shell. The heat capacity of the shell (𝑐𝑝𝑠𝐿) is calculated as a function of the temperature, 
𝑠𝑠𝐴𝑑1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ represents the volume of the material to be heated. 𝑞𝑑3,𝑟𝑎𝑑 is the radiative heat 
power recived by the shell from the surrounding air gap, expressed by equation (7.59) 
and 𝑞𝑑1,𝐿 is the convective heat transmitted from the shell to the liquid node and it is 
estimated through the equation (7.47). 
Temperature of shell under defect in contact with vapour phase (𝑇𝑑2) 
𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠𝑉𝑠𝑠𝐴𝑑2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑𝑇𝑑2
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝑑2𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑞𝑑4,𝑟𝑎𝑑 − 𝑞𝑑2,𝑉    (7.41) 
Where 𝑠𝑠𝐴𝑑2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ is the nodal volume, 𝑞𝑑3,𝑟𝑎𝑑 is the radiative heat power defined by 
equation (7.59) and 𝑞𝑑2,𝑉 is the convective and radiative heat transmitted from the shell 
to the vapour node and it is estimated through equation (7.55).  
Temperature of defect air gap in liquid side in contact with the flame (𝑇𝑑3) 
𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑖𝐴𝑑3̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑𝑇𝑑3
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝑑3𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡 − 𝐴𝑑1𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑞𝑑3,𝑟𝑎𝑑    (7.42) 
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Where 𝑑𝑎 and 𝑐𝑝𝑎 are respectively the density and the heat capacity of the air inside the 
enclosure defined in equation (7.60) and (7.61) respectively. 𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡 is the radiative and 
convective heat load from the flame to the external nodal surface, it is calculated with 
the equation (7.8) defined for the Baseline RADMOD with adequate value of variables. 
𝑠𝑖𝐴𝑑3̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ represent the nodal volume. 
Temperature of defect air gap in liquid side in contact with the flame (𝑇𝑑4) 
𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑖𝐴𝑑4̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑𝑇𝑑3
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝑑4𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡 − 𝐴𝑑2𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑞𝑑4,𝑟𝑎𝑑    (7.43) 
In the same way in which the balance of external node in liquid side is defined, also the 
equation for the vapour side external node is defined as shown in equation (7.43). 
Liquid temperature upgrades 
Equation (7.1) for the evaluation of the liquid temperature in case of not boiling liquid 
is valid because the fluid still receives the same heat powers from the pre-existent nodes. 
Since the radiative flux from the noded2 is currently neglected, only one term is added 
to this equation: the convective contribute from the inner wall of noded1. Equation (7.2) 
relative at the liquid temperature in case of boiling liquid is clearly untouched, since the 
variation of the liquid temperature in this case is zero. The novel equation for the not 
boiling liquid is: 
𝑚𝐿𝑐𝑣𝐿
𝑑𝑇𝐿
𝑑𝑡
= [𝑞𝐿,𝑏𝑜𝑖𝑙 + 𝑞𝐿,𝑟𝑎𝑑 + 𝑞𝐿𝑉] + 𝑞𝑑1,𝐿    (7.44) 
The unchanged terms are in square bracket, and the only term in more than (7.1) is 𝑞𝑑1,𝐿 
which is defined in equation (7.47) with the appropriate parameters reported before. 
Vapour temperature upgrades 
The equations (7.6) and (7.7) for the vapour temperature evaluation, respectively for not 
boiling and boiling liquid, both have in this sub-model one more term, which 
corresponds to the convective exchange with noded2 inner surface defined as 𝑞𝑑2,𝑉 and 
calculated from equation (7.55) with the appropriate parameters. The equations 
implemented in the RADMOD model for defective coating are: 
Not boiling liquid:   
𝑚𝑉𝑐𝑣𝑉
𝑑𝑇𝑉
𝑑𝑡
= [𝑞𝑉 + 𝑞𝑉,𝑟𝑎𝑑 − 𝑞𝐿𝑉 − 𝑧𝑧𝜙
𝑅𝑇𝑉
𝑀𝑊
] + 𝑞𝑑2,𝑉       (7.45) 
Boiling liquid: 
𝑚𝑉𝑐𝑣𝑉
𝑑𝑇𝑉
𝑑𝑡
= [𝑞𝐿 + 𝑞𝑉,𝑟𝑎𝑑 − 𝑞𝐿𝑉 − 𝑧𝑧𝜙
𝑅𝑇𝑉
𝑀𝑊
+
𝑑𝑚𝐿
𝑑𝑡
(𝑐𝑣𝑉(𝑇𝑉 − 𝑇𝐿) − 𝑧𝑧
𝑅𝑇𝐿
𝑀𝑊
)] + 𝑞𝑑2,𝑉    
         (7.46) 
Heat power to the liquid from “defective” liquid-space wall (noded1)  
The heat power received through convection by the liquid from noded1 walls, is 
expressed as: 
𝑞𝑑1,𝐿 = 𝐴𝑑1𝑖𝑛𝑡ℎ𝐿(𝑇𝑑1 − 𝑇𝐿)      (7.47) 
Where ℎ𝐿 is the convective heat transfer coefficient and it depends on the pool boiling 
regime (see chapter 5). Two cases are possible: 
 Interface evaporation 𝑇𝑑1 < 𝑇𝑏𝑜𝑖𝑙 + 2℃    Natural convection  
 
76 
 
 Nucleate boiling 𝑇𝑑1 ≥ 𝑇𝑏𝑜𝑖𝑙 + 2℃ 
For natural convection, the coefficient is obtained defining first the dimensionless 
numbers Prandtl, Grashof and Rayleigh, for liquid properties (subscript L) and for the 
hot horizontal flat surfaces facing upward, as reported in [Perry & Green, 1997], as: 
𝑃𝑟𝐿 =
𝜇𝐿𝑐𝑝𝐿
𝑘𝐿
          (7.48a) 
𝐺𝑟𝐿 =
𝑥𝑖
3𝜌𝐿
2𝑔(𝑇𝑑1−𝑇𝐿)𝛽𝐿
𝜇𝐿
2          (7.48b) 
𝑅𝑎𝐿 = 𝐺𝑟𝐿𝑃𝑟𝐿        (7.48c) 
Where g is the gravitational acceleration and  𝛽𝐿  the compressibility of liquid and 𝑥𝑖 is 
the characteristic length and it is calculated as ratio of four times the surface and the 
wetted perimeter involved in the phenomenon: 
𝑥𝑖 =
4𝐴𝑑1𝑖𝑛𝑡
2(𝑊+
𝐴𝑑1𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑊⁄ )
       (7.49) 
Where W is the tank length. 
Then the coefficient ℎ𝐿 is calculated through the Nusselt number, as follows: 
𝑁𝑢𝐿 = 𝑓(𝑅𝑎𝐿) =
ℎ𝐿𝑥𝑖
𝑘𝐿
        (7.50) 
Where the function which links NuL to RaL, depends on the value of the latter 
dimensionless number (RaL). 
In the case of nucleate boiling, there are several possible formulations for this 
phenomenon which have been included in the Matlab code following the design 
correlations of evaporators. Here it is reported one of the equation suggested in [Perry 
& Green, 1997]: 
ℎ𝐿 = 3.75 ∗ 10
−5𝑃𝑐
0.69𝑞"0.7 [1.8 (
𝑃
𝑃𝑐
)
0.17
+ 4 (
𝑃
𝑃𝑐
)
1.2
+ 18 (
𝑃
𝑃𝑐
)
10
] (7.51) 
Where 𝑃𝑐 is the critical pressure and 𝑞
" = ℎ𝐿(𝑇15 − 𝑇𝐿). 
The critical flux (see chapter 5) is reached when the inequality (7.54) by [Perry & Green, 
1997]  is not more verified: 
𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥
" = 0.18𝜌𝑉Λ (
(𝜌𝐿−𝜌𝑉)𝜎𝑔
𝜌𝑉
2 )
1
4⁄
> ℎ𝐿(𝑇𝑑1 − 𝑇𝐿)   (7.52) 
Where 𝜌𝐿 and 𝜌𝑉 are the density of the liquid and the vapour of the fluid calculated at 
𝑇𝐿. 
Heat power to the vapour from “defective” vapour-space wall (noded2)  
The total heat entering the vapour node is the sum of a convective contribution 𝑞𝑉,𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 
and a radiative contribution 𝑞𝑉,𝑟𝑎𝑑: 
𝑞𝑑2,𝑉 = 𝑞𝑉,𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 + 𝑞𝑉,𝑟𝑎𝑑 =  𝐴𝑑2𝑖𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑉,𝑐(𝑇𝑑2 − 𝑇𝑉) + 𝐴𝑑2𝑖𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑉,𝑟(𝑇𝑑2 − 𝑇𝑉) (7.53) 
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The radiative heat transfer coefficient ℎ𝑉,𝑟 is currently set equal to zero, for further 
evaluation. Whereas, the convective coefficient is calculate with the equations (7.56) or 
with equation (7.58) depending on the PRV function. 
If the PRV is closed, defining the dimensionless key parameters of equations set (7.48) 
but with the subscript V and changing the characteristic length as shown in equation 
(7.57), the convective coefficient is [Perry & Green, 1997]: 
𝑁𝑢 =
ℎ𝑉,𝑐 𝑥𝑖
𝑘𝑉
= 0.27𝑅𝑎
1
4⁄       (7.54) 
𝑥𝑖 =
4𝐴𝑑2𝑖𝑛𝑡
2(𝑊+
𝐴𝑑2𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑊⁄ )
       (7.55) 
If the PRV is opened, forced convection is also considered (ℎ𝑉,𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑑) and added to the 
natural convection coefficient.  
𝑁𝑢 =
ℎ𝑉,𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑥𝑖
𝑘𝑉
= 0.0243𝑅𝑒0.8𝑃𝑟0.4     (7.56) 
Where: 
 𝑃𝑟 =
𝜇𝑉𝑐𝑝𝑉
𝑘𝑉
  ;  𝑅𝑒 =
4𝜙
𝑝𝜇𝑉
      (7.57) 
Where 𝜙 is the mass flow throughout the PRV  and characteristic length (𝑥𝑖) is given 
by the ratio of the section of vapour phase and the wetted perimeter according to: 
𝑥𝑖 =
4𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑝
𝑝𝑤𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑
=
𝑅𝑖
2(𝑐𝑜𝑠−1(
𝐿−𝑅𝑖
𝑅𝑖
)−𝑠𝑖𝑛(
𝐿−𝑅𝑖
𝑅𝑖
)(
𝐿−𝑅𝑖
𝑅𝑖
))
2𝜋𝑐𝑜𝑠−1(
𝐿−𝑅𝑖
𝑅𝑖
)
    (7.58) 
Heat exchange inside the defect 
The mechanisms of heat transport in the enclosure are discussed in paragraph 6.1.1, 
where is assessed that the radiation is the main mechanism in the air gap. Thus the two  
terms of radiative transport 𝑞𝑑3,𝑟𝑎𝑑 and 𝑞𝑑4,𝑟𝑎𝑑 can be the defined as:  
𝑞𝑑,𝑟𝑎𝑑 = 𝜎𝜀𝑠(𝑇𝑑,𝑒𝑥𝑡
4 − 𝑇𝑑,𝑖𝑛𝑡
4 )      (7.59) 
Where  𝑇𝑑,𝑒𝑥𝑡 is the temperature of the external node which irradiates the internal node 
at temperature 𝑇𝑑,𝑖𝑛𝑡. 
Air properties inside the enclosure 
The density of the air is calculated through the ideal gas law: 
𝑑𝑎 =
𝑃 𝑀𝑤𝑎
 𝑅 𝑇 
        (7.60) 
𝑀𝑤𝑎 is the molecular weight of air, 𝑃 and 𝑇 are the pressure inside the enclosure, the 
pressure is set equal to the atmospheric value and the temperature is the mean between 
the temperature of the defect nodes (noded3 and noded4). 
The heat capacity of the air inside the enclosure is estimated as a function of the 
temperature, defined as the mean of the defect nodes temperatures. The correlation is 
from [Knudsen et al. 1999b]. The equation for the air heat capacity is: 
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𝑐𝑝𝑎 = (𝑐𝑣1 + 𝑐𝑣2 (
𝑐𝑣3
𝑇 sinh(
𝑐𝑣3
𝑇
)
)
2
+ 𝑐𝑣4 (
𝑐𝑣5
𝑇 cosh(
𝑐𝑣5
𝑇
)
)
2
)   (7.61) 
Where 𝑐𝑣1−5 are constant relative to the gas. 
 
7.3.2 Validation thermal sub-model for defects on thermal insulation system 
The data used for the validation of the sub-model for defective coating and the tests 
conditions are described in Section 3.4. The node division are defined in order to 
recreate the tests conditions, and this is shown in Figure 7.10. 
 
Figure 7.10 – Tank central section schematised of the nodes for the validation sub-
model of the RADMOD for defective coatings 
It should be reminded that in the tests the fire engulfs only half of the tank which 
corresponds at the right side of the schematisation reported above (Figure 7.10), the 
nodes corresponding to the not-defective insulation cannot be see in this sketch, but 
there are already present (see Figure 3.6 in Section 3.4). Compared with the previously 
division, (see Figure 7.6) two more nodes are added: 
 Node d5  Shell wall in contact with the liquid and with the not engulfed defect 
noded6 
 Node d6  Not engulfed coating defect of liquid side (air gap) 
Areas definition 
For what concerns the engulfed nodes on the liquid side (noded1 and noded3) the areas 
defined in the equations sets (7.31-32) and (7.35-36) remain untouched. While noded2 
and noded4 are now extended to the left side of the tank and they are partially engulfed. 
The areas definition, also in this case, remain unchanged and when the validation sub-
model is activated the only measure to adopt is to set the top height of the defect equal 
to the external diameter, including the insulation thickness, of the tank. In fact the 
validation sub-model doubling the values of the nodal areas obtained with the equations 
sets (7.33-34) and (7.37) corresponding to internal and external surfaces of noded2 and 
the internal surface of noded4, but not the external surface of the latter node. In fact, 
noded4 is now engulfed partially, so half of its external area exchanges with the flame 
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and the other half with the ambient air, for this reason equation (7.38) is still used for 
determination of the external surface of noded4 and the area thus obtained is used for 
both the flame and the ambient air exchanges, see equation (7.70). 
The surfaces of the two novel nodes on liquid side are set equal to the surfaces of the 
liquid side nodes already present, since the problem results to be symmetrical: 
𝐴𝑑5 = 𝐴𝑑1        (7.62) 
𝐴𝑑6 = 𝐴𝑑2        (7.63) 
Equations (7.62) and (7.63) are valid for the internal, external and averaged surfaces of 
the new nodes (noded5 and noded6). 
Equations definition in the RADMOD validation sub-model 
Two more variables and thus two more equations are added in this sub-model. The new 
variables are: 
 Temperature of shell in contact with the liquid and the not-engulfed defect 𝑇𝑑5 
 Temperature of not-engulfed defect in contact with ambient air on liquid side 
𝑇𝑑4 
Figure 7.11 is the upgraded Figure 7.9 which report the nodes as a blocks and the 
interaction between each other.   
 
 
Figure 7.11 – Schematization of the nodes and the exchanges between them of the RADMOD 
validation sub-model for defective coatings 
As can be seen in Figure 7.11, the only equations changed in the validation sub-model 
are the ones corresponding to the nodes which exchange with the novel node (noded5 
and noded6).  
Temperature of not-engulfed shell in contact with liquid (𝑇𝑑5) 
This node is on the not-engulfed side of the tank, the entering heat powers come from 
the defective air gap radiating the node and it is assumed that also the conduction 
mechanism from the adjacent nodes goes to heat up the node, as shown in equation 
(7.64): 
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𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠𝐿𝑠𝑠𝐴𝑑5̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑𝑇𝑑5
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝑑5𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑞𝑑6,𝑟𝑎𝑑 + 𝐴𝑑2𝑑5𝑞𝑑2,𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 − 𝐴𝑑5𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑞𝑑5,𝐿 + 𝐴𝑑1𝑑5𝑞𝑑1,𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑
         (7.64)  
The heat capacity of the steel shell (𝑐𝑝𝑠𝐿) is calculated as a function of the temperature 
of the node. 𝑠𝑠𝐴𝑑5̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  is the nodal volume and 𝐴𝑑5̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ , 𝐴𝑑5𝑒𝑥𝑡 and 𝐴𝑑5𝑖𝑛𝑡 are obtained through 
the equation (7.62), 𝑞𝑑6,𝑟𝑎𝑑 is the heat flux entering the node by radiation from the 
surrounding noded6, it is evaluated as shown in equation (7.71). 𝑞𝑑5,𝐿 is the convective 
heat from the shell to the liquid, as for the evaluation of 𝑞𝑑1,𝐿 , it is estimated through 
the equation (7.47) with appropriate value of area (𝐴𝑑5𝑖𝑛𝑡) and temperature difference 
(𝑇𝑑5 − 𝑇𝐿). Two conduction terms are present in equation (7.64)  one from the vapour 
side node (𝑞𝑑2,𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑) and the other one from the liquid engulfed side (𝑞𝑑1,𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑), they are 
introducted to increase the heat load reached by this node and are respectively defined 
in equations (7.72) and (7.73). The exchanging area associated with the conduction 
terms are: 
𝐴𝑑2𝑑5 = 𝐴𝑑1𝑑5 = 𝐿𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑠𝑠        (7.65) 
There are the orthogonal surfaces to the cylinder axis, in the interface of noded2 - noded5 
and noded1 - noded5 , respectively.  
Temperature of not-engulfed defect of liquid in contact with the ambient air (𝑇𝑑6) 
This node receives heat from the above noded4 and removes the heat away from noded5 
through radiation and from external ambient air: 
𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑖𝐴𝑑6̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑𝑇𝑑6
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝑑4𝑑6𝑞𝑑4,𝑟𝑎𝑑 − 𝐴𝑑5𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑞𝑑6,𝑟𝑎𝑑 − 𝐴𝑑6𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐼𝑎𝑚𝑏 (7.66) 
The air properties 𝑑𝑎 and 𝑐𝑝𝑎 are respectively calculated by equations (7.60) and (7.61), 
the volume of the air in the node is expressed by 𝑠𝑖𝐴𝑑6̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  and 𝑞𝑑4,𝑟𝑎𝑑 is the radiative 
power from noded6 ,defined in equation (7.78), its exchange surface is defined as: 
𝐴𝑑4𝑑6 = 𝐿𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑠𝑖         (7.67) 
The latter equation is the same as those defined for the conductive exchange in equation 
(7.65), thus it is the interface between the two nodes (noded4 and noded6). Further 
investigation on this area definition should be considered. The other areas 𝐴𝑑6𝑒𝑥𝑡 and 
𝐴𝑑6̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ follow the equation (7.63). 
 𝐼𝑎𝑚𝑏 is the exchange by radiative and convective mechanisms from the node external 
surface to the ambient air.  
Equations upgrade 
The equations used for the implementation of the thermal sub-model for defective 
coating are the same in the validation model with the addition of the terms of exchange 
with noded5 and noded6, the modified equations are reported below with the unchanged 
terms in square bracket: 
Temperature of noded1 (𝑇𝑑1) 
𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠𝐿𝑠𝑠𝐴𝑑1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑𝑇𝑑1
𝑑𝑡
= [𝐴𝑑1𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑞𝑑3,𝑟𝑎𝑑 − 𝑞𝑑1,𝐿]−𝐴𝑑1𝑑5𝑞𝑑1,𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑  (7.68) 
Temperature of noded2 (𝑇𝑑2) 
𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠𝑉𝑠𝑠𝐴𝑑2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑𝑇𝑑2
𝑑𝑡
= [𝐴𝑑2𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑞𝑑4,𝑟𝑎𝑑 − 𝑞𝑑2,𝑉] − 𝐴𝑑2𝑑5𝑞𝑑2,𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑  (7.69) 
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Temperature of noded4 (𝑇𝑑4) 
𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑖𝐴𝑑4̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑𝑇𝑑4
𝑑𝑡
= [𝐴𝑑4𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡 − 𝐴𝑑2𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑞𝑑4,𝑟𝑎𝑑] − 𝐴𝑑4𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐼𝑎𝑚𝑏 − 𝐴𝑑4𝑑6𝑞𝑑4,𝑟𝑎𝑑 
         (7.70) 
Temperature of liquid (𝑇𝐿) 
𝑚𝐿𝑐𝑣𝐿
𝑑𝑇𝐿
𝑑𝑡
= [𝑞𝐿 + 𝑞𝐿𝑉 + 𝑞𝑑1,𝐿] + 𝐴𝑑5𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑞𝑑5,𝐿    (7.71) 
 
Heat load from the flame 
The radiative part of heat that from the flame reaches the external steel jacket, expressed 
through equation (7.8) in the validation model is modified in order to set the black body 
temperature as input instead of the flame temperature. The two temperatures are linked 
together through the flame emissivity as:  𝜀𝑓 ∙ 𝑇𝑓
4 = 𝑇𝐵𝐵
4  [Modest, 2003], thus, replacing 
the term (𝜀𝑓 ∙ 𝑇𝑓
4)  in equation (7.8), the latter becomes: 
𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡 = 𝜎𝜀𝑠(𝑇 𝐵𝐵
4 + (1 − 𝜀𝑓)𝑇𝑎𝑚𝑏
4 )  − (𝜎𝜀𝑠𝑇𝑤
4)    (7.72) 
Heat loads to the shell node of not-engulfed liquid side (noded5) 
The radiant flux at input of the node is written as: 
𝑞𝑑6,𝑟𝑎𝑑 = 𝜎𝜀𝑠(𝑇𝑑6
4 − 𝑇𝑑5
4 )      (7.73) 
Equation (7.73) corresponds to the equation (7.59), with the adequate parameters, used 
for the evaluation of the heat transported by radiation inside the enclosure. 
The other two thermal inputs at the shell node are both conductive from the engulfed 
shell nodes: 
 𝑞𝑑1,𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 =
𝑘𝑠𝐿
𝑑𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝐿
(𝑇𝑑1 − 𝑇𝑑5)      (7.74) 
𝑞𝑑2,𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 =
𝑘𝑠𝑉
𝑑𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑉
(𝑇𝑑2 − 𝑇𝑑5)      (7.75) 
The thermal conductivities 𝑘𝑠𝐿 and 𝑘𝑠𝑉 are estimating as functions of the temperature 
of each node. The term 𝑑𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 is the distance between the node through which the 
conductive exchange takes place. It is assumed equal to the circumferential arc from the 
higher point of the heating node, to the start of the node to be heat, that are: 
𝑑𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝐿 =
𝑅𝑖
2
acos (
𝑅𝑖−𝐿
𝑅𝑖
)       (7.76) 
𝑑𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑉 = (𝑅𝑖 +
𝑠𝑠
2
) 𝛼𝑡𝑜𝑝       (7.77) 
The subscript (L) is associated to the conduction from the engulfed liquid side node 
(noded1) and the subscript (V) indicates the conduction from the engulfed, even if 
partially, vapour side node (noded2). Two of the test used for the validation have the 
defect covering all the circumference of the vessel, while one test has the configuration 
shown in Figure 7.10, where the “defective” shell node on the liquid side are not in 
direct contact, thus the term 𝑞𝑑1,𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 should not be present or at least should be referred 
to the node in real contact with the defect (node15), but in the code this term is left 
unchanged since the difference between the temperature of the real-contact node 
(node15) and the implemented node (noded1) is not so relevant (about 10°C).  
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Heat loads to the not-engulfed defect node of liquid side (noded6) 
The only term entering the node is from the surrounding air gap (noded4) which radiates 
noded4, the equation for the evaluation of this radiative flux is defined in the same way 
as for the radiative exchange inside the enclosure, equation (7.59), by including the 
appropriate temperature, as shown in equation (7.78): 
𝑞𝑑4,𝑟𝑎𝑑 =  𝜎𝜀𝑠(𝑇𝑑4
4 − 𝑇𝑑6
4 )      (7.78) 
Validation set-up 
The RADMOD validation sub-model described in this paragraph (7.3.2) is used 
considering also the stratification sub-model (strat3). During the validation a tuning 
factor is introduced for the height of the stratified layer, its value is set equal to 2. The 
doubled height of the stratified layer resulted to be around 60% of the total liquid filling 
level, such value of stratified depth, imposed in the stratification sub-model, represents 
a halfway between the Baseline and the stratified RADMOD models, respectively  
advised for unprotected and coated tanks, just as the problem implemented was. 
Moreover, the heat exchanges between the not engulfed defect (noded4) and ambient air 
was overestimated by 3 times. 
7.3.3 Software implementation 
There are five main MatLab codes developed, four of which are pre-existing codes and 
they consider the baseline and the three stratification sub-models version of RADMOD. 
They are called RADMOD_Baseline.m , RADMOD_Strat1.m, RADMOD_Strat2.m and 
RADMOD_Strat3.m. The fifth main code is called RADMOD_defect and considers both 
the Baseline and the Strat3 version. Other than these core files there are several 
functions for external evaluation, like for the thermodynamic properties of lading and 
wall material and for the heat-transfer coefficients. Each function can be called up 
within the main code to calculate the variation of these parameters with the time.  
Three Excel files are included, two for the initial data set-up: InitialData.xlsx for the 
pre-existing main codes and InitialData_def.xlsx for the novel implementation of the 
code for defective coatings (RADMOD_defect.m); and a third Excel file for reporting 
results (Results.xlsx). The two files for the input set-up are identical except for the 
section dedicated to the defect, which it was not present in the previously version of the 
code, and for the position of the cell. The first recommendation is to use the appropriate 
input file with the appropriate .m file or MatLab cannot read correctly the cell, so with 
respect to the model version that has to be run choose the appropriate input Excel file 
following the Table 7.4. 
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Table 7.4 – Summary of the MatLab code available associated with the appropriates input 
Excel file 
MatLab code Input Excel file Model Version  
RADMOD_defect.m     InitialData_def.xlsx Baseline 
Strat3 
RADMOD_Baseline.m InitialData.xlsx Baseline 
RADMOD_Strat1.m InitialData.xlsx Strat1 
RADMOD_Strat2.m InitialData.xlsx Strat2 
RADMOD_Strat3.m InitialData.xlsx Strat3 
 
Once the MatLab code and the input file are chosen, to run a simulation it is possible to 
follow the simple instructions: 
1. INPUT DATA: Open the InitialData.xlsx file and add all the inputs required 
(geometrical features, fire conditions, PRV dimension, etc.…). The only 
recommendation to follow is that of keeping the same format not moving the 
cells. Once this step has been completed, all data must be saved like first sheet. 
It is possible to create new copies of sheets to keep more initial data saved, just 
moving them away from the first position.  
2. CODE SELECTION: Chose the code to run among the five main Matlab codes. 
Open the selected one and start the simulation pressing the Run bottom on the 
Editor page.  The defect file is the most developed code so more results are 
provided, it is possible to select, in the input data file, what model version to 
run, it is advised to select the Baseline model for coated and defective tanks and 
the Strat3 model for uncoated tanks. If the defect file is running the MatLab 
window reports a message showing what model version is running. 
3. SIMULATION END: Wait until the end of simulation which can lasts a few 
minutes, from 2 to 5 min. depending the number of numerical iterations. It 
might happen that an error message could be displayed and it can be explained 
to the oversize of time step. If for some reason the simulation must be stopped 
manually it is possible to do that by pressing Ctrl+C in Matlab window.  
4. RESULTS: On Matlab screen are reported the time to failure (ttf_conservative 
and ttf) and, the time of the opening of PRV. The other parameters (fluid 
temperature, pressure and so on) can be seen in the plots as time function, while 
if it is necessary to have their numerical values the Results.xlsx file can be open. 
It is important to remember that the Results.xlsx must not be open during the 
simulation otherwise Matlab will not not able to write the output data as it 
cannot get access to the file giving an error.  
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8 Definition of sensitivity analysis and case studies 
 
Two modelling approaches are adopted in this thesis work: an advanced finite elements 
method (FEM) model and a simplified lumped parameters model, both are aimed to 
assess the performance of insulated tanks exposed to fire in presence of defects in their 
thermal insulation system. A sensitivity analysis is performed on the FEM model, the 
parameters to vary and their values are discussed in this chapter in the following section 
8.1. Whereas the lumped model is applied to real-scale case studies, section 8.2 is 
dedicated to the definition of variables and geometries individuated for the simulations. 
The results of the sensitivity analysis and case studies are reported and discussed in 
chapter 9. 
 
8.1 Sensitivity analysis 
In order to provide a sensitivity analysis for the FEM model, a series of variables are 
selected, in order to assess the effect of their variation. The implementation of a model, 
in general, requires several guesses and approximations of the realty. In the specific case 
of a model for tanks engulfed in fires, the assumptions made, especially in the 
approximation of flame conditions, may lead to relevant modification in the final results 
[Birk, 1995]. 
This part of the thesis work is aimed to understand how each assumption adopted in the 
model influences the simulation results, in order to assess which parameters should be 
modelled more accurately and which not significantly influence the response. This is 
aimed at determining the uncertainties affecting the model and the reliability of 
computer simulations. 
he mesh and time step implemented in the analysis are described in chapter 6, where it 
is also assessed the mesh independency (see section 6.3.3). The geometries and the 
boundary conditions implemented are the same used for the validation of the FEM 
model. As in the validation, the geometry is a quarter portion of a tank equipped with a 
coating blanket of ceramic fibre to which a square portion (15.2x15.2 mm2) of insulation 
is removed. Both the external steel jacket and the shell wall are made of carbon steel. 
The internal shell wall surface is supposed to be in contact with ambient air while the 
flame engulfs the complete external surface of the jacket. 
Three model geometries are simulated, each varying five variables related both to the 
flame and to the steel, as follows: 
Geometries 
 Fully protected 
 Sealed 
 Defect 15.2 
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Falme parameters: 
 𝑇𝐵𝐵    3 values of black body temperature 
 ℎ𝑓𝑙     3 values of convective heat coefficient between the flame and         
             the steel jacket  
 𝜀𝑓      3 values of emissivity 
Steel parameters: 
  ℎ𝑓     3 values of convective heat coefficient between the tank shell  
              and ambient air 
 𝜀𝑠      3 values of emessivity of the steel exposed to fire 
A total of thirty-three simulations are performed, eleven for each geometry, i.e. a 
baseline simulation and ten sensitivity simulations, as summarized in Table 8.1, the 
modelling approach with which the parameters are defined please refer to chapter 6.  
 
Table 8.1 – Summary of the parameters varied for each geometry in the sensitivity analysis 
performed on the FEM model 
  Baseline Minimum value Maximum value 
Flame 𝑇𝐵𝐵 °C 871 815 927 
ℎ𝑓𝑙 𝑊/𝑚
2𝐾 25 20 30 
𝜀𝑓  0.8 0.7 0.9 
Steel  ℎ𝑓 𝑊/𝑚
2𝐾 10 5 15 
𝜀𝑠  0.8 0.85 0.95 
 
The models are described in section 6.3.1, a schematisation of the geometry for the case 
“Defect 15.2” is shown in Figure 8.1. The materials properties implemented in the FEM 
model for the carbon steel are summarized in Table 8.2 whereas Table 8.3 shows the 
insulation specifications.    
 
 
Figure 8.1 – Schematisation of geometry ID “Defect 15.2” implemented in the FEM model, 
lengths in mm 
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Table 8.2 – Material properties implemented in the FEM simulations,  
related to carbon steel with density equal to 7850 𝑘𝑔/𝑚3 [Scarponi et al. 2016] 
Temperature 
°𝐶 
Heat capacity 
𝑗/𝑘𝑔 𝐾 
Thermal 
conductivity 
𝑊/𝑚 𝐾 
100 487.6 50.7 
300 564.7 44.0 
500 666.5 37.4 
700 1008.2 30.7 
900 650.4 24.0 
 
Table 8.3 – Material properties implemented in the FEM simulations,  
related to thermal protection coating with density  72 𝑘𝑔/𝑚3 and specific heat 1130 𝑗/𝑘𝑔 𝐾 
[Scarponi et al. 2016] 
Temperature 
°𝐶 
Thermal 
conductivity 
𝑊/𝑚 𝐾 
200 0.06 
400 0.11 
600 0.18 
800 0.28 
 
 
8.2 Case studies 
Once the lumped RADMOD model is validated against experimental data of bonfire 
small-scale tanks with defective coating, (see specific results in section 9.3) the model 
is extended to several case studies increasing the scale of both tank and defect.  
For the simulations of unprotected tanks the RADMOD stratification (Strat 3) sub-
model is used, whereas in all the other cases (fully protected and defective coatings) the 
baseline model is selected for simulations of this case studies, as suggested by [Nigro, 
2015] . 
The various cases of interest differ each other for the geometry, filling level and ratio of 
tank surface not covered by thermal protection due to the defect. The total number of 
simulations and the details of each ones are collected in Table 8.5. For all cases the 
propane contained inside the tank is a saturated liquid. The bonfire tests used for model 
validation were performed in North America, and the initial condition of saturated 
propane is mostly taken to 9 or 12 degree, here it is assumed equal to 10°C. Moreover, 
the fire apparatus used in this tests is similar to the one used for the bonfire tests on the 
quarter cylinder tank (see section 3.3 and 3.4) on which an accurate evaluation of the 
flame properties is available [VanderSteen, Birk, 2003] following this data the flame 
emissivity (𝜀𝑓) is assumed equal to 0.45 and the black body temperature (𝑇𝐵𝐵) is set to 
871°C. With this specifications the flame temperature (𝑇𝑓) is obtaneid through equation 
(8.1) [Modest, 2003] and it is set to 1120°C. For environmental requirement it can be 
assumed that the wind velocity is of 1 m/s and the environment temperature is equal to 
20°C. 
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𝜀𝑓 ∙ 𝑇𝑓
4 = 𝑇𝐵𝐵
4          (8.1) 
For the selection of horizontal pressurized vessels, the geometrical sizing was derived 
from vessels typically used for the applications of interest, which were reported in 
[Landucci et al. 2014], individuating a medium- and a large-scale tank. For every tank 
the PRV was designed according to API RP-520 and its behaviour was assumed relay 
opening at design pressure. The PRV cross area designed in such way is then oversized 
by 30%, further details in [Nigro, 2015]. The dimensions related to the tank are 
summarized in Table 8.4. 
 
Table 8.4 – Geometrical details related to tanks for case studies implemented with the 
RADMOD model [Landucci et al. 2013; Nigro, 2015] 
Tank 
scale 
 
Tank 
ID 
Design 
pressure  
Volume  Diameter Length Shell 
thickness  
PRV 
area 
bar m3 mm mm mm cm2 
Medium M 15 25 1700 10500 15 80 
Large L 15 50 2100 13200 18 32.5 
 
Table 8.5 – Summary of the case studies implemented with the RADMOD model 
Case ID Adef/Atank Adef Htop Hbtm Ldef Filling 
% m2 m m m % v/v 
M 8%def 8 4.5 1.7 1.23 9.45 70 
M 15%def 15 8.4 “ a 0.85 “ 
a 70 
M 30%def 30 16.8 “ 
a 0.23 “ a 70 
M 40%def 40 22.4 “ 
a 0.03 “ a 70 
M 45%fill 15 8.4 “ 
a 0.85 “ a 45 
M 70%fill 15 “ 
a “ a “ a “ a 70 
M 95%fill 15 “ 
a “ a “ a “ a 95 
L 8%def 8 7.0 2.1 1.52 11.9 70 
L 15%def 15 13.1 “ 
a 1.05 “ a 70 
L 30%def 30 26.1 “ 
a 0.28 “ a 70 
L 40%def 40 34.8 “ 
a 0.03 “ a 70 
L 45%fill 15 13.1 “ 
a 1.05 “ a 45 
L 70%fill 15 “ 
a “ a “ a “ a 70 
L 95%fill 15 “ 
a “ a “ a “ a 95 
“ a : as above 
 
The case studies identificated with the subscript 45%fill are the same as 15%def , in fact 
this percentace of defective insulation area is chosen for the evaluation of the effect of 
initial liquid filling level variation. The top height of the defect is set equal to the tank 
diameter in each simulation, the defect wideness corresponds to the 90% of the tank 
length. The bottom height of defect is obtained from the other parameters through 
equation 8.2. 
 
88 
 
𝐻𝑏𝑡𝑚 = 𝐻𝑡𝑜𝑝 − 𝐷𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑘 sin (
𝐴𝑑𝑒𝑓
𝐿𝑑𝑒𝑓 𝐷𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑘
)    (8.2) 
The insulation system implemented in the case studies is the the same as in the FEM 
model, thus the properties of this materials collected in Table 8.3 are used for the 
RADOMOD simulations. The steel jacket and the tank shell are both made of carbon 
steel, as in the FEM model, but in this code the specific heat and thermal conductivity 
are not function of the temperature, thus their averaged value in the range of temperature 
of interest are set in the case studies. The specific heat is set equal to 490 𝑗/𝑘𝑔 𝐾 , while 
thermal conductivity is assumed to be 44 𝑊/𝑚 𝐾. The density value is left to 7850 𝑘𝑔/𝑚3 
and the yield strength used for the evaluation of the time to failure of the tank is 
 480 𝑀𝑃𝑎. [Engineering ToolBox, 2016] 
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9 Results and discussion 
 
9.1 FEM validation results 
The validation of the FEM model was carried out against the experimental data 
described in section 3.3. Several squared defects on a quarter portion of tank were 
bonfire tested and thus the geometries implemented for the validation aimed to 
reproduce them. The geometries implemented were specified according to Section 6.3  
and the boundary conditions were modelled as reported in section 6.2. For further details 
on the FEM model validation refer to [Scarponi et al. 2016]. 
 
9.2 Sensitivity analysis results 
In this section are reported the results of the sensitivity analysis performed on the FEM 
model. The aim of this analysis is understanding which of the several parameters 
implemented in the model, have significant influence on the results obtained. The 
geometries, the parameters and the boundary conditions of the simulations performed 
during the sensitivity analysis are reported in section 8.1. The results are collected in 
Figures 9.3 and Figures 9.4, where the curves are obtained setting-up a baseline 
simulation, taking its parameters value as a reference to the comparison with the results 
of the sensitivity simulations, in which only one parameter value differs from the 
baseline.  
The sensitivity analysis was performed on three different geometries: with coating, 
completely without coating and with coating in presence of defect; in this section are 
shown only the results of the latter geometry since it involved more phenomena and 
thus it can be considers the completest-case examined. 
9.2.1 Dynamic analysis of temperature in the center of defect 
Figures 9.3 (a, b, c, d, e) show the dynamic temperature behaviour of the central point 
of the defect in function of the time. In particular each figure shows the results obtained 
changing one parameter: (a) black body temperature of the flame, (b) emissivity of the 
flame, (c) emissivity of the steel exposed to fire, convective heat coefficient between 
the flame and external steel jacket (d) or between the internal shell and ambient air (e). 
The baseline simulation is indicated as “Base_” followed by the reference-value of the 
parameters on which the sensitivity analysis is performed, the results of the other 
simulations are identified specifying the variable name and its associated value 
implemented in the model. The results are summarized in Table 9.1 reporting the 
relative error of each simulation with respect the baseline temperature. 
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Figure 9.1a – Sensitivity analysis results, dynamic defect center temperature, influence of the 
black body temperature (TBB in °C) 
 
 
Figure 9.1b – Sensitivity analysis results, dynamic defect center temperature, influence of 
flame emissivity (εf) 
 
Figure 9.1c – Sensitivity analysis results, dynamic defect center temperature, influence of 
exposed steel emissivity (𝜀𝑠) 
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Figure 9.1d – Sensitivity analysis results, dynamic defect center temperature, influence of 
convective coefficient between the flame and the external jacket (ℎ𝑓𝑙  𝑖𝑛 𝑊/𝑚
2𝐾) 
 
 
Figure 9.1b – Sensitivity analysis results, dynamic defect center temperature, influence of 
convective coefficient between the internal steel and ambient air (ℎ𝑓 𝑖𝑛 𝑊/𝑚
2𝐾) 
 
 
The relative error of each simulation with respect the baseline temperature is calculated 
as shown in equation (9.1): 
∆𝑇% =
𝑇𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛−𝑇𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒
𝑇𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒
∙ 100     (9.1) 
 
Table 9.1 – Relative errors obtained from the sensitivity analysis, results obtained for the 
temperature at the center of defect 
∆𝑻% 𝑻𝑩𝑩 𝜺𝒇 𝜺𝒔 𝒉𝒇𝒍   𝒉𝒇 
min max min max min max min max min max 
start 
-22% 28% 1% -1% 
-
11% 14% -6% 6% 0% 0% 
end -12% 13% 1% -1% -2% 2% -1% 1% 5% -4% 
averaged -15% 17% 1% -1% -4% 4% -1% 1% 3% -3% 
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9.2.2 Temperature profile along the defect 
Whereas in Figure 9.4 (a, b, c, d, e) are plotted the temperature profile along the defect 
at 20 minutes from the starting of simulation. The results are summarized in Table 9.2 
where the relative errors obtained through equation (9.1) are collected. The normalized 
distance from the defect central point is reported in abscissas. 
 
Figure 9.2a – Sensitivity analysis results, temperature along defect at 20 min, influence of the 
black body temperature (TBB in °C) 
 
 
Figure 9.2b – Sensitivity analysis results, temperature along defect at 20 min, influence of 
flame emissivity (εf) 
 
 
Figure 9.2c – Sensitivity analysis results, temperature along defect at 20 min, influence of 
exposed steel emissivity (𝜀𝑠) 
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Figure 9.2d – Sensitivity analysis results, temperature along defect at 20 min, influence of 
convective coefficient between the flame and the external jacket (ℎ𝑓𝑙  𝑖𝑛 𝑊/𝑚
2𝐾) 
 
 
Figure 9.2e – Sensitivity analysis results, temperature along defect at 20 min, influence of 
convective coefficient between the internal steel and ambient air (ℎ𝑓 𝑖𝑛 𝑊/𝑚
2𝐾) 
 
 
In the following Table 9.2 the results of the analysis are summarized reporting the 
relative error of each simulation with respect the baseline temperature, calculated as 
shown in equation (9.1). In this case the relative error committed in the central point 
and in the external points are reported. 
 
Table 9.2 – Relative errors obtained from the sensitivity analysis, results obtained for the 
temperature along the defect at 20 minutes for central point and external points 
∆𝑻% 𝑻𝑩𝑩 𝜺𝒇 𝜺𝒔 𝒉𝒇𝒍   𝒉𝒇 
min max min max min max min max min max 
central -11% 11% 1% -1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 10% -9% 
external -12% 13% 1% -1% -2% 2% -1% 1% 5% -4% 
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9.2.3 Discussion on the sensitivity analysis results 
The sensibility analysis highlights that the results are main influenced by the flame black 
body temperature amongst other parameters. This results was expected since the 
radiative heat power received by the system from the flame is a function of the 
temperature raised to the fourth power, thus a variation in the flame temperature should 
significantly affect the thermal behaviour of the system. The results of the 
implementation supports the previously assumption, different black body temperatures 
show variation from the baseline of about 30% in the dynamic analysis and a little bit 
more than the 10% in the defect temperature profile at 20 minutes.  Clearly, a black 
body temperature increase leads to an increase of the temperature reached in the defect, 
and vice versa. 
The other parameter which was expected to influence the thermal behaviour of the 
system was the flame emissivity, it determines, in this case, the temperature of 
convective exchange of the flame. In fact in this model the black body temperature and 
the flame emissivity are set as input data and the flame temperature (𝑇𝑓) is obtained 
from this two parameters, as equation (9.2) shows. 
𝜀𝑓 ∙ 𝑇𝑓
4 = 𝑇𝐵𝐵
4        (9.2) 
Nevertheless, the results of this analysis point out that changing the emissivity of the 
flame a maximum of 1% error can be reached. This is probably due to the few 
contribution of the convective heat transfer mechanism compared to the radiative one, 
this can be see also in the results obtained changing the emissivity of the steel exposed 
to fire and the convective heat exchange from the flame and the jacket. Changing the 
steel emissivity the results get far from the baseline ones of a 5% and in fact, the it 
regulates the radiative exchange between the flame and the external jacket. Whereas 
different value of the convective heat exchange of the flame do not affect the 
temperature reached in the defect.  
The last variable analysed is the convective heat transport coefficient of the inner tank 
wall in contact with ambient air. Its influence can be seen in the temperature profile 
along the defect at 20 minutes (Figure 9.3e), if the coefficient increases the dissipative 
power from the wall increases and thus the temperature in the defect results to be lower, 
and vice versa. 
The sensitivity analysis highlights the importance of modelling the parameters linked to 
the radiative exchange between the flame and the jacket. In particular the main variable 
able to affect significantly the results is the black body temperature of the flame. 
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9.4 RADMOD validation 
The lumped parameters model (RADMOD) was enhanced for the simulation of coated 
tanks exposed to fire in presence of defect in their insulation system. In order to assess 
the credibility of the results obtained with the novel RADMOD model, a validation 
against experimental data was needed. The validation of the model was carried out by 
comparison the results obtained with the RADMOD model and the results of the bonfire 
tests described in section 3.4.  
The boundary conditions were set-up according to section 7.4. The geometries and the 
insulation properties were implemented in order to recreate the same conditions of the 
bonfire tests, thus all details are specified in section 3.4, with the exception of the tank 
length, which value was set to 2.12 m neglecting the heads of the tank. The steel 
properties are reported in section 8.2 as they were also used for the case-studies 
simulations. 
The experimental available data concern: the temperature of the lading (vapour and 
liquid phase), the temperature of the wall exposed to fire and the pressure reached inside 
the tank. Three bonfire tests were carried out and thus three set of data were available 
for the validation of the model, some specifications on the set-up related to the three 
cases are summarized in table 9.3. 
Table 9.3 – Information on the input data used in the RADMOD validation 
Bonfire test ID 04-03 04-04 04-05 
Adef/Atank (%) 15% 15% 8% 
Filling degree (%) 71% 78% 71% 
Time step (s) 1 1 1 
Initial lading pressure (bar) 6.6 8.9 6.6 
PRV opening P (bar) 26.26 21.2 26.26 
PRV closing P (bar) 23.85 19.3 23.85 
 
The PRV behaviour was assumed to be relay and the discharge area was set to 1.8 cm2 
. The ambient temperature was estimated to be 18°C with a wind velocity of 1 m/s. The 
time checked for each simulation was choose equal to the time at which the tanks failed 
during the bonfire tests. The black body temperature of the flame was set equal to 871°C 
with an emissivity of 0.45. 
9.4.1 Validation results – Pressure prediction 
Figure 9.4 shows the pressure results obtained with the RADMOD model compared 
with the results of the experimental tests, in particular: (a) test 04-03, (b) test 04-04 and 
(c) test 04-05. It is reported also the time to failure predicted by the model with the two 
different criteria explained in paragraph 7.2.4 and the experimental ones estimated by 
Birk [Birk et al. 2006], more details in section 3.4.  
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Figure 9.3a – RADMOD validation results, pressure comparison of experimental test 04-03 
 
Figure 9.3b – RADMOD validation results, pressure comparison of experimental test 04-04 
 
Figure 9.3c – RADMOD validation results, pressure comparison of experimental test 04-05 
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9.4.2 Validation results – Lading temperature prediction 
The experimental data on the lading temperature were available only for test 04-03 and 
04-04 (both with 15% Adef), thus, no validation on the lading temperature prediction 
was performed on the small-defect simulation. The results are shown in Figures 9.5, (a) 
for test 04-03 and (b) test 04-04, where the temperatures obtained by the thermocouples 
are compared with the results obtained with the RADMOD model. The position of the 
thermocouples and their ID number is also shown in Figures 9.5, where are reported the 
central bundle of thermocouples (see section 3.4) used in the validation. The 
temperature obtained with the model are the temperature of the vapour node and the 
averaged liquid temperature between the bulk (at constant temperature) and the 
stratified liquid layer (with altered temperature). 
 
Figure 9.4a – RADMOD validation results, lading temperature comparison, experimental test 
04-03. A sketch of vessel section and thermocouples bundle are reported in the upper left 
 
 
Figure 9.4b - RADMOD validation results, lading temperature comparison, experimental test 
04-04. A sketch of vessel section and thermocouples bundle are reported in the upper right 
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9.4.2 Validation results – Wall temperature prediction 
The last step of the validation was aimed to evaluate the ability of the model to predict 
the temperature of the tank walls. This parameter determines the time to failure of the 
tank calculated by the model, since the estimation of the yield strength of the material 
depends on the maximum temperature reached by the steel walls (see paragraph 7.2.4). 
The walls in contact with the vapour phase have higher temperatures and in particular 
the shell between the vapour and the engulfed defect has the highest one (𝑇𝑑2).  
The temperature comparison shown in Figures 9.7 is between the temperature read from 
the wall thermocouple and the temperature of the shell nodes under the exposed defect 
(noded1 and noded2 respectively in contact with the liquid and the vapour phase) 
calculated by the model. The thermocouples position during the experiments is shown 
in Figures 9.6 where the instrumented wall under the defect wideness is reported, for a 
complete sketch of the instrumentation see section 3.4. In Figures 9.6 it is also shown, 
by the blue dotted lines, the indicative level reached by liquid during the tests. 
 
 
Figure 9.5a – Sketch of vessel and wall thermocouples position, experimental test 04-03 
 
Figure 9.6a – RADMOD validation results, wall temperature comparison, experimental test 04-
03 
 
Figure 9.5b – Sketch of vessel and wall thermocouples position, experimental test 04-04 
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Figure 9.6b – RADMOD validation results, wall temperature comparison, experimental test 
04-04 
 
Figure 9.5c – Sketch of vessel and wall thermocouples position, experimental test 04-05 
 
Figure 9.6c – RADMOD validation results, wall temperature comparison, experimental test 04-
05 
 
9.4.3 Discussion on the RADMOD model for defective coatings validation results 
Generally, the model shows to be able to predict the behaviour of the three parameters 
analysed during the validation. The few experiments available permit to validate the 
model by the introduction of two tuning factor, one for the stratified layer depth and one 
for the dissipative term of the system to ambient air. It would be interesting to establish 
the performance of the code compared with medium- and large-scale experimental data. 
The variables compared during the validation are discussed in this section, in relation 
to the results previously shown. 
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Pressure 
The model shows a good prediction of the pressure behaviour inside the tank, the 
simulated pressure curves result to be conservative compared to the real pressure 
registered during the tests. Changing the value of the tuning factor the pressure turns 
out to increase both with the lower depth of the stratified layer and with the flame 
emissivity increases. In the latter case also the temperature reached by the walls is higher 
leading to an early time to failure of the tank. Another point to consider is that up to the 
opening time of PRV, the pressure profiles are close to the experimental ones, whereas, 
as explained in section 7.2.5, at the opening of the PRV an ideal mixing occurs between 
the liquid bulk and the liquid in the stratified layer, resulting in a vapour pressure lower 
than the real one. Thus, after the PRV opening the pressure profiles deviates from the 
experimental curves up to the second opening of the PRV. 
In the end, the model reproduces the first opening of the PRV well, the pressure 
calculated in this point is overestimated by  5% for the simulations of test 04-04 and 04-
05, whereas for the first test (04-03) it around 20%. Coming closer to the uniform liquid 
bulk temperature, the pressure profile approaches the experimental one. 
Lading temperature 
From the results shown in Figures 9.5, the behaviour of both liquid and vapour phase 
obtained with the model, is close to the experimental profiles. In the first test (04-03) 
the PRV never opens and the vapour temperature is good predicted by the model. Also 
the liquid averaged temperature profile conservatively follows the experimental data. In 
the second test (04-04) the vapour temperature profile is well predicted up to the PRV 
opening, then, for the same considerations made above on pressure underestimation 
after the first material discharge, also the vapour temperature undergo a lowering greater 
than the experimental one after the PRV opening. Whereas, the liquid averaged 
temperature remains close to its real behaviour also after the PRV opening. 
Wall temperature 
The thermocouples on the tank shell collect bundles of temperature profiles, of which 
in Figures 9.7 are shown the higher curve and a representative profile of the other data. 
This experimental curves result well predicted by the model, which calculates an 
averaged temperature close to the higher reached during experiments, for the wall in 
contact with the vapour phase. On the other hand the temperature of the walls in contact 
with the liquid phase results to be slightly underestimated. 
 
9.5 Results of the case studies 
In this section, the results of medium- and large-scale tanks implemented as case-studies 
are reported and discussed. The results are obtained through the implementation of the 
RADMOD model for defective real-scale defects, which boundary conditions are 
described in paragraph 7.3.1, while the case-studies definition is reported in section 8.2. 
In this paragraph results of different defect areas simulations are compared, varying 
both the initial liquid filing level and the tank scale. The analysed cases are: the presence 
or not of insulation system and its integrity, the different ratio of defective insulation 
area and different initial filling level.  The effect of changing this parameters is analysed 
on three variables: the pressure inside the tank, the temperature of the lading, in 
particular the vapour phase, and the time to failure of the tank, thus the maximum 
temperature reached by shell walls. The time scale of the following graphs is cut after 
the prediction of time to failure. 
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9.5.1 Pressure  
In Figure 9.8 are shown the pressure results of the medium- (a) and large-scale (b) tanks, 
in the case of unprotected, fully protected and with 30% of defective insulation area. 
Whereas in Figure 9.9 is reported the pressure profile with different defective areas 
compared between each other and with the fully protected case. The pressure profiles 
obtained implementing different filling level are reported in Figure 9.10. 
 
 
Figure 9.7a – Medium scale case study, pressure comparison between unprotected, fully 
protected and 30% defective insulation area  
 
 
Figure 9.7b – Large scale case study, pressure comparison between unprotected, fully protected 
and 30% defective insulation area 
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Figure 9.8a – Medium scale case study, pressure comparison between different ratio of 
defective area (fully protected, 15%, 30% and 40% of defective area) 
 
 
Figure 9.8b – Large scale case study, pressure comparison between different ratio of defective 
area (fully protected, 15%, 30% and 40% of defective area) 
 
Figure 9.9a – Medium scale case study, pressure comparison between different initial filling 
level (45%, 70% and 95% filling; 15% defective area) 
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Figure 9.9b – Large scale case study, pressure comparison between different initial filling level 
(45%, 70% and 95% filling; 15% defective area) 
 
 
9.5.2 Lading temperature 
The vapour temperature results are shown in Figure 9.11 for the insulation presence and 
in Figure 9.12 with respect different defective areas, each Figure shows in (a) the 
medium-scale results and in (b) the large-scale ones. The results of the simulation with 
different initial liquid filling are collected in Figure 9.13. Whereas the comparison 
between the tank scales is shown in Figure 9.14. 
 
 
Figure 9.10a – Medium scale case study, vapour temperature comparison between unprotected, 
fully protected and 15% defective insulation area 
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Figure 9.10b – Large scale case study, vapour temperature comparison between unprotected, 
fully protected and 15% defective insulation area 
 
Figure 9.11a – Medium scale case study, vapour temperature comparison between different 
ratio of defective area (fully protected, 15%, 30% and 40% of defective area) 
 
 
Figure 9.11b – Large scale case study, vapour temperature comparison between different ratio 
of defective area (fully protected, 15%, 30% and 40% of defective area) 
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Figure 9.12a – Medium scale case study, vapour temperature comparison between different 
initial filling level (45%, 70% and 95% filling; 15% defective area) 
 
Figure 9.12b – Large scale case study, vapour temperature comparison between different initial 
filling level (45%, 70% and 95% filling; 15% defective area) 
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Figure 9.13 – Different tank scale results comparison, liquid and vapour temperatures are 
reported jointly the pressure inside the tank 
 
9.5.3 Discussion 
Pressure 
It was expected that the tank with 30% of defective insulation area has a pressure profile 
intermediated between the fully protected and the fully unprotected tank, Figures 9.8 
confirm this assumption. The defective area increase leads to a higher pressure inside 
the tank, as well as the liquid filling increase. In this case, the top volume of vessel 
available for the vapour phase filling, decreases and the system responds with a faster 
pressurization. 
Lading temperature 
The behaviour of the vapour temperature follows the same consideration done for the 
pressure, about the intermediate behaviour of the defective coating-case and the 
unprotected or fully protected ones. Up to the first opening of the PRV the curves 
relative to different defect areas appears superimposed. Whereas the comparison 
between the different initial filling level turns out in a vapour temperature altered, for 
higher liquid filling the resulting vapour temperature is higher. 
Wall temperature and time to failure of the tank 
The maximum wall temperature reached by the shell wall in contact with the defective 
air gap and the vapour phase has no noticeable changes between the case-studies. This 
supports the hypothesis of the existence of a critical defect size exceeding which the 
temperature reached in the defect is not correlated to the defect size. Thus, also the time 
to failure calculated with the model, according to section 7.2.4, are not much influenced 
by the defect area increase. The conservative times to failure of the tank obtained with 
the model, relative at different defective area are summarized in Table 9.4 for the 
medium-scale and in Table 9.5 for the large-scale, the fully protected tank never fails 
during the simulations. 
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Table 9.4 – Summary of the time to failure results of the medium-scale case-studies 
Adef/Acoating % 8% 15% 15% 15% 30% 40% unprot. 
Filling level  % 70% 45% 70% 95% 70% 70% 70% 
ttfconservative min 18 18 17 16 17 16 11 
ttfBS7910 min 20 20 19 18 19 20 16 
emptying min       60 
 
Table 9.5 – Summary of the time to failure results of the large-scale case-studies 
Adef/Acoating % 15% 15% 15% 30% 40% unprot. 
Filling level  % 45% 70% 95% 70% 70% 70% 
ttfconservative min 20 20 18 19 19 14 
ttfBS7910 min 23 23 21 22 22 19 
emptying min      68 
 
 
Tank scale 
The results of the simulation with 40% of defective area and 70% of initial filling, is 
used for the comparison of the medium- and large-scale of tank. As it was expected to 
be, the smaller tank pressurizes earlier, and both the liquid and the vapour temperatures 
follow this profile. 
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10 Conclusions and future works 
 
Starting from the data analysis of past accidents occurred in road and rail hazmat 
transportation, the main causes and consequences of accidents involving LPG were 
identified. Accidental fire exposures emerged among causes of LPG tankers failure, in 
this scenario the BLEVEs are the worst case occurrence. Thus, the analysis raised the 
question of the need of passive fire protection systems able to avoid, or at least delay, 
the BLEVEs, since ADR and RID regulations do not require any PFP on LPG tankers. 
The matter with the implementation of such protections on tankers is that thermal 
coatings undergo defects, as discovered by thermographic inspection of tank-cars [Birk 
& Cunningham, 2000], thus the action of thermal protection may be compromised. To 
assess the performance of defective insulation systems, overcoming real-scale bonfire 
tests, the implementation of simulation tools was considered. Thus, the issues 
concerning insulated tanks exposed to fire with defective insulation system were 
characterized first through the analysis of available bonfire experiments [Birk et al. 
2006; VanderSteen & Birk, 2003] and then through the analysis of literature studies 
[Scarponi et al. 2016].  
With this basis, an advanced FEM model was presented. The model was implemented 
and validated by [Scarponi et al. 2016] and then it was applied to a sensitivity analysis, 
to assess the influence of several parameters on the behaviour of a quarter cylinder tank 
exposed to fire, with different deficiencies configuration. The FEM model requires and 
provides detailed information on the problem, allowing the use of a correct failure 
criteria to evaluate the time to failure of the tank. This analysis has very high 
computational time, a way to reduce it is to skip the computing of pressure and lading 
temperature providing these data as external boundary conditions. 
Thus, a simplified lumped parameters model was implemented to assess the 
performance of defective coatings, in order to save computation time and requiring less 
detailed information in input. The RADMOD model was improved for the simulation 
of defective coatings with respect to a previously work [Landucci et al. 2013] which 
was developed only for unprotected and completely insulated tanks. The model 
validation was performed against available experimental data [Birk et al. 2006] on 
small-scale tanks. Then the model was extended to the simulation of medium- and large-
scale tanks through the definition of several case-studies.  
The results obtained with the RADMOD code have showed that the model generally 
realizes a conservative analysis of the thermal behaviour of LPG tanks, providing 
credible temperatures and pressure profiles and also computing a conservative time to 
failure, which anyway gives an idea of tank behaviour. However, some keys 
improvements could be considered in the development of the work as discussed in the 
following: 
 Add extra nodes 
 Partial engulfment enhancement 
 Heat transfer coefficients detailed correlations 
 Vapour transparency detailed analysis 
 Itemized studies on PRV opening effect 
 De-stratification sub-model 
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 Widening type of substances implemented   
 Software lightening and speeding up 
Introducing extra nodes, generally, could be a good improvement of the code. Firstly, 
the steel jacket could also be considered adding the associated nodes, whereas more 
nodes in the shell could bring more detailed maximum temperature of the shell. Farther, 
the current version of the model considers the partial engulfment of the tank only 
dividing the external surfaces, thus the computed temperature is averaged on the node. 
Add extra nodes, with respect the engulfment, could allow the simulation of different 
flame impingements and it would be interesting especially for the analysis in the first 
time step when the fire is not usually fully propagated. 
For what concerns the heat transfer modelling and balances, the evaluation of heat-
transfer coefficients affects the temperature profiles, thus, many simplified correlations 
were adopted and more detailed correlation could be considered. Moreover, for the heat 
transfer by radiation between the shell walls and vapour-phase, an improvement was 
already done not considering the vapour as completely transparent, but a detailed 
analysis could be done considering three quantities; gas emissivity, gas absorptivity and 
gas transmissivity among which the first one is a function of the gas temperature, while 
the others are functions of both gas and surface radiation temperatures. Moreover, a 
conductive contribution through the liquid side shell and the vapour side shell could be 
considered.  
A limit of the model is in the vapour temperature after the opening of the PRV, now 
there is already a heat transfer coefficient boost considering a forced convective 
contribution after PRV opening, anyway some extra studies could be done on that. 
Actually, the vapour is also considered as a pure gas, it is reasonable to believe that 
some liquid droplets could be present in the gas bulk as the consequence of boiling 
process and it has a 2-phases venting through PRV. Another improvement related to the 
PRV could be the implementation of a de-stratification sub-model, since at the PRV 
opening the model considers the immediate mixing of the stratified layer and this, 
clearly, needs further improvement to model the real behaviour of the liquid-phase 
inside the tank.  
The model could be also extended to other substances like pure compound or mixture. 
In latter case also the mixing rule could be considered, which requires quite more efforts. 
Also the software code could be improved, first rewriting it from brand new to make 
the simulation faster and to add less approximation in the mathematical calculation, and 
then checking the analytical stability of the model. 
The defect sub-model could be modified allowing setting the percentage of defective 
area in each side, vapour or liquid. This action requires a geometrical analysis of the 
problem which is complicated if different fire impingement want to be simulated.  
In conclusion, when experimental data will be available for medium- and large-scale 
tanks some validation studies have to be carried to verify the ability of the defective 
RADMOD sub-model. 
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Appendix A 
 
Additional information about the modelling of heat and mass balances in the RADMOD 
Baseline code are reported in this appendix. First are explained the equations related to 
the variables, then the heat loads and heat exchange coefficients are defined. and in the 
end the nodal area are determinate.  
The summary of the equations implemented in the RADMOD Baseline is reported in 
Table A.1 and A.2. While, the equations set implemented in the novel version of the 
code are collected in Table A.2 and A.3 for the defective sub-model and in Table A.4 
and A.5 for the validation sub-model. 
Pressure 
The equation to describe the pressure trend comes directly from the ideal gas law: 
𝑃𝑉𝑉 = 𝑧𝑧
𝑚𝑉
𝑀𝑊
𝑅𝑇𝑉       (A.1) 
Where 𝑉𝑉 is the gas volume. Considering the differentiate with constant zz and doing 
the mathematical rearrangements, a general formula for both thermodynamic systems 
is: 
𝑑𝑃
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑧𝑧𝜌𝑉
𝑚𝑉
(
𝑃
𝜌𝐿
𝑑𝑚𝐿
𝑑𝑡
+
𝑅𝑇𝑉
𝑀𝑊
𝑑𝑚𝑉
𝑑𝑡
+
𝑅𝑚𝑉
𝑀𝑊
𝑑𝑇𝑉
𝑑𝑡
)    (A.2) 
Where 𝜌𝑉 and 𝜌𝐿are the vapour and liquid densities. Including the other equation of 
liquid and vapour mass, the equation (A.2) will become specific for the case of sub-
cooled or boiling liquid. 
Liquid mass and Level 
The liquid level inside the tank has an important role to define the surface for heat 
exchange for each node and consequently the correct thermal response of the tank. 
Not boiling liquid:   
𝑑𝑚𝐿
𝑑𝑡
= 0        (A.3) 
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝑡
= 0         (A.4) 
Boiling liquid: 
𝑑𝑚𝐿
𝑑𝑡
= −
(𝑞𝐿+𝑞𝐿𝑉)
Λ
       (A.5) 
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝑡
=
1
2𝜌𝐿𝑊√𝑅𝑖
2−(𝑅𝑖−𝐿)
2
𝑑𝑚𝐿
𝑑𝑡
      (A.6) 
Where Λ is the heat of vaporization, W is the length of the tank and, 𝑅𝑖 is the inner 
radius of cylindrical container.  
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Vapour mass  
To evaluate the vapour mass it is possible to take into account of the variation of total 
mass (𝑚𝑡𝑜𝑡 = 𝑚𝐿 + 𝑚𝑉) that is equal to the mass flow entering the system (none) less 
the mass flow discharged through the PRV: 
𝑑𝑚𝑉
𝑑𝑡
= −
𝑑𝑚𝐿
dt
− 𝜙       (A.7) 
Including the other balance of liquid mass it is possible to obtain the two simple specific 
equations for the vapour in the case of sub-cooled and boiling liquid. 
Temperature of the shell in contact with the liquid (𝑇15) 
𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠𝐿
𝑠𝑠
2
𝐴15̅̅ ̅̅̅
𝑑𝑇15
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴15𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑘𝑠𝐿
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝐿 − 𝑇15) − 𝑞𝐿,𝑏𝑜𝑖𝑙   (A.8) 
Where 𝑑𝑠 is the density of shell material, 𝑐𝑝𝑠𝐿 (eq. A.30) and 𝑘𝑠𝐿 (eq. A.31) are 
respectively the heat capacity and the thermal conductivity of wall in contact with the 
liquid, 𝑠𝑠 is the shell thickness, 𝐴15̅̅ ̅̅̅ and 𝐴15𝑒𝑥𝑡 are the node averaged and external 
surface, respectively formulated as shown in equations (A.36c) and (A.36b). 
Considering the node division, 
𝑠𝑠
2
𝐴15̅̅ ̅̅̅ gives the volume of the node15,  𝐴15𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑘𝑠𝐿
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝐿 −
𝑇15) is the conductive heat power entering the system on the liquid side. 𝑞𝐿,𝑏𝑜𝑖𝑙  is the 
heat power transferred from the wall in contact with the liquid to the liquid amount, and 
it is different if the liquid system is sub-cooled or boiling. The formulation of energy 
balance does not consider the conductive heat flux due to the circular pattern; this is 
negligible because the thickness is small.  
Temperature of the shell in contact with the vapour (𝑇26) 
𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠𝑉
𝑠𝑠
2
𝐴26̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑𝑇26
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴26𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑘𝑠𝑉
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝑉 − 𝑇26) − 𝑞𝑉 − 𝑞𝐿,𝑟𝑎𝑑  (A.9) 
Where 𝑐𝑝𝑠𝑉 and 𝑘𝑠𝑉 are respectively the heat capacity and the thermal conductivity of 
shell on vapour side as a function of temperature. As in the case of the liquid-space wall,  
𝑠𝑠
2
𝐴26̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ gives the volume of the node26,  𝐴26𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑘𝑠𝑉
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝑉 − 𝑇26) is the conductive heat 
power entering the system on the vapour side. While 𝑞𝑉 is the heat power transferred 
from the wall to the vapour phase, it consists of both radiative and convective 
contribution. Term 𝑞𝐿,𝑟𝑎𝑑 is the heat power transferred from wall on vapour side to the 
liquid by radiation.  
Temperature of the intermediate nodes iL and iV (𝑇𝑖𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑖𝑉) 
Unprotected: 
𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠𝐿
𝑠𝑠
2
𝐴𝑖𝐿̅̅ ̅̅
𝑑𝑇𝑖𝐿
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝑖𝐿,𝐹𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡,𝐿 − 𝐴𝑖𝐿,𝐴𝐼𝑎𝑚𝑏,𝐿−𝐴15𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑘𝑠𝐿
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝐿 − 𝑇15)    (A.10) 
𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠𝑉
𝑠𝑠
2
𝐴𝑖𝑉̅̅ ̅̅
𝑑𝑇𝑖𝑉
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝑖𝑉,𝐹𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡,𝑉−𝐴𝑖𝑉,𝐴𝐼𝑎𝑚𝑏,𝑉 − 𝐴26𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑘𝑠𝑉
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝑉 − 𝑇26) (A.11) 
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Coated: 
(𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠𝐿
𝑠𝑠
2
𝐴𝑖𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑝𝑖
𝑠𝑖 
2
𝐴𝑖𝐿𝑒𝑥𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )
𝑑𝑇𝑖𝐿
𝑑𝑡
=
                                          𝐴37𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑘𝑖
𝑠𝑖
(𝑇37 − 𝑇𝑖𝐿)−𝐴15𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑘𝑠𝐿
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝐿 − 𝑇15)     (A.12) 
(𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠𝑉
𝑠𝑠
2
𝐴𝑖𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑝𝑖
𝑠𝑖 
2
𝐴𝑖𝑉𝑒𝑥𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )
𝑑𝑇𝑖𝑉
𝑑𝑡
=
                                            𝐴48𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑘𝑖
𝑠𝑖
(𝑇48 − 𝑇𝑖𝐿)−𝐴26𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑘𝑠𝑉
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝑉 − 𝑇26)  (A.13) 
Where 𝑑𝑖  , 𝑐𝑝𝑖 , 𝑘𝑖 and 𝑠𝑖 are respectively the density, the heat capacity, the thermal 
conductivity and the thickness of the coating. For the determination of all the nodal 
areas related to 𝐴𝑖𝐿, 𝐴𝑖𝑉, 𝐴48, 𝐴37, 𝐴15and 𝐴26 see equations (A.36-A.41). 
The heat leaving the systems to the inner nodes remains unchanged from the two cases, 
it is expressed as 𝐴15𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑘𝑠𝐿
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝐿 − 𝑇15) and 𝐴26𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑘𝑠𝑉
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝑉 − 𝑇26), for nodeiL and nodeiV 
respectively, and represents the power heat transferred by conduction from the 
intermediate nodes to the internal node15 and node26. 
Temperature of the external coating nodes 48 and 37 (𝑇48𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇37) 
As already said, this nodes are present only in case of coated tank and the equations are 
the same as the intermediate nodes for unprotected tanks. The temperature of the nodes 
on liquid side (𝑇37) and on vapour side (𝑇48) are calculated as: 
𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑝𝑖
𝑠𝑖
2
𝐴37̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑𝑇37
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴37,𝐹𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡,𝐿−𝐴37,𝐴𝐼𝑎𝑚𝑏,𝐿 − 𝐴37𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑘𝑖
𝑠𝑖
(𝑇37 − 𝑇𝑖𝐿)   (A.14) 
𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑝𝑖
𝑠𝑖
2
𝐴48̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑𝑇48
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴48,𝐹𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡,𝑉 − 𝐴48,𝐴𝐼𝑎𝑚𝑏,𝑉 − 𝐴48𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑘𝑖
𝑠𝑖
(𝑇48 − 𝑇𝑖𝑉) (A.15) 
Heat loads from external nodes to ambient 
In case of partial engulfment the heat flux from the shell surface to the ambient air is 
both convective and radiative: 
𝐼𝑎𝑚𝑏 = ℎ𝑎(𝑇𝑤 − 𝑇𝑎𝑚𝑏) + 𝜎𝜀𝑠(𝑇𝑤
4 − 𝑇𝑎𝑚𝑏
4  )    (A.16) 
Where Tw is, the generic wall temperature to change with the specific nodal 
temperature, Tamb is the ambient temperature and hais the convective heat-transfer 
coefficient to evaluate the heat exchange between the shell and the air at the temperature 
Tamb. As suggested in [Kern, 1965]: 
ℎ𝑎 = 0.3 ∗ 5.678(𝑇𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙 − 𝑇𝑎𝑚𝑏)
0.25     (A.17) 
Heat loads to the liquid from the internal shell nodes  
The heat load received by the liquid 𝑞𝐿is defined as the sum of a convective and a 
radiative contribution (𝑞𝐿 = 𝑞𝐿,𝑏𝑜𝑖𝑙 + 𝑞𝐿,𝑟𝑎𝑑). The convective term is expressed as: 
𝑞𝐿,𝑏𝑜𝑖𝑙 = 𝐴15𝑖𝑛𝑡ℎ𝐿(𝑇15 − 𝑇𝐿)      (A.18) 
Where ℎ𝐿 is the convective heat transfer coefficient and it depends on the pool boiling 
regime. The two cases and the relative correlation for the estimation of ℎ𝐿 are the same 
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used in the novel RADMOD version and described in paragraph 7.3.1 for the two cases 
of interface evaporation or nucleate boiling. 
Regarding the radiative heat transfer between the vapour-space internal surface and the 
liquid, in the novel implementation of the code, see paragraph 7.3.1. 
Heat loads to the liquid from the vapour phase 
𝑞𝐿𝑉 = 𝐴𝐿𝑉ℎ𝐿𝑉(𝑇𝑉 − 𝑇𝐿)      (A.19) 
𝐴𝐿𝑉 is surface of the liquid-vapour interface calculated throught equation (A.42). The 
heat-transfer coefficient ℎ𝐿𝑉 is consist of two terms, a natural convective coefficient and 
other radiative. For convective contribution the correlation of hot horizontal plate facing 
downward are adopted as suggested in [Perry & Green, 1997]. Defining the same 
dimensionless key parameter of (7.28 , paragraph 7.3.1), but with the subscript V and 
the characteristic length defined as in equation (A.21) , the heat coefficient ℎ𝐿𝑉,𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 is 
derived from:  
𝑁𝑢 =
ℎ𝐿𝑉𝑥𝑖
𝑘𝑉
= 0.27𝑅𝑎
1
4⁄       (A.20) 
𝑥𝑖 =
4𝐴𝐿𝑉
2(𝑊+
𝐴𝐿𝑉
𝑊⁄ )
       (A.21) 
Whereas the radiative heat-transfer coefficient from vapour to liquid is calculate by the 
empirical correlation [Perry & Green, 1997]: 
ℎ𝐿𝑉,𝑟𝑎𝑑 = 5.6783
[(
𝑇𝑉
100
)
4
−(
𝑇𝐿
100
)
4
]0.173
(𝑇𝑉−𝑇𝐿)
     (A.22) 
Heat loads to the vapour from the internal shell nodes  
The total heat entering the vapour node is the sum of a convective contribution 𝑞𝑉,𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 
and a radiative contrivution 𝑞𝑉,𝑟𝑎𝑑: 
𝑞𝑉 = 𝑞𝑉,𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 + 𝑞𝑉,𝑟𝑎𝑑 =  𝐴26𝑖𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑉,𝑐(𝑇26 − 𝑇𝑉) + 𝐴26𝑖𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑉,𝑟(𝑇26 − 𝑇𝑉) (A.23) 
The convective coefficient is calculate with the equations (A.24) or with equation 
(A.26) depending on the PRV function. 
If PRV is closed: 
Defining the dimensionless key parameters of (7.48, paragraph 7.3.1) but with the 
subscript V and characteristic length defined as shown in equation (A.25), the 
convective coefficient is: 
𝑁𝑢 =
ℎ𝑉,𝑐 𝑥𝑖
𝑘𝑉
= 0.27𝑅𝑎
1
4⁄       (A.24) 
𝑥𝑖 =
4𝐴26𝑖𝑛𝑡
2(𝑊+
𝐴26𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑊⁄ )
       (A.25) 
If PRV is opened: 
Forced convection is also considered and added to the natural convection coefficient.  
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𝑁𝑢 =
ℎ𝑉,𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑥𝑖
𝑘𝑉
= 0.0243𝑅𝑒0.8𝑃𝑟0.4     (A.26) 
Where: 
 𝑃𝑟 =
𝜇𝑉𝑐𝑝𝑉
𝑘𝑉
  ;  𝑅𝑒 =
4𝜙
𝑝𝜇𝑉
      (A.27) 
Where 𝜙 is the mass flow throughout the PRV derived with equation (A.35) 
Characteristic length 𝑥𝑖 is given by the ratio of the section of vapour phase and the 
wetted perimeter according to: 
𝑥𝑖 =
4𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑝
𝑝𝑤𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑
=
𝑅𝑖
2(𝑐𝑜𝑠−1(
𝐿−𝑅𝑖
𝑅𝑖
)−𝑠𝑖𝑛(
𝐿−𝑅𝑖
𝑅𝑖
)(
𝐿−𝑅𝑖
𝑅𝑖
))
2𝜋𝑐𝑜𝑠−1(
𝐿−𝑅𝑖
𝑅𝑖
)
    (A.28) 
The radiative coefficient ℎ𝑉,𝑟𝑎𝑑 is calculated as follow: 
ℎ𝑉,𝑟 = 5.6783
[(
𝑇26
100
)
4
−(
𝑇𝑉
100
)
4
]0.173
(𝑇26−𝑇𝑉)
     (A.29) 
Thermal properties of wall material 
The thermodynamic properties of the steel wall (stainless and carbon steel) are 
dependent of the temperature of the wall. Properties of interest are the heat capacity, 
and the conductive heat transfer coefficient.  
The specific heat of carbon steel (subscript CS) is a fit of the properties for steel taken 
from Eurocode [Eurocode 1, 2005] as seen in equation set (A.30), where 𝑐𝑝 is 
calculated in J/kgK and the steel temperature T is in°C. 
 20 ≤ 𝑇(°𝐶) < 600  
𝑐𝑝𝐶𝑆 = 425 + 0.773 ∙ 𝑇 − 0.00168 ∙ 𝑇
2 + 2.22 ∙ 10−6 ∙ 𝑇3   (A.30a) 
 600 ≤ 𝑇(°𝐶) < 735  
𝑐𝑝𝐶𝑆 = 666 +
13002
738−𝑇
        (A.30b) 
 735 ≤ 𝑇(°𝐶) < 900  
𝑐𝑝𝐶𝑆 = 545 +
17820
𝑇−731
        (A.30c) 
 900 ≤ 𝑇(°𝐶) < 1200  
𝑐𝑝𝐶𝑆 = 650         (A.30d) 
The thermal conductivity (𝑘𝐶𝑆) is modelled from equation set (A.31), as found by 
Eurocode [Eurocode 1, 2005]. It is estimated as W/mK. 
 20 ≤ 𝑇(°𝐶) < 800  
𝑘𝐶𝑆 = 54 − 0.0333 ∙ 𝑇       (A.31a) 
 800 ≤ 𝑇(°𝐶) < 1200  
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𝑘𝐶𝑆 = 27.3         (A.31b) 
The same approach is considered for the stainless steel (subscript SS). The specific heat 
of stainless steel may be determined from the following equation (A.32), whereas the 
conductive heat transfer coefficient follows the equation (A.33). Both correlations are 
found by Eurocode [Eurocode 1, 2005]. 
 20 ≤ 𝑇(°𝐶) < 1200  
𝑐𝑝𝑆𝑆 = 450 + 0.280 ∙ 𝑇 − 2.91 ∙ 10
−4 ∙ 𝑇2 + 1.34 ∙ 10−7 ∙ 𝑇3   (A.32) 
 20 ≤ 𝑇(°𝐶) < 1200  
𝑘𝑆𝑆 = 14.6 − 0.0127 ∙ 𝑇       (A.33) 
Mass flow through PRV 
The general equation for determination of the mass flow discharged through he PRV is 
defined as: 𝜙 = 𝜌𝑣𝑢𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠. The density of the vapour 𝜌𝑣 is calculated through the ideal 
gas law, and for considering the real gas behaviour the compressibility factor (zz) is 
inserted in the equation. The cross-sectional area (𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠) is the area of valve through 
which the fluid has the efflux velocity 𝑢. Making use of Mach number definition 
(eqation A.34) for a subsritical flow (more detail in Chapter 5), the mass flow is 
calculated with hypothesis of a isentropic process and, considering that the internal 
dissipative phenomena (wall friction) and the heat exchanges with the external 
environment are negligible.  
𝑀𝑎 = √
(
𝑃
𝑃𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐
)
𝛾−1
𝛾
−1
𝛾−1
2
       (A.34) 
𝜙 = 𝑐𝐷𝐴𝑃𝑅𝑉
𝑃
𝑧𝑧
√
𝛾𝑀𝑊
𝑅𝑇𝑉
 
𝑀𝑎
(1+
𝛾−1
2
𝑀𝑎2)
𝛾+1
2(𝛾−1)
    (A.35) 
Nodal areas 
The nodal areas are calculated in function of the liquid level, which determines the 
surfaces in the liquid space and the ones in the vapour space. The the definition of three 
exchanging areas for each node, specifically: internal, external and averaged area,  is 
complex and the difference between the three surfaces on the same node is not that 
significative. The internal and the external areas are are the surfaces through with the 
heat powers passing through, whereas the averaged areas are used for the volumes 
evaluation. A simplification is advisable in the future works, by the definition of one 
area of exchange for each node. Starting the inner nodes, the different nodal areas are 
defined as follow, subscripts 𝑖 or 𝑠 means that the variables are referred to the insulation 
or to the steel walls, 𝐿 is the liquid level and 𝑊 is the tank length: 
Liquid side inner node (node15) 
𝐴15𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 2𝑊𝑅𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑠
−1 (
𝑅𝑖−𝐿
𝑅𝑖
)      (A.36a) 
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𝐴15𝑒𝑥𝑡 =
𝐴15𝑖𝑛𝑡+𝐴𝑖𝐿̅̅ ̅̅̅
2
       (A.36b) 
𝐴15̅̅ ̅̅̅ =
𝐴15𝑖𝑛𝑡+𝐴15𝑒𝑥𝑡
2
       (A.36c) 
Vapour side inner node (node26) 
𝐴26𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 2𝜋𝑊𝑅𝑖 − 𝐴15𝑖𝑛𝑡       (A.37a) 
𝐴26𝑒𝑥𝑡 =
𝐴26𝑖𝑛𝑡+𝐴𝑖𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
2
       (A.37b) 
𝐴26̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ =
𝐴26𝑖𝑛𝑡+𝐴26𝑒𝑥𝑡
2
       (A.37c) 
Liquid side intermediate node (nodeiL) 
𝐴𝑖𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ =
𝐴𝑖𝐿̅̅ ̅̅̅+𝐴15𝑒𝑥𝑡
2
       (A.38a) 
𝐴𝑖𝐿𝑒𝑥𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ =
𝐴𝑖𝐿̅̅ ̅̅̅+𝐴37𝑖𝑛𝑡
2
       (A.38b) 
𝐴𝑖𝐿̅̅ ̅̅ = 2𝑊𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑠
−1 (
𝑅𝑒−𝐿
𝑅𝑒
)       (A.38c)  
Vapour side intermediate node (nodeiV) 
𝐴𝑖𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ =
𝐴𝑖𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ ̅+𝐴26𝑒𝑥𝑡
2
       (A.39a) 
𝐴𝑖𝑉𝑒𝑥𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ =
𝐴𝑖𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ ̅+𝐴48𝑖𝑛𝑡
2
       (A.39b) 
𝐴𝑖𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ = 2𝜋𝑊𝑅𝑒 − 𝐴𝑖𝐿̅̅ ̅̅        (A.39c) 
Liquid side external node (node37) 
𝐴37𝑖𝑛𝑡 =
𝐴𝑖𝐿̅̅ ̅̅̅+𝐴37𝑒𝑥𝑡
2
       (A.40a) 
𝐴37𝑒𝑥𝑡 = 2𝑊(𝑅𝑒 + 𝑠𝑖)𝑐𝑜𝑠
−1 (
𝑅𝑒+𝑠𝑖−𝐿
𝑅𝑒+𝑠𝑖
)     (A.40b) 
𝐴37̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ =
𝐴37𝑖𝑛𝑡+𝐴37𝑒𝑥𝑡
2
       (A.40c) 
Vapour side external node (node48) 
𝐴48𝑖𝑛𝑡 =
𝐴𝑖𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ ̅+𝐴48𝑒𝑥𝑡
2
       (A.41a) 
𝐴48𝑒𝑥𝑡 = 2𝑊(𝑅𝑒 + 𝑠𝑖) − 𝐴37𝑒𝑥𝑡      (A.41b) 
𝐴48̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ =
𝐴48𝑖𝑛𝑡+𝐴48𝑒𝑥𝑡
2
       (A.41c) 
Liquid-vapour interface  
𝐴𝐿𝑉 = 𝑊𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛 (𝑐𝑜𝑠
−1 |
𝐿−𝑅𝑖
𝑅𝑖
|)      (A.42) 
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Summary of equations system in the RADMOD code 
 
RADMOD code – Equations set 
 
The equations set defined for the Baseline RADMOD model are 12 for a coated tank, 
whereas 10 variables are defined for unprotected tanks. The equations set is shown in 
Table A.1 and A.2 , in case of unprotected tanks the last two equations are not solved. 
If RADMOD_Strat1.m or RADMOD_Strat3.m the equations set is valid, with the 
appropriate definition of  𝑚𝐿. 
Table A.1 – Summary of the RADMOD code equations set for the Sub-Cooled liquid 
condition, 𝑃 > 𝑃𝑠𝑎𝑡(𝑇𝐿) 
 
 
 
𝑇𝐿  𝑚𝐿𝑐𝑝𝐿
𝑑𝑇𝐿
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑞𝐿,𝑏𝑜𝑖𝑙 + 𝑞𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑑 + 𝑞𝐿𝑉 
𝑇𝑉 𝑚𝑉𝑐𝑣𝑉
𝑑𝑇𝑉
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑞𝑉 − 𝑞𝐿𝑉 − 𝑧𝑧 𝜙
𝑅𝑇𝑉
𝑀𝑊
 
𝑃 
𝑑𝑃
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑧𝑧
𝜌𝑉𝑅
𝑀𝑊
𝑑𝑇𝑉
𝑑𝑡
− 𝑧𝑧𝜙
𝜌𝑉𝑅𝑇𝑉
𝑚𝑉𝑀𝑊
 
𝐿 
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝑡
= 0 
𝑚𝐿 
𝑑𝑚𝐿
𝑑𝑡
= 0 
𝑚𝑉 
𝑑𝑚𝑉
𝑑𝑡
= −𝜙 
𝑇15 𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠
𝑠𝑠
2
(
𝐴15𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝐴15𝑎𝑣
2
)
𝑑𝑇15
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴15𝑎𝑣
𝑘𝑠
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝐿 − 𝑇15) − 𝑞𝐿,𝑏𝑜𝑖𝑙 
𝑇26 𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠
𝑠𝑠
2
(
𝐴26𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝐴26𝑎𝑣
2
)
𝑑𝑇26
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴26𝑎𝑣
𝑘𝑠
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝑉 − 𝑇26) − 𝐴26𝑖𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑉(𝑇26 − 𝑇𝑉) − 𝑞𝐿,𝑟𝑎𝑑 
𝑇𝑖𝐿 
(𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑝𝑖
𝑠𝑖
2
(
𝐴𝑖𝐿̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝐴37𝑖𝑛𝑡
2
) + 𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠
𝑠𝑠
2
(
𝐴𝑖𝐿̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝐴15𝑒𝑥𝑡
2
))
𝑑𝑇𝑖𝐿
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴37𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑘𝑖
𝑠𝑖
(𝑇37 − 𝑇𝑖𝐿) − 𝐴15𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑘𝑠
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝐿 − 𝑇15) 
𝑇𝑖𝑉 
(𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑝𝑖
𝑠𝑖
2
(
𝐴𝑖𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝐴48𝑖𝑛𝑡
2
) + 𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠
𝑠𝑠
2
(
𝐴𝑖𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝐴26𝑒𝑥𝑡
2
))
𝑑𝑇𝑖𝑉
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴48𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑘𝑖
𝑠𝑖
(𝑇48 − 𝑇𝑖𝑉) − 𝐴26𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑘𝑠
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝑉 − 𝑇26) 
𝑇37 𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑝𝑖
𝑠𝑖
2
(
𝐴37𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝐴37𝑒𝑥𝑡
2
)
𝑑𝑇37
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴37𝐹𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐿 − 𝐴37𝐴𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐿 − 𝐴37𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑘𝑖
𝑠𝑖
(𝑇37 − 𝑇𝑖𝐿) 
𝑇48 𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑝𝑖
𝑠𝑖
2
(
𝐴48𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝐴48𝑒𝑥𝑡
2
)
𝑑𝑇48
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴48𝐹𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑉 − 𝐴48𝐴𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑉 − 𝐴48𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑘𝑖
𝑠𝑖
(𝑇48 − 𝑇𝑖𝑉) 
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Table A.2 – Summary of the RADMOD code equations set for the boiling liquid 
condition, 𝑃 ≤ 𝑃𝑠𝑎𝑡(𝑇𝐿). 
 
 
  
𝑇𝐿  
𝑑𝑇𝐿
𝑑𝑡
= 0 
𝑇𝑉 𝑚𝑉𝑐𝑣𝑉
𝑑𝑇𝑉
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑞𝑉 − 𝑞𝐿𝑉 − 𝑧𝑧 𝜙
𝑅𝑇𝑉
𝑀𝑊
+
𝑑𝑚𝐿
𝑑𝑡
(𝑐𝑣𝑉(𝑇𝑉 − 𝑇𝐿) −
𝑅
𝑀𝑊
𝑇𝐿) 
𝑃 
𝑑𝑃
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑧𝑧
𝜌𝑉
𝑚𝑉
(
𝑃
𝜌𝐿
𝑑𝑚𝐿
𝑑𝑡
+
𝑅𝑇𝑉
𝑀𝑊
𝑑𝑚𝑉
𝑑𝑡
+
𝑅𝑚𝑉
𝑀𝑊
𝑑𝑇𝑉
𝑑𝑡
) 
𝐿 
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝑡
=
1
2𝜌𝐿𝑊√𝑅2 − (𝑅 − 𝐿)2
𝑑𝑚𝐿
𝑑𝑡
 
𝑚𝐿 
𝑑𝑚𝐿
𝑑𝑡
= −
(𝑞𝐿 + 𝑞𝐿𝑉)
𝛬
 
𝑚𝑉 
𝑑𝑚𝑉
𝑑𝑡
=
(𝑞𝐿 + 𝑞𝐿𝑉)
𝛬
− 𝜙 
𝑇5 𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠
𝑠𝑠
2
(
𝐴15𝑒𝑥𝑡 + 𝐴15𝑖𝑛𝑡
2
)
𝑑𝑇15
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴15𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑘𝑠
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝐿 − 𝑇15) − 𝑞𝐿,𝑏𝑜𝑖𝑙 
𝑇26 𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠
𝑠𝑠
2
(
𝐴26𝑒𝑥𝑡 + 𝐴26𝑖𝑛𝑡
2
)
𝑑𝑇26
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴26𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑘𝑠
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝑉 − 𝑇26) − 𝐴26𝑖𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑉(𝑇26 − 𝑇𝑉) − 𝑞𝑉,𝑟𝑎𝑑 
𝑇𝑖𝐿  
(𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑝𝑖
𝑠𝑖
2
(
𝐴𝑖𝐿̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝐴37𝑖𝑛𝑡
2
) + 𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠
𝑠𝑠
2
(
𝐴𝑖𝐿̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝐴15𝑒𝑥𝑡
2
))
𝑑𝑇𝑖𝐿
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴37𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑘𝑖
𝑠𝑖
(𝑇37 − 𝑇𝑖𝐿) − 𝐴15𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑘𝑠
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝐿 − 𝑇15) 
𝑇𝑖𝑉 
(𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑝𝑖
𝑠𝑖
2
(
𝐴𝑖𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝐴48𝑖𝑛𝑡
2
) + 𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠
𝑠𝑠
2
(
𝐴𝑖𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝐴26𝑒𝑥𝑡
2
))
𝑑𝑇𝑖𝑉
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴48𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑘𝑖
𝑠𝑖
(𝑇48 − 𝑇𝑖𝑉) − 𝐴26𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑘𝑠
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝑉 − 𝑇26) 
𝑇37 𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑝𝑖
𝑠𝑖
2
(
𝐴37𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝐴37𝑒𝑥𝑡
2
)
𝑑𝑇37
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴37𝐹𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐿 − 𝐴37𝐴𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐿 − 𝐴37𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑘𝑖
𝑠𝑖
(𝑇37 − 𝑇𝑖𝐿) 
𝑇48 𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑝𝑖
𝑠𝑖
2
(
𝐴48𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝐴48𝑒𝑥𝑡
2
)
𝑑𝑇48
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴48𝐹𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑉 − 𝐴48𝐴𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑉 − 𝐴48𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑘𝑖
𝑠𝑖
(𝑇48 − 𝑇𝑖𝑉) 
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Novel RADMOD sub-model for defective coatings – Equations set 
 
The novel RADMOD model for the presence of defect in the thermal insulation system 
required the definition of 16 variable and the associated equations. The equations set for 
the RADMOD_defect.m are summarized in Table A.3 and A.4 for sub-cooled and 
boiling liquid conditions, respectively. If the Strat3 is selected in the input data file, the 
equations set is valid, with the appropriate definition of  𝑚𝐿. 
Table A.3 – Summary of equations set of the novel RADMOD code for defective coatings, for 
the boiling liquid condition, 𝑃 > 𝑃𝑠𝑎𝑡(𝑇𝐿). 
 
𝑇𝐿 𝑚𝐿𝑐𝑝𝐿
𝑑𝑇𝐿
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑞𝐿,𝑏𝑜𝑖𝑙 + 𝑞𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑑 + 𝑞𝐿𝑉 + 𝑞𝑑1,𝐿 
𝑇𝑉 𝑚𝑉𝑐𝑣𝑉
𝑑𝑇𝑉
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑞𝑉 − 𝑞𝐿𝑉 − 𝑧𝑧 𝜙
𝑅𝑇𝑉
𝑀𝑊
+ 𝑞𝑑2,𝑉 
𝑃 
𝑑𝑃
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑧𝑧
𝜌𝑉𝑅
𝑀𝑊
𝑑𝑇𝑉
𝑑𝑡
− 𝑧𝑧 𝜙
𝜌𝑉𝑅𝑇𝑉
𝑚𝑉𝑀𝑊
 
𝐿 
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝑡
= 0 
𝑚𝐿 
𝑑𝑚𝐿
𝑑𝑡
= 0 
𝑚𝑉 
𝑑𝑚𝑉
𝑑𝑡
= −𝜙 
𝑇15 𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠
𝑠𝑠
2
(
𝐴15𝑒𝑥𝑡 + 𝐴15𝑖𝑛𝑡
2
)
𝑑𝑇15
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴15𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑘𝑠
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝐿 − 𝑇15) − 𝑞𝐿,𝑏𝑜𝑖𝑙 
𝑇26 𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠
𝑠𝑠
2
(
𝐴26𝑒𝑥𝑡 + 𝐴26𝑖𝑛𝑡
2
)
𝑑𝑇26
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴26𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑘𝑠
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝑉 − 𝑇26) − 𝐴26𝑖𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑉(𝑇26 − 𝑇𝑉) − 𝑞𝐿,𝑟𝑎𝑑 
𝑇𝑖𝐿 
(𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑝𝑖
𝑠𝑖
2
(
𝐴𝑖𝐿̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝐴37𝑖𝑛𝑡
2
) + 𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠
𝑠𝑠
2
(
𝐴𝑖𝐿̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝐴15𝑒𝑥𝑡
2
))
𝑑𝑇𝑖𝐿
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴37𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑘𝑖
𝑠𝑖
(𝑇37 − 𝑇𝑖𝐿) − 𝐴15𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑘𝑠
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝐿 − 𝑇15) 
𝑇𝑖𝑉 
(𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑝𝑖
𝑠𝑖
2
(
𝐴𝑖𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝐴48𝑖𝑛𝑡
2
) + 𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠
𝑠𝑠
2
(
𝐴𝑖𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝐴26𝑒𝑥𝑡
2
))
𝑑𝑇𝑖𝑉
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴48𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑘𝑖
𝑠𝑖
(𝑇48 − 𝑇𝑖𝑉) − 𝐴26𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑘𝑠
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝑉 − 𝑇26) 
𝑇37 𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑝𝑖
𝑠𝑖
2
(
𝐴37𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝐴37𝑒𝑥𝑡
2
)
𝑑𝑇37
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴37𝐹𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐿 − 𝐴37𝐴𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐿 − 𝐴37𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑘𝑖
𝑠𝑖
(𝑇37 − 𝑇𝑖𝐿) 
𝑇48 𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑝𝑖
𝑠𝑖
2
(
𝐴48𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝐴48𝑒𝑥𝑡
2
)
𝑑𝑇48
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴48𝐹𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑉 − 𝐴48𝐴𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑉 − 𝐴48𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑘𝑖
𝑠𝑖
(𝑇48 − 𝑇𝑖𝑉) 
𝑇𝑑1 𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠𝐿𝑠𝑠𝐴𝑑1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑𝑇𝑑1
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝑑1𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑞𝑑3,𝑟𝑎𝑑 − 𝑞𝑑1,𝐿 
𝑇𝑑2 𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠𝑉𝑠𝑠𝐴𝑑2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑𝑇𝑑2
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝑑2𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑞𝑑4,𝑟𝑎𝑑 − 𝑞𝑑2,𝑉 
𝑇𝑑3 𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑖𝐴𝑑3̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑𝑇𝑑3
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝑑3𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡 − 𝐴𝑑1𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑞𝑑3,𝑟𝑎𝑑 
𝑇𝑑4 𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑖𝐴𝑑4̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑𝑇𝑑3
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝑑4𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡 − 𝐴𝑑2𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑞𝑑4,𝑟𝑎𝑑 
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Table A.4 – Summary of equations set of the novel RADMOD code for defective coatings, for 
the boiling liquid condition, 𝑃 ≤ 𝑃𝑠𝑎𝑡(𝑇𝐿). 
 
  
𝑇𝐿  
𝑑𝑇𝐿
𝑑𝑡
= 0 
𝑇𝑉 𝑚𝑉𝑐𝑣𝑉
𝑑𝑇𝑉
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑞𝑉 − 𝑞𝐿𝑉 − 𝑧𝑧𝜙
𝑅𝑇𝑉
𝑀𝑊
+
𝑑𝑚𝐿
𝑑𝑡
(𝑐𝑣𝑉(𝑇𝑉 − 𝑇𝐿) −
𝑅
𝑀𝑊
𝑇𝐿) + 𝑞𝑑2,𝑉 
𝑃 
𝑑𝑃
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑧𝑧
𝜌𝑉
𝑚𝑉
(
𝑃
𝜌𝐿
𝑑𝑚𝐿
𝑑𝑡
+
𝑅𝑇𝑉
𝑀𝑊
𝑑𝑚𝑉
𝑑𝑡
+
𝑅𝑚𝑉
𝑀𝑊
𝑑𝑇𝑉
𝑑𝑡
) 
𝐿 
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝑡
=
1
2𝜌𝐿𝑊√𝑅2 − (𝑅 − 𝐿)2
𝑑𝑚𝐿
𝑑𝑡
 
𝑚𝐿 
𝑑𝑚𝐿
𝑑𝑡
= −
(𝑞𝐿 + 𝑞𝐿𝑉)
𝛬
 
𝑚𝑉 
𝑑𝑚𝑉
𝑑𝑡
=
(𝑞𝐿 + 𝑞𝐿𝑉)
𝛬
− 𝜙 
𝑇15 𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠
𝑠𝑠
2
(
𝐴15𝑒𝑥𝑡 + 𝐴15𝑖𝑛𝑡
2
)
𝑑𝑇15
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴15𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑘𝑠
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝐿 − 𝑇15) − 𝑞𝐿,𝑏𝑜𝑖𝑙 
𝑇26 𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠
𝑠𝑠
2
(
𝐴26𝑒𝑥𝑡 + 𝐴26𝑖𝑛𝑡
2
)
𝑑𝑇26
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴26𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑘𝑠
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝑉 − 𝑇26) − 𝐴26𝑖𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑉(𝑇26 − 𝑇𝑉) − 𝑞𝐿,𝑟𝑎𝑑 
𝑇𝑖𝐿  
(𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑝𝑖
𝑠𝑖
2
(
𝐴𝑖𝐿̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝐴37𝑖𝑛𝑡
2
) + 𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠
𝑠𝑠
2
(
𝐴𝑖𝐿̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝐴15𝑒𝑥𝑡
2
))
𝑑𝑇𝑖𝐿
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴37𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑘𝑖
𝑠𝑖
(𝑇37 − 𝑇𝑖𝐿) − 𝐴15𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑘𝑠
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝐿 − 𝑇15) 
𝑇𝑖𝑉 
(𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑝𝑖
𝑠𝑖
2
(
𝐴𝑖𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝐴48𝑖𝑛𝑡
2
) + 𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠
𝑠𝑠
2
(
𝐴𝑖𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝐴26𝑒𝑥𝑡
2
))
𝑑𝑇𝑖𝑉
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴48𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑘𝑖
𝑠𝑖
(𝑇48 − 𝑇𝑖𝑉) − 𝐴26𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑘𝑠
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝑉 − 𝑇26) 
𝑇37 𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑝𝑖
𝑠𝑖
2
(
𝐴37𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝐴37𝑒𝑥𝑡
2
)
𝑑𝑇37
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴37𝐹𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐿 − 𝐴37𝐴𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐿 − 𝐴37𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑘𝑖
𝑠𝑖
(𝑇37 − 𝑇𝑖𝐿) 
𝑇48 𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑝𝑖
𝑠𝑖
2
(
𝐴48𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝐴48𝑒𝑥𝑡
2
)
𝑑𝑇48
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴48𝐹𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑉 − 𝐴48𝐴𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑉 − 𝐴48𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑘𝑖
𝑠𝑖
(𝑇48 − 𝑇𝑖𝑉) 
𝑇𝑑1 𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠𝐿𝑠𝑠𝐴𝑑1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑𝑇𝑑1
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝑑1𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑞𝑑3,𝑟𝑎𝑑 − 𝑞𝑑1,𝐿 
𝑇𝑑2 𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠𝑉𝑠𝑠𝐴𝑑2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑𝑇𝑑2
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝑑2𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑞𝑑4,𝑟𝑎𝑑 − 𝑞𝑑2,𝑉 
𝑇𝑑3 𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑖𝐴𝑑3̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑𝑇𝑑3
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝑑3𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡 − 𝐴𝑑1𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑞𝑑3,𝑟𝑎𝑑 
𝑇𝑑4 𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑖𝐴𝑑4̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑𝑇𝑑3
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝑑4𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡 − 𝐴𝑑2𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑞𝑑4,𝑟𝑎𝑑 
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Table A.5  – Summary of equations set of the novel RADMOD validation sub-model for 
defective coatings, for the boiling liquid condition, 𝑃 > 𝑃𝑠𝑎𝑡(𝑇𝐿). 
 
  
𝑇𝐿 𝑚𝐿𝑐𝑝𝐿
𝑑𝑇𝐿
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑞𝐿,𝑏𝑜𝑖𝑙 + 𝑞𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑑 + 𝑞𝐿𝑉 + 𝑞𝑑1,𝐿 + 𝐴𝑑5𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑞𝑑5,𝐿 
𝑇𝑉 𝑚𝑉𝑐𝑣𝑉
𝑑𝑇𝑉
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑞𝑉 − 𝑞𝐿𝑉 − 𝑧𝑧𝜙
𝑅𝑇𝑉
𝑀𝑊
+ 𝑞𝑑2,𝑉 
𝑃 
𝑑𝑃
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑧𝑧
𝜌𝑉𝑅
𝑀𝑊
𝑑𝑇𝑉
𝑑𝑡
− 𝑧𝑧 𝜙
𝜌𝑉𝑅𝑇𝑉
𝑚𝑉𝑀𝑊
 
𝐿 
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝑡
= 0 
𝑚𝐿 
𝑑𝑚𝐿
𝑑𝑡
= 0 
𝑚𝑉 
𝑑𝑚𝑉
𝑑𝑡
= −𝜙 
𝑇15 𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠
𝑠𝑠
2
(
𝐴15𝑒𝑥𝑡 + 𝐴15𝑖𝑛𝑡
2
)
𝑑𝑇15
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴15𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑘𝑠
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝐿 − 𝑇15) − 𝑞𝐿,𝑏𝑜𝑖𝑙 
𝑇26 𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠
𝑠𝑠
2
(
𝐴26𝑒𝑥𝑡 + 𝐴26𝑖𝑛𝑡
2
)
𝑑𝑇26
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴26𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑘𝑠
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝑉 − 𝑇26) − 𝐴26𝑖𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑉(𝑇26 − 𝑇𝑉) − 𝑞𝐿,𝑟𝑎𝑑 
𝑇𝑖𝐿 
(𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑝𝑖
𝑠𝑖
2
(
𝐴𝑖𝐿̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝐴37𝑖𝑛𝑡
2
) + 𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠
𝑠𝑠
2
(
𝐴𝑖𝐿̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝐴15𝑒𝑥𝑡
2
))
𝑑𝑇𝑖𝐿
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴37𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑘𝑖
𝑠𝑖
(𝑇37 − 𝑇𝑖𝐿) − 𝐴15𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑘𝑠
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝐿 − 𝑇15) 
𝑇𝑖𝑉 
(𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑝𝑖
𝑠𝑖
2
(
𝐴𝑖𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝐴48𝑖𝑛𝑡
2
) + 𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠
𝑠𝑠
2
(
𝐴𝑖𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝐴26𝑒𝑥𝑡
2
))
𝑑𝑇𝑖𝑉
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴48𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑘𝑖
𝑠𝑖
(𝑇48 − 𝑇𝑖𝑉) − 𝐴26𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑘𝑠
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝑉 − 𝑇26) 
𝑇37 𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑝𝑖
𝑠𝑖
2
(
𝐴37𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝐴37𝑒𝑥𝑡
2
)
𝑑𝑇37
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴37𝐹𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐿 − 𝐴37𝐴𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐿 − 𝐴37𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑘𝑖
𝑠𝑖
(𝑇37 − 𝑇𝑖𝐿) 
𝑇48 𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑝𝑖
𝑠𝑖
2
(
𝐴48𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝐴48𝑒𝑥𝑡
2
)
𝑑𝑇48
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴48𝐹𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑉 − 𝐴48𝐴𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑉 − 𝐴48𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑘𝑖
𝑠𝑖
(𝑇48 − 𝑇𝑖𝑉) 
𝑇𝑑1 𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠𝐿𝑠𝑠𝐴𝑑1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑𝑇𝑑1
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝑑1𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑞𝑑3,𝑟𝑎𝑑 − 𝑞𝑑1,𝐿−𝐴𝑑1𝑑5𝑞𝑑1,𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 
𝑇𝑑2 𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠𝑉𝑠𝑠𝐴𝑑2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑𝑇𝑑2
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝑑2𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑞𝑑4,𝑟𝑎𝑑 − 𝑞𝑑2,𝑉 − 𝐴𝑑2𝑑5𝑞𝑑2,𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 
𝑇𝑑3 𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑖𝐴𝑑3̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑𝑇𝑑3
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝑑3𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡 − 𝐴𝑑1𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑞𝑑3,𝑟𝑎𝑑 
𝑇𝑑4 𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑖𝐴𝑑4̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑𝑇𝑑3
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝑑4𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡 − 𝐴𝑑4𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐼𝑎𝑚𝑏 − 𝐴𝑑2𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑞𝑑4,𝑟𝑎𝑑−𝐴𝑑4𝑑6𝑞𝑑4,𝑟𝑎𝑑 
𝑇𝑑5 𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠𝐿𝑠𝑠𝐴𝑑5̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑𝑇𝑑5
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝑑5𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑞𝑑6,𝑟𝑎𝑑 + 𝐴𝑑2𝑑5𝑞𝑑2,𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 − 𝐴𝑑5𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑞𝑑5,𝐿 + 𝐴𝑑1𝑑5𝑞𝑑1,𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 
𝑇𝑑6 𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑖𝐴𝑑6̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑𝑇𝑑6
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝑑4𝑑6𝑞𝑑4,𝑟𝑎𝑑 − 𝐴𝑑5𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑞𝑑6,𝑟𝑎𝑑 − 𝐴𝑑6𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐼𝑎𝑚𝑏 
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Table A.6 – Summary of equations set of the novel RADMOD validation sub-model for 
defective coatings, for the boiling liquid condition, 𝑃 ≤ 𝑃𝑠𝑎𝑡(𝑇𝐿). 
 
  
𝑇𝐿 
𝑑𝑇𝐿
𝑑𝑡
= 0 
𝑇𝑉 𝑚𝑉𝑐𝑣𝑉
𝑑𝑇𝑉
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑞𝑉 − 𝑞𝐿𝑉 − 𝑧𝑧𝜙
𝑅𝑇𝑉
𝑀𝑊
+
𝑑𝑚𝐿
𝑑𝑡
(𝑐𝑣𝑉(𝑇𝑉 − 𝑇𝐿) −
𝑅
𝑀𝑊
𝑇𝐿) + 𝑞𝑑2,𝑉 
𝑃 
𝑑𝑃
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑧𝑧
𝜌𝑉
𝑚𝑉
(
𝑃
𝜌𝐿
𝑑𝑚𝐿
𝑑𝑡
+
𝑅𝑇𝑉
𝑀𝑊
𝑑𝑚𝑉
𝑑𝑡
+
𝑅𝑚𝑉
𝑀𝑊
𝑑𝑇𝑉
𝑑𝑡
) 
𝐿 
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝑡
=
1
2𝜌𝐿𝑊√𝑅2 − (𝑅 − 𝐿)2
𝑑𝑚𝐿
𝑑𝑡
 
𝑚𝐿 
𝑑𝑚𝐿
𝑑𝑡
= −
(𝑞𝐿 + 𝑞𝐿𝑉)
𝛬
 
𝑚𝑉 
𝑑𝑚𝑉
𝑑𝑡
=
(𝑞𝐿 + 𝑞𝐿𝑉)
𝛬
− 𝜙 
𝑇15 𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠
𝑠𝑠
2
(
𝐴15𝑒𝑥𝑡 + 𝐴15𝑖𝑛𝑡
2
)
𝑑𝑇15
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴15𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑘𝑠
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝐿 − 𝑇15) − 𝑞𝐿,𝑏𝑜𝑖𝑙 
𝑇26 𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠
𝑠𝑠
2
(
𝐴26𝑒𝑥𝑡 + 𝐴26𝑖𝑛𝑡
2
)
𝑑𝑇26
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴26𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑘𝑠
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝑉 − 𝑇26) − 𝐴26𝑖𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑉(𝑇26 − 𝑇𝑉) − 𝑞𝐿,𝑟𝑎𝑑 
𝑇𝑖𝐿 
(𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑝𝑖
𝑠𝑖
2
(
𝐴𝑖𝐿̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝐴37𝑖𝑛𝑡
2
) + 𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠
𝑠𝑠
2
(
𝐴𝑖𝐿̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝐴15𝑒𝑥𝑡
2
))
𝑑𝑇𝑖𝐿
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴37𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑘𝑖
𝑠𝑖
(𝑇37 − 𝑇𝑖𝐿) − 𝐴15𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑘𝑠
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝐿 − 𝑇15) 
𝑇𝑖𝑉 
(𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑝𝑖
𝑠𝑖
2
(
𝐴𝑖𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝐴48𝑖𝑛𝑡
2
) + 𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠
𝑠𝑠
2
(
𝐴𝑖𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝐴26𝑒𝑥𝑡
2
))
𝑑𝑇𝑖𝑉
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴48𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑘𝑖
𝑠𝑖
(𝑇48 − 𝑇𝑖𝑉) − 𝐴26𝑒𝑥𝑡
𝑘𝑠
𝑠𝑠
(𝑇𝑖𝑉 − 𝑇26) 
𝑇37 𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑝𝑖
𝑠𝑖
2
(
𝐴37𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝐴37𝑒𝑥𝑡
2
)
𝑑𝑇37
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴37𝐹𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐿 − 𝐴37𝐴𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐿 − 𝐴37𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑘𝑖
𝑠𝑖
(𝑇37 − 𝑇𝑖𝐿) 
𝑇48 𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑝𝑖
𝑠𝑖
2
(
𝐴48𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝐴48𝑒𝑥𝑡
2
)
𝑑𝑇48
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴48𝐹𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑉 − 𝐴48𝐴𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑉 − 𝐴48𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑘𝑖
𝑠𝑖
(𝑇48 − 𝑇𝑖𝑉) 
𝑇𝑑1 𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠𝐿𝑠𝑠𝐴𝑑1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑𝑇𝑑1
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝑑1𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑞𝑑3,𝑟𝑎𝑑 − 𝑞𝑑1,𝐿−𝐴𝑑1𝑑5𝑞𝑑1,𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 
𝑇𝑑2 𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠𝑉𝑠𝑠𝐴𝑑2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑𝑇𝑑2
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝑑2𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑞𝑑4,𝑟𝑎𝑑 − 𝑞𝑑2,𝑉 − 𝐴𝑑2𝑑5𝑞𝑑2,𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 
𝑇𝑑3 𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑖𝐴𝑑3̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑𝑇𝑑3
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝑑3𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡 − 𝐴𝑑1𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑞𝑑3,𝑟𝑎𝑑 
𝑇𝑑4 𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑖𝐴𝑑4̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑𝑇𝑑3
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝑑4𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐼𝑒𝑥𝑡 − 𝐴𝑑4𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐼𝑎𝑚𝑏 − 𝐴𝑑2𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑞𝑑4,𝑟𝑎𝑑 − 𝐴𝑑4𝑑6𝑞𝑑4,𝑟𝑎𝑑 
𝑇𝑑5 𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑠𝐿𝑠𝑠𝐴𝑑5̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑𝑇𝑑5
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝑑5𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑞𝑑6,𝑟𝑎𝑑 + 𝐴𝑑2𝑑5𝑞𝑑2,𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 − 𝐴𝑑5𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑞𝑑5,𝐿 + 𝐴𝑑1𝑑5𝑞𝑑1,𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 
𝑇𝑑6 𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑖𝐴𝑑6̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑𝑇𝑑6
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝑑4𝑑6𝑞𝑑4,𝑟𝑎𝑑 − 𝐴𝑑5𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑞𝑑6,𝑟𝑎𝑑 − 𝐴𝑑6𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐼𝑎𝑚𝑏 
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